US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
6-1-2015

The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and
Afghanistan: Why the ANSF Will Not Hold, and the Implications for
the U.S. Army in Afghanistan
M. Chris Mason Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
M. Chris Mason Dr., The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the ANSF
Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan ( US Army War College Press, 2015),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/10

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The Strategic Lessons
Unlearned from Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan:
Why the Afghan National
Security Forces Will Not Hold,
and the Implications for the
U.S. Army in Afghanistan

M. Chris Mason

UNITED STATES
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

Carlisle Barracks, PA

and

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP and
DEVELOPMENT

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
contributes to the education of world class senior
leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides
solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.

U.S. Army War College

SLDR

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program
supports the United States Army War College’s lines of
effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being
education and support by developing self-awareness
through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
i

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press
THE STRATEGIC LESSONS UNLEARNED
FROM VIETNAM, IRAQ,
AND AFGHANISTAN:
Why the Afghan National Security Forces
Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S.
Army in Afghanistan

M. Chris Mason
June 2015
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

iii

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may
also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted
or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate
credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-683-2

iv

CONTENTS
Foreword ……………………………………….........vii
About the Author.........................................................ix
Introduction ……………………...................................1
Part I: Why the Afghan National
Security Forces Cannot Hold, and
the Implications for the
U.S. Army in Afghanistan ..................................… 5
Summary ………………………………………........…5
Relative Geographical and Force Sizes …..………..11
Comparison of the Ground Forces ….…………......16
Comparison of the Air Forces ……………….......…21
Comparison of the Paramilitary Police Forces........26
Comparison of the Irregular Forces ….................…41
Strategic Impact of Irregulars …………………....... 48
Military Conclusions Regarding
Comparable Force Sizes ..........................................50
Close Air Support: The Sine Qua Non of
Afghan National Security Forces Survival .......... 52
The Unending Civil War …………………............... 57
Attrition: The Force Killer …………….................… 69
The Ethnic Time Bomb ……………………….......…77
The Elephant in the Room …………………….........85
Countervailing Arguments ……...........................…88
Part II. Afghanistan Year-by-Year 2015-19..........129
Motivation: Why the Afghan National
Army will Collapse in the South ……....................129
Where Does Motivation Come From?
The Critical Legitimacy Factor …........................... 140
The Fallacy of “Nation-Building”.……….............. 147

v

The Future of Afghanistan by Year
from 2015 to 2019.................................................... 156
Part III. The Strategic Lessons Unlearned
from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan ……….. 175
Impediments to Strategic Judgment ….................. 175
Guidelines for Future Wars …………..............…...186
Conclusions ……………………………................... 190
Appendix I: Central Intelligence Agency
Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency …………..211
Appendix II: Relative Combat Power:
Wargaming Beyond One-to-One ……….........…219

vi

FOREWORD
Military personnel who have experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam, as well as senior leaders
and military historians alike, will find this book by
Dr. Chris Mason thought-provoking and useful. Dr.
Mason examines indigenous personnel issues at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and
uses empirical data and exhaustive research to argue
that all three wars were lost before the first shots were
fired—not on the battlefield, but at the strategic level
of war.
The United States interpreted all three conflicts as
insurgencies, Mason writes, when in fact all three were
civil wars in which the United States took a side. Success was never possible from the outset, his provocative thesis argues, because none of the three countries
were nations for which the majority of their citizens
were willing to fight and die. Nation-building is a
slow, evolutionary, internal process through which
the political identity of the peoples within a country’s
borders matures over centuries to transcend tribalism,
secularism, and ethnic divides, Mason argues, until
it reaches a pervasive sense of nationhood. “Nationbuilding,” and democracy-importation on the point of
foreign bayonets, this book maintains, is impossible.
Throughout this book, Mason continually examines the issues from new perspectives and introduces
new tactical, operational, and strategic paradigms.
His explication in Part II of what will happen in Afghanistan year-by-year from 2015 to 2019 unless
major changes occur in theater is bold, captivating,
stark—and credible. The contributions to operational
wargaming in Afghanistan in Appendix II alone make
this publication a must-read. His comparative statis-
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tical and qualitative analyses of the Afghan National
Security Forces today, and those in Vietnam and Iraq
at their respective points of collapse, are no less eyeopening and thought provoking. His examination of
the bureaucratic and psychological obstacles to policymaking and objective strategic analysis in Part III
should be absorbed by every military officer in the
United States.
In short, this is a provocative, highly readable, and
wide-ranging analysis of the future of Afghanistan
and the future of land warfare. Not everyone will like
or agree with his conclusions, but they are a valuable
contribution to understanding the conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—and those the U.S. Army
may fight in the future—in an important new way.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press

viii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
M. CHRIS MASON joined the faculty at the Strategic
Studies Institute as a Professor of National Security
Affairs in June 2014. He has worked in and on Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Dr. Mason retired from
the Foreign Service in 2005 and worked as the South
Asia desk officer for the Marine Corps’ Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Language for several
years, where he wrote the Marine Corps deployer’s
guide to Afghan culture and the guide to Operational
Pashtunwali. He has deployed to and traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan numerous times, beginning in
December 2001, serving as the political officer on the
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Paktika in 2005.
Dr. Mason authored the first paper in the U.S. Government on the Afghan National Army (ANA) in October 2001, and worked for 5 years on ANA, Afghan
National Police and other security issues as the representative of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs
to the Afghan Interagency Operations Group. From
1981 to 1986, he served as a regular U.S. Navy Officer
on active duty, including tours as the Gunnery Officer on the USS John Young (DD973) and a Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer with 2d Battalion 12th Marines in
Okinawa, Japan, and 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison
Company (ANGLICO [Airborne]) at Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina. Dr. Mason was a Peace Corps Volunteer in rural development in South America from
1977 to 1979. Dr. Mason trained tens of thousands of
deploying American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military personnel on military and cultural
aspects of the war in Afghanistan, and has published
widely on Afghanistan and Pakistan in numerous
publications over the past 10 years. Dr. Mason holds

ix

a bachelor’s degree with Honors from Carnegie Mellon University; graduated with Distinction from the
resident Command and General Staff College course
at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA; holds
a masters degree in military studies from the Marine Corps University, and a Ph.D. in military and
Central Asian history from The George Washington
University, Washington, DC.

x

INTRODUCTION
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it.
		

George Santayana1

Anyone wanting to commit American ground forces to the mainland of Asia should have his head
examined.
		

Douglas MacArthur, 19612

Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia
or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head
examined.
		

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 20113

The wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were
all fought after General Douglas MacArthur’s admonition in 1961 to President John Kennedy not to commit land forces to a war in Asia. Three times in 40
years, the United States committed large numbers of
U.S. ground forces to land wars in Asia anyway and
lost all three of them, not on the battlefield, but at the
strategic level of war. As of December 2014, 65,069
Americans have died in those wars. So far, no one has
had their head examined. This book seeks to conduct
that examination on a national strategic level, and
to lay out for senior military leaders the explicit lessons of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan that remain
unlearned and which would have prevented every
single one of those deaths.
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This book is written in three parts. It builds from
the tactical to the operational to the strategic level of
war. The purpose of Part I is to explain why the security forces of Afghanistan cannot hold back the Taliban
in the southern half of the country based on analysis
using comparisons with the military and political situations at the time of the U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Iraq. Part II will examine, at the operational
level of war, what will happen in Afghanistan yearby-year over the next 5 years (from 2015 to 2019), the
concept of “nation-building,” and the resulting operational lessons from the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Part III synthesizes Parts I and II, examines
obstacles to strategic judgment when faced with this
kind of information, and provides a strategic guide
for evaluating all international military engagements
from the point of view of land warfare. These strategic
lessons from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan should
form the foundation of consideration and strategic
thought for all future potential land warfare.
From the American perspective, all three conflicts
were counterinsurgencies, but this is not a book about
counterinsurgency, or to what extent the future Army
should train and be equipped for counterinsurgency,
or even if counterinsurgency doctrine itself is sound.
Counterinsurgency works if the people living inside
the insurgency want it to work, and it fails if they do
not. Foreigners can build architecture, but they cannot
build a nation. Extensive empirical data shows conclusively that there was no increase in local community support for the Afghan government, for example,
after the delivery of schools, roads, clinics, and so on,
by the counterinsurgents.4 We built it, and they did
not come. Furthermore, this data was available before the tactic of “clear, hold, and build” was widely
implemented at enormous cost in blood and treasure.
2

The intent of this book is not to criticize at any level
the military participants in these conflicts. With rare
exceptions, the U.S. military fought honorably and capably in all three conflicts and achieved outcomes in
each case that were, in grand strategic terms, about
the best that could have been achieved. No disrespect
to the men and women who went overseas and did
the best jobs they could in complex environments under difficult conditions should be inferred in the pages
that follow. There are no counterhistorical arguments
about how these conflicts might have been better conducted with different tactics, operations, and strategies, if indeed there were any strategies, or any hypothetical alternative outcomes.
There are also neither impracticable “recommendations” for how to fix Afghanistan with the vague, and
grandiose “musts” and “shoulds” that usually accompany analyses of this type, nor any trivial rearranging of deck chairs such as twiddling on the margins of
force size and so on. Americans are a practical people
restlessly in search of solutions, but some problems
have no solutions, and Afghanistan is one of them.
There are no silver bullets, and anything that could
help salvage the situation is politically impossible.
American officers are trained to find a way to win, but
sometimes forces beyond the battlefield make negative outcomes inevitable. Instead, the intent of this
book is to break up the ice of conventional thinking,
which has calcified the discussion of these issues into
such predictable patterns, and to demonstrate that the
outcomes in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were, in
fact, predetermined by immutable political and cultural imperatives before the first shots were fired. This
book will show that these tragedies were avoidable,
and will define these immutable political and cultural
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imperatives as strategic litmus tests for the security
policy apparatus of the United States. They are especially critical to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of their
processes for determining when, where, and how to
engage U.S. military power.
ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION
1. George Santayana, “The Life of Reason, or the Phases of
Human Progress,” Vol. I, Reason in Common Sense, New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920, p. 284.
2. James Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and
Why It Matters, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008, p. 102.
3. “Gates’s Warning: Avoid Land War in Asia, Middle East,
and Africa,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 2011,
available from www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0226/Gatess-warning-Avoid-land-war-in-Asia-Middle-East-and-Africa.
4. Dr. Jennifer Brick, “The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan,” Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008.
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PART I:
WHY THE AFGHAN NATIONAL
SECURITY FORCES CANNOT HOLD, AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
IN AFGHANISTAN
SUMMARY
All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed.
Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as
being self-evident.
		
Arthur Schopenhauer1

A new paper, article, or book seemingly appears
almost daily about the future of Afghanistan, generally ruminating on “ifs” and “unknowns” before
concluding that the outcome remains “uncertain.” In
fact, the outcome in Afghanistan and the events of the
next 5 years are not difficult to foresee, and there is
not really any realistic doubt about this outcome. Everything else is whistling past the strategic graveyard
and magical thinking.2 The conclusions drawn here
are entirely in accord with the consensus of the U.S.
intelligence community, as set out in the unclassified
portions of a series of National Intelligence Estimates
(NIEs) released to the public.3 Indeed, this book is derived entirely from unclassified and publicly available
documents and information sources, together with the
author’s interviews and conversations in unclassified
public fora. Readers should bear in mind that the most
pessimistic and negative information, such as districtby-district intelligence assessments of Taliban control
in Afghanistan, are classified, and this book contains
only information from the more optimistic sphere
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of public information. Nevertheless, some military
readers of this book may still experience cognitive
dissonance, so deeply has the ethos of optimism been
ingrained in the culture of the military.
This is most often visible in the friction between
the intelligence community and the military. The track
record of intelligence assessments on Afghanistan
being condemned by senior military leaders as being “too pessimistic,” only to be proven to have been
too optimistic, is a long one, but it has not changed
the pattern.4 In the past, Central Command (CENTCOM) leaders even went to the extraordinary step of
demanding a military rebuttal to the pessimistic conclusions of Afghanistan NIEs.5 The overall pattern for
almost a decade has been that the intelligence community creates an NIE, the NIE is condemned by the
military (which does not have a statutory role outside
of the Defense Intelligence Agency in intelligence production and coordination), and the assessment proves
to have been correct (or even understated).6 When the
next NIE is produced, the process is repeated. Nor is
this new. The exact same thing happened during the
Vietnam War. Indeed, this is just another of the extraordinary number of parallels between the wars in
Afghanistan and Vietnam.7 Sociologists and psychologists refer to this as the “backfire effect,” or in clinical
terms, the confirmation bias,8 which is the odd but human tendency to interpret contradictory new evidence
as confirmation of one’s existing beliefs rather than
as a reason to change them. Part III of this book will
briefly examine the confirmation bias, why the U.S.
military establishment is so frequently at odds with
the intelligence community, and why there remains a
disturbing tendency to downplay the consensus of our
best intelligence analysts in favor of more optimistic
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military projections of capabilities and future events
to the overall detriment of national security policy.
Regarding the future of Afghanistan, in blunt
terms, the United States has been down this road at
the strategic level twice before, in Vietnam and Iraq,
and there is no viable rationale for why the results will
be any different in Afghanistan. South Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan are, or were, very different countries.
Yet, at the strategic level of war, all three have critical
commonalities, and these yield strategic lessons that
remain unlearned. First and foremost, all three countries were artificial colonial relics with no pervasive
sense of national identity. South Vietnam was the bastard stepchild of colonial French Indochina, the result
of an inept post-war French effort to regain its colonies
in Southeast Asia with ill-considered and ill-advised
U.S. financial and logistical support.9 Afghanistan was
an unruly outlier of many empires when Central Asia
was the heart of the world and cursed to be, in historian Arnold Toynbee’s words, “the Eastern crossroads
of history.”10 Its present cartographic form results from
the desire to create a buffer of wilderness between the
18th and 19th century Russian and British empires.11
Whether this 19th century European construct should
be preserved at the cost of thousands of lives simply
for the sake of preserving it goes unasked.
Iraq is another colonial relic (or was, as there seems
little realistic possibility of it being reestablished de
facto within its 1922/2005 de jure boundaries), concocted in a British imperial “absence of mind.”12 Its
borders were randomly drawn in straight lines across
the old Ottoman Empire by Gertrude Bell in 1918 and
affirmed by the Treaty of Mohammara in 1922.13 Indeed, imperial mapmakers like Bell created such lines
all over Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia largely
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along geographical features or simply with a straight
edge, with little regard for religious, tribal, linguistic,
or ethnic realities on the ground. Slowly, these imperial maps are being redrawn from within, in places like
Bangladesh, Sudan, Eritrea, East Timor, the former
Yugoslavia, and Iraq, accompanied by bloodshed and
stubbornly resisted as long as possible as a matter of
principle by diplomats of the status quo at the United
Nations (UN) and the State Department. The questions of whether places like Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan
are actually ever going to be viable as nations at all,
and should even be single countries are never asked
when discussions of using military force arise. For
whatever reason, foreign policy, and therefore military policy, always proceeds from the unquestioned
assumption that failed and failing countries should be
kept together as countries at all costs, even though unsustainable and unworkable borders usually lie at the
core of their failure.
Second, all three conflicts were civil wars. This is
another startling commonality of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In words that echo of
Iraq and Afghanistan, Vietnam historian Jeffrey
Record notes:
By refusing to recognize or admit that the Vietnam War
was from its inception primarily a civil war, and not part
of a larger, centrally-directed international conspiracy,
policymakers assumed that North Vietnam was, like the
United States, waging a limited war, and therefore that it
would be prepared to settle for something less than total
victory (especially if confronted by military stalemate on
the ground in the South and the threat of aerial bombardment of the North). In so making this assumption, policymakers not only ignored two millennia of Vietnamese
history, but also excused themselves from confronting
the harsh truth that civil wars are, for their indigenous
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participants, total wars, and that no foreign participant
in someone else’s civil war can possibly have as great a
stake in the conflict’s outcome—and attendant willingness to sacrifice—as do the indigenous parties involved.14

Of the three countries under consideration in
this book, South Vietnam came the closest to having
a workable ethnic majority, but religious and socioeconomic divides created insurmountable obstacles to
national unity, and ultimately to a meaningful sense
of nationhood. None of three had ever been a democracy or came close to developing the social values that
underpin western democracy. In each case, the United States attempted to impose one anyway. In each
one, the U.S. Army (primarily) attempted to create a
standing army in the exact model of the U.S. Army
itself, which would be responsible for maintaining in
power a U.S.-created system of government. All three
of these governments were proclaimed “legitimate”
based on the trappings of elections, despite elections
having never been a source of legitimacy of governance in any of them before. In each case, the enemies
of the U.S.-created governments and their militaries
were able to marshal, train, equip, and find sanctuary
across a border with a territorial neighbor—Cambodia and North Vietnam in the case of South Vietnam,
Syria in the case of Iraq, and Pakistan in the case of
Afghanistan.
Thus at the strategic level, the military outcome in
Afghanistan is not seriously in question, as there is no
strategic basis for it to be different than the outcomes
in South Vietnam and Iraq, no matter how much
whistling past the strategic graveyard proceeds it. The
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
Police (ANP) cannot maintain security in the southern
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part of the country after the departure of American
forces: Indeed, they are not entirely doing so today.
Even while American air power is still available and
being applied robustly, at least five Afghan districts
have no government presence, and many ANA garrisons in the south and east are already surrounded like
little Alamos. Many of these base-bound garrisons are
struggling simply to obtain food and ammunition,
and they rarely venture outside their perimeters. An
hour’s drive from Kabul, in Tagab district of Kapisa
Province, for example, the soldiers of the ANA garrison are permitted by the Taliban to leave their base for
1 hour each day, to go to the bazaar to buy their food,
as long as they carry no weapons.15 On December 2,
2014, with the help of an ANA defector from the post,
the Taliban attacked the ANA outpost Bala Murghab
district of Badghis Province16 almost within sight of the
Turkmenistan border and killed the entire garrison of
six soldiers.17 On November 29, 2014, the Taliban overran the ANA garrison in Sangin, Helmand Province,
killing 14 ANA soldiers. Another six or seven soldiers
were missing in action.18 The real government in these
districts and many, many others today is the Taliban.
Momentum is not on the side of the Afghan government, and there is no perceivable “game changer” on
the horizon. Slow decay is inevitable, and state failure
is a matter of time. Using the metrics in the Central
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) unclassified “Guide to the
Analysis of Insurgency”19 and publicly available statistics, it is clear that Afghanistan is in the “final stages
of a successful insurgency,” (see Appendix I).
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Map I-1. Afghanistan.
To assess first the inevitability of state security failure in southern Afghanistan in strictly military terms,
a brief summary of the comparative strengths of the
security forces of South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan will provide a useful point of departure.
RELATIVE GEOGRAPHICAL AND FORCE SIZES
South Vietnam: 67,108 square miles
Population (1975): 19.6 million20
Paramilitary:21 Police, 102,000
		
Police Field Force, 20,200
Total Paramilitary Police: 122,200
	Other Paramilitary Forces not reporting to the
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN):
		People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF),
1,000,00022 (after 1968)
		Revolutionary Development Cadre
(RDC), 54,500 (Including Son Thong
RDC)
		
Provincial Reconnaissance Units, 6,000
		
Kit Carson Scouts, 2,916
11

		
Armed Propaganda Teams, 5,550
	Total Paramilitary Forces: 1,068,966 = 15.9
militia forces per square mile
Military:23
	Army: 710,000 regulars = 10.58 soldiers per
square mile
		Army: 510,000 Irregulars (Regional Forces and Provincial Forces, organized into
1,500 companies and 8,186 platoons24)
	
Navy: 57,000 (Including the 15,000 man
Vietnamese Marine Corps)
Air Force: 63,000
	Total Military Forces: 1,340,000 = 20 soldiers
per square mile
 ecurity Force Total: 2,531,116 men, 37.71 per sq.
S
mile, 129.14 per 1,000 citizens
Percentage of Security Forces comprised by Paramilitary Police: 12.5.
Note: All Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)
were transferred into the Border Ranger Battalions of
the ARVN in 1970.
Afghanistan: 251,827 square miles (Regional Command [RC] South and RC Southwest:
77,869 square miles25)
Population (2014): 28.3 million26
Paramilitary: Regular Police, 157,000
	Irregular Police, 24,000 (Afghan local police or
ALP)27
	Public Protection Force (Afghan Public Protection Force or APPF)28 20,000
	Total Paramilitary Forces: 201,000 = 0.8 per
square mile
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	Military: Army 156,000 regulars in 6 Corps =
0.62 soldiers per square mile29
(The ANA has no reserve or irregular forces associated with it.)
 ecurity Force Total: 358,000 men, 1.4 per sq. mile
S
12.8 per 1,000 citizens
Percentage of Security Forces comprised by Paramilitary Police: 56.
Note: The National Directorate of Security (NDS), the
successor to the Soviet Khadamat-e Aetela’at-e Dawlati
(KHAD) secret police, maintains armed security personnel in each province, possibly totaling 5,000 to
7,000 fighters. The Army number includes the 6,000
men (and approximately 20 women) of the Afghan
National Air Force.
Iraq: 169,234 square miles
Population (2014): 34.8 million30
	Police +/- 25,000: 1 policeman for every 6.8
square miles
	Army active duty: 283,000 men in 197 combat
battalions
Army reserves: 528,500 men
 ecurity Force Total: 836,500 men, 4.9 per sq. mile
S
24.0 per 1,000 citizens
Percentage of Security Forces comprised by Paramilitary Police: 3.
Note: The 2014 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
offensive struck with such rapidity that effectively
none of the reserve forces were mobilized before the
collapse of the Iraqi Army. Thus, it could be more ac-
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curate to assess that there were 308,000 armed security
providers, or 1.82 per square mile.
From this statistical comparison, it can be readily
seen that of the three countries, in strictly numerical terms, Afghanistan has by far the lowest ratios
of armed government security providers per square
mile of territory (1.4) and per 1,000 citizens (12.8),
and, by an extreme margin, the highest percentage of
the state security apparatus comprised of relatively
combat-weak police forces (56 percent). The earlier
edition of Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency,
gave a force density recommendation of 25 security
forces per 1,000 citizens, and stated that “20 counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the
minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.”31
These numbers were contentious and dropped
from the new edition of the manual, and one wonders if the rationale for deleting this formula was a
result of South Vietnam having 129 security forces
per 1,000 citizens, Iraq having 24 per 1,000 citizens,
while Afghanistan has an embarrassingly low 12.8
security personnel per 1,000 citizens, more than half
of whom are static and combat-weak police. Force
size in counterinsurgency is a hotly debated topic, but
until recently, statistical analysis was not available
to back up any of the various theories and “rules of
thumb.” In 2011, however, after an exhaustive empirical study of more than 50 insurgencies using a variety
of potential metrics (e.g., number of security forces
per square mile, number of security forces per 1,000
population, number of security forces per insurgent,
etc.) Jeffrey Friedman of Harvard’s Kennedy School
concluded that:
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force size as measured by troops per inhabitant in the
area of operations demonstrates a consistent, positive
correlation with counterinsurgents’ success in both
univariate and multivariate regressions. Troop density also has an advantage over the alternative measures in terms of model fit. This suggests that troopsper-inhabitant is the best way to measure force size in
most cases.32

Comparing only army forces, the ARVN had eight
and a half times the number of regular and irregular soldiers that Afghanistan has today (1,340,000 to
157,000), in a country one-fourth the size. Their paramilitary police forces were approximately equal in total numbers, but because of South Vietnam’s smaller
area, the South Vietnamese Police had a force density
four times higher than the ANP today. South Vietnam had 1,068,966 men and women in armed militia
units, not counting 510,000 regional forces-provincial
forces (RF-PFs), who were irregulars formally part of
the ARVN. Afghanistan has, on paper, 30,000—a numerical militia advantage for South Vietnam of 35-to1, in a country one-fourth the size. For Afghanistan
to have the counterinsurgent militia strength today
that South Vietnam had per square mile in 1970, there
would have to be 4,011,362 men in the ALP. There
might be 24,000 ALP actually present.33 The Iraqi
Army, on paper, was twice the size of the ANA, excluding its reserves, with only about 60 percent as
much territory to defend. The Iraqi Police were militarily a nonentity. The following sections will now
examine qualitative factors.
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COMPARISON OF THE GROUND FORCES
Despite its glaring senior level leadership faults,
the ARVN was, in fact, a potent force. As James
Willibanks notes:
South Vietnamese combat strength included about 120
infantry battalion in 11 divisions supported by 58 artillery battalions, 19 battalion-sized armored units, and
many engineer and signal formations. By 1972, the
regular ARVN divisions were robust organizations
with modern equipment and weapons. They included
three infantry regiments of three battalions each, one
artillery regiment of three battalions, a cavalry squadron, an engineer battalion and various logistics units.
In addition to the ARVN divisions, there were 37
border ranger battalions, 21 ranger battalions and the
airborne and marine divisions. Complementing the
regular forces were the Territorial Forces that included
300,000 Regional Forces and 250,000 Popular Forces
(RF/PF) soldiers, and more than 500,000 People’s SelfDefense Forces.34

The ARVN was thus qualitatively and quantitatively
vastly superior to the ANA today. Not counting irregular forces, the ARVN not only numbered over
710,000 regular soldiers, more than four times as many
as the ANA, but it also had a country only the size
of Regional Command (RC) South and RC Southwest
in Afghanistan to defend. A majority of ARVN noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and field-grade commissioned officers fought for the French against the
Viet Minh, and many had a decade or more of experience as seasoned soldiers. This is much less true of the
ANA. In fact, a deliberate decision was made in the
Donald Rumsfeld Department of Defense (DoD) to
exclude from the ANA anyone who had ever served
in a military-type capacity before, such as former
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mujahideen, former communist Afghan Army soldiers, and members of warlord militias.35 The questionnaire for ANA recruits in 2002 (conducted orally, since
virtually all recruits were and are illiterate) included
the question “Have you ever used a rifle before?” and
potential recruits were disqualified if they answered
in the affirmative.36 The future Afghan Army was to
be idealistically comprised only of youth who were
untainted and uncorrupted by violence. In contrast,
from the outset, the ARVN fielded a large number of
battle-hardened troops. The ARVN had many excellent combat formations with hundreds of thousands
of tough, battle-tested soldiers. In 1975 there were
54 ARVN Ranger Battalions (in Vietnamese, the Biêt
Đông Quân) comprising approximately 29,365 men37
who were as good or better than the equivalent ANA
Commandos today.38 As of June 2014, the ANA has
nine commando battalions totaling approximately
10,000 men.39

South Vietnamese Rangers were as tough as anything the
Viet Cong or the NVA could put in the field. There were 54
battalions of them.

Picture I-1. South Vietnamese Rangers.
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The ARVN also had a well-developed and functional logistics system, while it is well-documented
and widely accepted that the ANA has virtually no
logistics capability.40 As the military proverb runs,
“Amateurs talk tactics and professionals talk logistics.”41 The ARVN had an abundance of tactical vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and two-and-ahalf-ton trucks; the ANA is hamstrung by vehicle and
fuel shortages. As Antonio Giustozzi notes, as much
as two-thirds of the fuel delivered to the ANA is being siphoned off by corruption, according to current
estimates.42 The Afghans’ ability to keep running the
relatively high-maintenance and high-tech vehicles
they have inherited from the United States is also
limited.43 In 2014, for example, the Afghan 205 Corps
reported that 50 percent of its vehicles were already
inoperable.44 On December 11, 2014, departing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander
Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson told the Reuters
news agency that Afghan security forces could not
perform even basic maintenance. “The problem is you
don’t have units fixing stuff at their level. This is inept.
This is nothing to do with corruption. This is purely
ineptitude.”45
The ARVN also had a full complement of communications gear, down to the platoon level, with welltrained and experienced operators and working tactical codes; the ANA has few radios and communicates
largely in the clear with cell phones.46 In a country
where, in many areas, inland waterways were the primary means of transportation, the Vietnamese Navy
had absolute brown water supremacy. The ANA, of
course, has no navy for obvious reasons, but its ability
to keep open even major arteries of the comparable
road network of Afghanistan analogous to the rivers
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and waterways of Vietnam is tenuous at best. The vital Route California in Konar Province, for example,
was severed by the Taliban for periods of up to a week
on several occasions in 2014.47
The ARVN possessed a competent and high-functioning medical corps which provided good quality
care to wounded soldiers. In Afghanistan, the 2011
ANA Dawood hospital scandal, when it was discovered that scores of emaciated ANA wounded had died
of their wounds for want of food and basic medicines—
which the ANA senior medical officer responsible was
selling on the black market—speaks for the state of the
ANA’s marginal medical capability.48 Compounding
the problem, in one of the most disgraceful episodes
of the Afghan war, U.S. military officers attempted to
cover up the scandal.49
The other major components of the ARVN were
the RF-PF. The South Vietnamese Popular Force (in
Vietnamese, nghĩa quân) (sometimes abbreviated
SVPF or just PF) consisted of local militias that protected their home villages from attacks by Viet Cong
forces and later by People’s Army of Vietnam units
(PAVN). These forces originally were called the Civil
Guard and Self-Defense Corps. The RF (Vietnamese, đįa phuông quân) were also militias formed in the
early-1960s. RF manned a country-wide system of
outposts and defended tactically vital points such as
bridges and crossroads. The đįa phuông quân defended
approximately 9,000 key terrain features, nearly half
of them in the strategically vital Mekong Delta region.
In 1964, the RF were integrated into the ARVN and
placed under the command of the Joint General Staff.
This was vastly more militarily effective than having
such militia forces under the control of the Ministry of
the Interior (MOI), as is the case in Afghanistan today.
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In 1969, with the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the RF
became increasingly important, and units began to
be attached to ARVN battalions directly, and to deploy with the ARVN outside their home provinces, a
significant force multiplier. By 1973, there were 1,810
RF companies of approximately 140 men each.50 They
fought stubbornly, but took heavy casualties. Thomas
Thayer, a former analyst in the Secretary of Defense’s
Office of Systems Analysis, estimates the RF-PFs suffered about 60 percent of the combat casualties within
the South Vietnamese security forces and inflicted
about 30 percent of enemy casualties.51 This is indicative of the fact that, like the ALP in Afghanistan, they
were intended for local defense, and like the ALP,
they were no match for the Viet Cong Main Force and
the PAVN, which are the equivalent of the Taliban today. This mismatch in Afghanistan was starkly in evidence again on December 21, 2014, for example, when
Taliban guerillas hit an ALP checkpoint in Qashtepa
district of Jowzjan province, killing at least seven ALP
militia and wounding at least five more.52
On an individual soldier level, the overall quality of ANA recruits always has been low and almost
all are from the rural areas.53 This is important because, as the Taliban gains control over more of the
rural areas, the number of potential recruits coming
from those areas will be curtailed. As Giustozzi noted
in 2013, the drive to increase ANA numbers rapidly
resulted in the weak vetting of recruits:
There has been little effort to vet recruits even in terms
of physical fitness. Physically weak, drug-addicted
and under-motivated recruits have often proved unable to withstand even the rather mild 10-week basic
training course.54
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This in part also fueled a spike in green-on-blue
attacks, which drove a wedge of mistrust between
ANA soldiers and their mentors. Interviews with
ANA recruits have consistently shown the primary
motivation to join has always been money.55 In short,
the ARVN was a large, capable, well-equipped, and
modern army that could shoot, move, communicate,
and sustain. The ANA, one-eighth the size, can barely
shoot.
As for Iraq, after Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, and
Paul Bremer made the decision to disband the entire
Iraqi Army in May 2003 following the occupation of
Baghdad,56 sending home hundreds of thousands of
trained and capable soldiers, NCOs and officers with
their weapons, there was never any real possibility of
creating a cohesive professional Iraqi Army in the political time frame available. As war correspondent David Axe notes, “Fundamentally, the fault was America’s for destroying the existing army, but there was
nothing America could do after that to build a truly
inclusive and effective new army.”57 The Iraqi Army
that was created, armed, and trained for almost a decade by the United States at a cost of some $25 billion
dollars58 disintegrated as a military force within hours
in the summer of 2014 at Mosul in the face of a few
hundred ISIS irregulars.59
COMPARISON OF THE AIR FORCES
The ARVN also had a powerful air force, the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), comprising 2,075 aircraft,
including six squadrons of F-8s, and a large force of
helicopters, including an impressive Medevac component.60 It was, at one time, the world’s fourth largest air force. Already by 1970, the VNAF was flying
over 300,000 sorties per year.61 In comparison, because
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then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld decreed in 2002
that Afghanistan would have no air force,62 the existing Afghan National Air Force (ANAF, the term used
by the Afghans themselves) languished with only a
few decrepit Soviet legacy Mi-24 Hind and Mi-17
Hipp helicopters until 2009, when the Obama administration took office.63 In 2014, the ANAF flew a total
of 7,000 sorties.64 ISAF flew 133,000, of which 34,000
were for close air support (CAS).65 In November 2014
the ANAF still had only three Soviet legacy Hind helicopters dedicated to the support of all of RC South,
including one (as of October 2014 reporting) down
for repairs.
As it stands, very few of the ANAF’s current aircraft have operational weapon systems. The ANAF
has no operational jets, and currently has no fixedwing aircraft capable of CAS. It also has no technical
or human capability for forward air control.66 A total
of 20 of the sturdy Brazilian-made Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light aircraft (essentially an operationally
mature light trainer design in search of a new market)
are planned for delivery to the ANAF from 2015 to
2018.67 The U.S. Air Force (USAF) took delivery of the
first aircraft in late-September 2014.68 This little turboprop spotter plane can be armed with two machine
guns and two rockets or bombs, and it represents
the only significant U.S. commitment to the creation
of an organic CAS capability within the ANAF. The
ANAF also operates a vague number of MD530f (high
altitude) Cayuse Warrior light observation helicopters, perhaps 10 in all, and in the fall of 2014 a $44
million contract was awarded to MD Helicopters to
install one .50 caliber (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] 12.7 x 99 millimeter [mm]) machine
gun pod with an ordnance capacity of 400 rounds
on each MD530f.69 An additional 63 well-used and
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renovated Russian Mi-17 Hipp transport helicopters,
called “flying tractors” in Afghanistan, have recently
been procured for the ANAF.70 (See Picture I-2.) In
desperation, the ANAF has begun jerry-rigging machine guns and 57-mm rocket launchers onto some
Mi-17 transport helicopters.71 The ANAF Mi-17 fleet is
widely reported to be used to transport narcotics. Two
investigations, one by the DoD and one by the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), have been conducted to
probe this criminal activity.

An ANAF Mi-17 “flying tractor” fires 57 mm rockets in training
in Kandahar. This would appear to reduce the service life of the
landing gear. (U.S. military photo)

Picture I-2. ANAF Mi-17 “Flying Tractor.”
The ability of the ANAF to maintain and fly even
this tiny fleet and to procure needed spare parts to keep
them airworthy is doubtful. In this regard, the situation has actually deteriorated significantly in the past
12 months as a result of sanctions imposed on Russia
related to events in the Ukraine. Sanctions have caused
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the suspension of procurement of spare parts for the
Russian-made aircraft operated by the ANAF,73 with
a resulting drop in readiness, a good example of how
events far from the battlefield can impact outcomes.
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) maintenance
personnel with even rudimentary literacy and mechanical abilities are hard to attract and are routinely
hired away by the higher-paying private sector.74 Afghanistan also has a fledgling Special Missions Wing
(SMW) for counternarcotics and counterterrorism
missions, which the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) found in 2013 was
unable to fly or maintain its aircraft.75 The technical
literacy gap is wide and deep. As USAF Lieutenant
Colonel Michael Veneri notes, for example, the National Officer Training Academy in Kabul was unable
to inflate any of its soccer balls because it did not have
a pump, and the expensive U.S.-provided electrical air
compressor was broken, no one knew how to fix it,
and no spare parts were available.76 Veneri saw this
lack of simple technical know-how as a metaphor for
the ANSF’s problems:
Whether weapon systems or air pumps, our technology confounds them. . . . As I surveyed the landscape
of . . . the surrounding Kabul airport, littered with detritus from the Soviets, I sensed that either they would
do without . . . or they would let things sit and rot
when they broke down. I realized that our expectations for them to understand and use our technologies
are simply set too high. . . . What we were providing
could never be maintained without significant oversight. We overlooked this requirement.77

South Vietnam and Afghanistan faced different
air threats: North Vietnam had an air force, and the
Taliban in 2014 does not, although there has been at
24

least one credible but officially unverified report by an
American military officer that Pakistani military forces
flew multiple helicopter missions to resupply Taliban
fighters inside Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province in
2007.78 (From 1996-2001, the Pakistani Air Force maintained and flew aircraft for the Taliban.79) The fact that
there were jet-to-jet dogfights between the VNAF and
the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) should not
obscure the fact, however, that the vast preponderance of South Vietnamese air power went to CAS, logistics, resupply, and medevac operations in support
of the ARVN, which were never interdicted by North
Vietnamese aircraft. The VNAF was far superior qualitatively and quantitatively to the NVAF, which until
the very end of the war in 1975 did not fly in South
Vietnamese air space.80 The main point to be observed
here is that the ARVN had a large, powerful, modern and self-sustaining air force, with 63,000 personnel, 2,075 aircraft, and 72 operational squadrons with
total freedom of operation to support ground forces
in South Vietnam with more than 300,000 sorties per
year. The ANA effectively has none at all.
The Iraqi Air Force is also a military nonentity, with
approximately 212 aircraft, virtually none of which
are modern or even armed,81 and 14,000 personnel.82
When the ISIS terrorist offensive began in June 2014,
for all intents and purposes, there was no Iraqi Air
Force.83 This contributed significantly to the collapse
of the Iraqi Army itself that summer.84 The Iraqi Air
Force has recently sourced 12 Su-25 Frogfoot attack
aircraft from Russia and ordered 36 Lockheed Martin
F-16 Block 52 jets but none of these is currently operational.85 The inclusion of this information on the Iraqi
Air Force in this paragraph seems like an afterthought,
but the Iraqi Air Force itself was an afterthought.
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COMPARISON OF THE PARAMILITARY
POLICE FORCES
For good reasons, police forces are not generally
considered to be a part of the equation in calculating
military outcomes, and those of South Vietnam and
Iraq were no exception. Police are, by definition, a
law enforcement mechanism, and one not structured,
trained, or equipped to perform as light infantry.
Their combat power is so negligible that no one has
ever invented a military tactical symbol for a police
company (see Appendix II). Third World police forces
like the ANP are illiterate and innumerate, corrupt,
lightly armed, and barely trained to maintain civil order. Their primary “security” function is to man roadblocks, search vehicles for weapons and explosives,
and act as a “tripwire” for enemy attacks, relying on
reinforcements from nearby army garrisons for support in extremis. As will be seen, the ANP fail at even
these basic tasks, and there is little cooperation with
the ANA.

Tough Police Field Force (PFF) troopers before a joint operation
with the ARVN. Note the camouflage fatigues, camouflaged helmets, and tracking dogs. The PFF used the dogs to aggressively
track insurgents and engage them. The ANSF don’t touch dogs,
believing them unclean, and rarely, if ever pursue insurgents.

Picture I-3. PFF Troops before a Joint Operation
with the ARVN.
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The police in South Vietnam, on the other hand,
included a number of capable paramilitary police
forces, including combat police with armored fighting
vehicles. Together, they comprised 12.5 percent of the
overall security forces. In Afghanistan, the paramilitary police forces, including the lightly armed ANP,
comprise 56 percent of the security forces. Historically, the police forces of South Vietnam and Iraq were
military nonentities in the collapse of those countries
in 1975 and 2014, respectively, and the same will be
true of Afghanistan.
The police forces of the Republic of [South] Vietnam included the National Police or RVNP (in Vietnamese the Cânh lúc Quôc gia Viêt Nam Công hòa),
the Rural Development Cadres, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, Kit Carson Scouts (Viet Cong defectors), and most significantly an elite, division-sized
quick-reaction police unit known as the Republic of
Vietnam National Police Field Force (in Vietnamese,
the Cãnh Sát Dã Chiên or CSDC). None of these valuable counterinsurgency units have any equivalent in
the ANP today. The CSDC was largely comprised of
tough, experienced professionals, many of whom had
been fighting communist guerillas since the days of
the French colonial regime in the 1950s. By August
1971, CSDC strength was 16,500 officers and enlisted
men organized into 44 provincial battalions with 90
companies, 242 district platoons and an independent
armored cavalry platoon.86
Overall, there were 17.75 counterinsurgent paramilitary forces (paramilitary police, PSDF, RF-PF, and
other paramilitary forces) per square mile in South
Vietnam, compared to 0.8 paramilitary forces (paramilitary police and ANP) per square mile in Afghanistan today. In other words, in every 10 square mile
area of South Vietnam, there were 177 paramilitary
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forces; in Afghanistan there are eight, an RVNP numerical advantage of over 22:1. Importantly, the entire
operational area of the RVNP was 10,000 square miles
smaller than just RC South and RC Southwest combined in Afghanistan today, permitting much faster
response times by security forces. Furthermore, man
for man, the South Vietnamese police were a better
paramilitary force than the ANP, with higher literacy
(adult literacy in South Vietnam in the 1970s was approximately 80 percent87), far more average years of
experience per patrolman, better equipment, lower attrition, better training, and better pay. Overall adult
literacy is about 25 percent in Afghanistan today.88
This means most police and paramilitary forces in
South Vietnam were literate, while few in Afghanistan
are, as a result of intense private sector competition
there for literate employees.

Because of high literacy levels in Vietnam, such leaflets could
have an effect.

Picture I-4. South Vietnamese Propaganda Leaflet.
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Attrition is a serious problem for the ANP. ANP
desertion rates are difficult to come by and even more
difficult to verify. The Congressional Research Service
reported on December 2, 2014, that ANP desertions
are “far higher than that of the ANA.”89 Giustozzi
and Mohammed Isaqzadeh note that attrition in the
spring of 2010 was running at 70 percent, dropping to
an annualized 60 percent by November.90 In Helmand
Province in 2008-09, annual ANP attrition was 57 percent, of which 45 percent was a result of desertions
and 12 percent a result of combat casualties.91 The U.S.
Institute for Peace (USIP), however, cites a figure of 25
percent.92 A reasonable hybrid estimate of police attrition through desertions, weighted for methodology
and reliability, would be about 50 percent per year.

Because annual attrition runs at 50
percent, most ANP patrolmen have
little training and little tactical skill.
There were so many accidents in
training that ANP trainees are given
wooden guns, above. Because of reliability issues, when they graduate to
real guns, they are not given bullets
(Barcroft Media/Daily Mail).

Picture I-5. Training of ANP Patrolmen.
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Police forces in all three countries were and are
plagued by uneven and politicized leadership, and by
a debilitating reputation for corruption. A report released by SIGAR on January 12, 2015, found that there
were 152,678 ANP formally on the rolls93 but twice
that many ANP identification cards are in circulation.
To put it bluntly, no one has any idea how many ANP
there actually are, and SIGAR noted that the 152,678
number is largely guesswork. In its in-person 2011 audit of ANP personnel, SIGAR found personnel numbers “ranging from 111,774 to 125,218, a discrepancy
of 13,444 personnel.”94 Personnel accountability of the
ANP has been a chronic problem since its inception.95
Some percentage of the ANP number consists of
nonexistent personnel, or “ghost policemen.” How
large is the “ghost policeman” problem? No one
knows. In 2006, 20 percent of reported ANP personnel were found to be nonexistent by the Inspectors
General for the Departments of State and Defense in
a joint report.96 In 2009, the number had risen to 30
percent, or 25,000 phantom policemen, according to
a U.S. embassy cable cited by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office.97 The embassy cable reported
that police chiefs all over Afghanistan were “creating
‘ghost policemen’” in order to collect their salaries. As
SIGAR noted:
Most recently, in August 2014, the Department of
Defense Office of Inspector General reported that the
MOI processed 4,579 potentially improper salary payments totaling $40 million due to the ministry’s lack
of procedures to identify improper payments, such as
duplicate payments. The Department of Defense Inspector General also found that MOI officials did not
follow payroll procedures and modified payroll documents after the documents had been approved and
signed.98
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If the 30 percent “ghost policeman” rate has not
improved since 2009, and in January 2014 SIGAR reported no reason to believe it has, then the ANP in
January 2015 has a total of approximately 107,000 actual personnel. In June 2014, about half of the ANP
consisted of actual enlisted “patrolmen” in the field.99
Thus a reasonable estimate of the number of ANP
actually in the field in Afghanistan today with guns
in their hands would be 53,500 men. About 27,000 of
them desert and have to be replaced each year; another 4,000 are killed in action. As a result, the average
level of training per patrolman, years of experience
per patrolman, and literacy per patrolman is very low.
Security is not simply a numbers game. It is dangerous, even intellectually dishonest, to count such
poorly armed and poorly trained paramilitary personnel as “security forces” in any but the lowest threat
security environments, such as, for example, Indian
Kashmir today. In 2013, the Taliban launched 6,604
operations, 50 suicide attacks, and 1,704 direct attacks
on police,100 killing at least 4,000 policemen.101 Approximately 2,000 police checkpoints in Afghanistan were
overrun by Taliban hit-and-run attacks in 2014. Most
of them were subsequently reestablished nearby, but
this entirely misses the point. The Taliban’s tactics are
not intended to take and hold rural checkpoints, they
are intended to inflict steady casualties on the police
and intimidate and demoralize the force. In the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, in comparison, there
were 17 attacks on security forces in 2014, causing 11
deaths.102 This is the level of insurgency at which vertically integrated policing and other paramilitary forces
are effective, not 1,700 attacks.
In a full-blown insurgency like Vietnam and Afghanistan, police add so little to the overall military
balance that their inclusion gives little more than a
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false sense of security from force numbers, which appear larger without adding any real combat capability.
The Taliban are not bicycle thieves or farmers fighting
over water rights, they are heavily armed and highly
motivated guerillas akin to the Viet Cong Main Force
and the PAVN. Indeed, in the final stages of a successful insurgency, as defined by the CIA and as Afghanistan is in now,103 the police are essentially stationary
targets providing a source of free weapons, ammunition and equipment for the guerrillas. Using the CIA’s
“Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” from the high
ANP casualty and desertion rates and the number of
direct attacks on the police this year, it is clear that
in 2014 the ANP are already in over their heads militarily in the “late stage of a successful insurgency,”104
(see Appendix I).

Taliban fighters, top (Reuters/Wahdat). Mixed
group of Viet Cong and PAVN troops, bottom.

Picture I-6. Taliban Fighters and a Mixed Group of
Viet Cong and PAVN Troops.
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The ability of the ANP to carry out sustained resistance in the face of a determined and numerically
superior enemy force in rural areas is very limited.
The ANP are, in fact, a net security negative, in the
sense that their existence contributes more overall to
insecurity than to security.
There are four basic components of this overall net
negative rating: First, their corruption alienates the local population and spurs Taliban recruiting.105 A recent
survey found the level of confidence in the ANP in the
Pashtun provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, and Paktika
was below 25 percent,106 and half of all Afghans interviewed said they had personally experienced police
corruption.107 Police corruption has been frequently
cited as one of the most common causes of popular
support and recruiting for the Taliban.108 Their corruption may well be creating more Taliban than they
are taking off the field in combat. That alone would
make them a net security negative. As the Marine
Lieutenant Colonel heading the police advisory group
in Sangin in 2013 noted, “If you shut down all their
corruption schemes, the police would cease to exist.”
He noted with obvious frustration that the local police
chief is “a murderer and child molester” who “treats
the people of Sangin as his personal piggy-bank.” The
Marine reported all of this up the chain of command,
and, reporter Ben Anderson observed, “Nothing was
ever done.” “Having to work with people like this,”
the Marine officer said, “[in order] to get the mission
done . . . kind of wears on you.”109
Second, their ubiquitous, system-wide focus on
taking bribes means little actual added security. Police
“checkpoints” (usually a rock or two in the middle of
the road) are almost universally the venue for shaking
down motorists and truck drivers for bribes. The security function of these checkpoints is routinely negated
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when 10 rupees will bypass the requirement for an
inspection of passengers and cargo. Anyone moving
insurgent leaders or materiel by car or truck simply
pays the bribe.

Above, an Afghan National Policeman taking a routine bribe from a truck driver not to inspect the cargo,
caught on a CBS News surveillance video. Below, an
ANP patrolman takes a bribe from a pedestrian not to
search him. This unversal behavior simply alienates the
people and is “security” (as in “ANSF”) in name only.

Picture I-7. ANP Patrolmen Taking Bribes
Not to Inspect Cargo or Pedestrians.
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Third, their casualties demoralize civilians inclined to support the government. The ANP are being
liquidated systematically, and the local civilian population sees this. An average of 11 ANP personnel are
killed every day as stationary targets in indefensible
fixed positions.110 For example, four policemen were
captured and later murdered in Wardak province
on January 3, 2015, by a Taliban battle group.111 On
January 4, 2015, five more were attacked and killed
by a much larger Taliban force in Baraki Barak district of Logar province.112 On January 12, 2015, the
Police Chief of Mazan district in Zabul province was
killed, along with two of his bodyguards.113 In December 2014, ANP casualties were at an all-time high.114
Almost 3,000 ANP were killed in action in 2013, and
3,500 were killed in action in the first 10 months of
2014, suggesting the 2014 year-end ANP killed in action (KIA) statistic reached 4,000.115 At least 12,000
more were wounded.116 Many ANP units in the south
and southwest and even northern Kapisa province are
engaged in combat with jihadists on an almost daily
basis.117 In fact, the insurgency has grown far beyond
anything these untrained and lightly armed constabularies can cope with.
Fourth, their passive, static nature and easily
overrun positions are a free arsenal from which the
Taliban can acquire more weapons, ammunition, and
equipment. In military terms, in a high-threat environment as Afghanistan is now, a static force focused
on defending its own positions contributes little to the
battlefield. The ANP have little mobility, very little
firepower, are dependent on the local community for
logistics, and have little or no initiative and offensive
spirit. In the Armed Forces Journal in 2012, for example,
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis reported Ameri-
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can troops in Kunar province as saying the ANP rarely leave their checkpoints.118 Following one Taliban
attack on a police checkpoint, Davis himself asked the
police commander if he regularly pursued attacking
insurgents. The ANP commander looked at him “with
an incredulous expression” then laughed and replied,
“No, we don’t go after them. That would be dangerous!”119 Counting the ANP as “ANSF” is a chimera,
and lumping them into a larger “security forces” number as equal and interchangeable units with a value of
“one” is willful self-deception (see Appendix II).
In comparison, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) numbered on paper approximately 25,000 policemen in
2007, of whom about a third were on leave at any
given time.120 The police forces in Iraq only comprised
about 3 percent of the overall security forces. At the
time of the U.S. invasion, Iraq had one of the highest
male literacy rates in the Middle East,121 and most Iraqi
policemen were literate. Iraq had no government-recognized paramilitary forces. In 2014, during the advance of the terrorist organization known as ISIS, the
IPS disintegrated within minutes wherever the two
forces came into contact, the IPS often fleeing in their
vehicles ahead of the ISIS lead elements. In an overall comparison of the capability of the police forces in
these three countries to maintain civil order in rural
areas and act as paramilitary first-responders to insurgent attacks, the RVNP ranks first by a wide margin,
followed far behind by the ANP. In the collapse of the
security forces in both Vietnam and Iraq, the Vietnamese police and the IPS were militarily insignificant.
This in particular bodes poorly for the situation in
Afghanistan, where in comparison to Iraq (3 percent)
and Vietnam (12.5 percent), the weak paramilitary police comprise 56 percent of the security providers in
the overall force (see Appendix II).
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The failure of the police to be able to match up to
the threat is another lesson unlearned from the Vietnam war. The challenges facing both police trainers
and policymakers in South Vietnam in the early-1960s
are so strikingly relevant to the situation in Afghanistan today that they bear quoting at length:
The growth of the insurgency created a dilemma for
American police advisors. As eager as they were to develop civilian law enforcement institutions, they also
recognized that lightly armed police, particularly in
the countryside, the area of the insurgency’s greatest
strength, were likely to be overwhelmed by aggressive
and disciplined communist guerilla forces. American
military critics of police-oriented counter-insurgency
strategies had argued that police and paramilitary
forces were no match for the PLAF [People’s Liberation Armed Forces]. American police advisors eventually reached the same conclusion. The Viet Cong’s
strength was apparent every time PSD [personal security detail] personnel left Saigon. Guerilla ambushes
were a routine feature of the environment in Vietnam’s hinterlands. Few civilian police were operating
in rural areas, but what few there were encountered
a communist adversary who was often better trained
and equipped. Villages controlled by the PAVN were
virtually no-go areas for Diem’s law enforcement
agencies. The Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps (SDC)
and village militias were receiving generous American
assistance to provide security for the Strategic Hamlet
Program. The paramilitary forces, however, failed to
halt communist violence in the countryside.122

The lack of cooperation between the ANP and the
ANA is a major area of security failure. The ANA
rarely acts in concert with ANP, and the antagonism
between them has sharply reduced security levels. In
late-December 2014, The New York Times quoted an
ANP patrolman named Mohammad Saleh as saying
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“The army rarely conducts joint operations with the
police, leaving [the police] to do most of the fighting.”
Another policeman added “Only the asphalt road is
under the control of the government in Sangin. Everything else is Taliban.”123 In November 2014, Stars
and Stripes reporter Josh Smith observed in Laghman
province what was supposed to be a joint ANA/ANP
operation. The ANA were firing a 122-mm Soviet artillery piece more or less at random toward a police
operation a mile or two away. Later in the day while
the police were still engaging insurgents with small
arms, the ANA packed up and went home without
telling the police.124
In some parts of the country, this lack of cooperation results in armed conflict between the ANA and
the ANP. In the summer of 2014, for example, combat
between the ANA and the ANP occurred in Helmand
province.125 The failure of the ANA and ANP to cooperate and coordinate security does not bode well for
the longevity of the security forces, and it is such a
severe problem today that it has recently received attention from both the outgoing ISAF commander and
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. In December 2014,
departing Commander of ISAF Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson noted the Ministry of Defense and the
Ministry of Interior need to figure out how to cooperate—when new Ministers are approved and sworn
into office. “Right now they don’t have the forces,”
Anderson noted, “and they don’t have the cooperation
between the entities.”126 Afghan news source TOLO
News reported on December 16, 2014, that:
in a meeting with Afghan National Army officers in
Kabul, [President Ashraf] Ghani . . . stressed there was
a lack of coordination between the Ministry of De-
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fense, Ministry of Interior, and the National Directorate of Security.127

On December 11, Anderson added: “You’ve got a
mix right now of uniform police, civil obedience police, and the army, all in the same footprint debating
over who’s got primacy for responsibility. That’s a
fundamental issue here.”128 The outgoing head of the
European Union (EU) Police Mission in Afghanistan
(EUPOL), Karl Ake Roghe, said in December 2014:
This is the main problem for Afghanistan—how they
are dividing the responsibilities for fighting the insurgency. This should be a task for the Afghan National
Army, not the police. Currently it belongs to the police
and the main part of the fight is done by the police. . . .
They are doing this totally alone, and, of course, they
are not properly equipped for this task.129

Even when the army is inclined to support the police, the ANA’s relative lack of tactical mobility and
firepower has made it difficult for the Afghan Army
to reinforce the ANP quickly. In addition, in Afghanistan, the police are armed with the AK-47 family of
rifles, firing 7.62-mm caliber ammunition; while the
ANA is now equipped with the M-16 family of rifles,
chambering 5.56-mm ammunition. As a result, the
ANA and the ANP cannot share ammunition, so that
when the ANA are called in to support ANP garrisons
or outposts under attack, if the ANA respond at all,
they cannot resupply the police with ammunition, a
tactical interoperability failure with major operational
implications.
However, in some areas, ANP performance is better than ANA performance, and they are more reliable. Two American Special Forces personnel were
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killed and another four wounded in the Tagab district
center of Kapisa Province 50 miles east of Kabul in
February 2014 by a green-on-blue attack. The area is
riddled with Taliban as The New York Times reports:130
American Special Forces soldiers who have operated
in the area describe a disciplined Taliban force that
has been able to operate freely. Its ability to issue and
execute orders is exacting, and ambushes are orchestrated with precision.131

The performance of the ANA in the district was
described as “lackluster,” and it was determined that
the ANA was so thoroughly infiltrated by the Taliban
that the decision was made to cease operations with
them and try working with the ANP garrison there
instead.132 In Tagab and elsewhere, however, the ANP
lack the firepower, manpower, and willpower to take
the fight to the enemy. The New York Times reporter
present in a skirmish in November 2014 reported that
the ANP fought a static, defensive battle:
As the firing continued and drew closer, the Afghan
forces threw everything they had at the insurgents.
They lobbed grenades, fired rockets, and emptied
clips, but never left the road . . . for the most part, they
refused to enter the valley and pursue the Taliban.133

The point to be observed here is simply that, in a
comparison of the post-U.S. departure environments
of South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan for purposes of assessing outcomes, the paramilitary forces
of South Vietnam were far superior, qualitatively and
quantitatively, to those of Afghanistan today, and they
comprised only a small fraction of the overall force. In
Afghanistan, they are more than half the force. Those
of Iraq were irrelevant.
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COMPARISON OF THE IRREGULAR FORCES
South Vietnam had a very large and comparatively
well-equipped and well-organized body of irregulars,
some of whom had embedded U.S. advisors for years
as part of the Marine Corps’ Combined Action Platoon
(CAP) program instituted by Marine General Walt in
I Corps.134 The ARVN could depend on local support
from some 510,000 RF-PFs (or “ruff-puffs” as they
were referred to in the argot of the time), and vice versa. The RF-PFs were similar in concept to the ALP now
being hastily established as a part of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) underway today in Afghanistan, but critically, in terms of their effectiveness and
sustainment, they were a part of the Ministry of Defense. In Afghanistan, these forces are illogically and
inefficiently connected to the police and the faraway
(and notoriously corrupt) MOI in Kabul, rather than
to the local ANA battalion, making close operational
cooperation with the ANA difficult or impossible. In
Vietnam, the paramilitary wiring diagram was more
logically and more efficiently vertically integrated to
the ARVN and the Ministry of Defense. In South Vietnam, both the regular army and the irregulars (such
as the ALP would be considered) were in the same
chain of command and had interoperable weapons
and communications equipment. In Afghanistan, the
ALP are expressly prohibited from participating in
offensive actions.135
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, however, the
overall number of village defense groups supported by
embedded American forces was and is limited; in Vietnam by the relatively small size of the Marine Corps’
CAP program in I Corps, and the unwillingness of the
U.S. Army to have any part of the program,136 and in
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Afghanistan by the limited number of Special Forces/
Special Operations Forces (SF/SOF) teams available.
Once again, as in 2005, current requirements in Iraq
for these “high demand, low density” forces are having an impact on the VSO effort in Afghanistan by reducing the number of SF/SOF personnel available. In
many areas of Afghanistan, the VSO teams, or “platforms,” have already “thinned up,” (i.e., moved up to
the district center level of operations from the village
level) as part of the operating concept to “shape, hold,
build, expand, and transition.”137 The CAP program
was highly successful because it was connected directly to the ARVN and the Marine Corps in I Corps.138
As Max Boot notes, “No village protected under CAP
was ever retaken by the Viet Cong.”139 The same cannot be said of the ALP.
Roughly similar levels of effort were expended in
Vietnam and Afghanistan to create such secure hamlets and, in theory, gradually expand them together
into ink blots of territory in armed opposition to the insurgents. Overall, in strategic terms, the scale of these
operations in comparison to the sizes of the countries
and the percentages of villages engaged, however,
could best be described as “experimental.” There are
approximately 60,000 villages in Afghanistan in 410
districts,140 and the VSO program is authorized to conduct operations in approximately 100 districts. The exact number of villages in the program is not publicly
available, but a design force size of 30 men per village and 300 men per district is standard.141 Given an
overall program force size of 30,000 men, a total of approximately 1,000 villages could be involved, or proportionally 10 per district in each of the approximately
100 districts authorized.142 That would correspond to
about 1/60th of all the villages in Afghanistan.
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ALP forces in Sar Hawza District of Paktika Province,
where the author served, in 2011. One elder, seven boys
and five rifles. This is what is supposed to stop the Taliban. Photo by Heidi Voight/AP.

Picture I-8. ALP Forces in Sar Hawza District.
The CAP program that supported the PSDF and
the RF-PFs was limited to the operational area of the
Marines in I Corps, the northernmost of four Corps
in South Vietnam, with regional responsibility shared
with the Army, because the Army had no interest in
the program. Instead, American SF/SOF personnel
operated with the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
(CIDG), which were converted into ARVN Border
Ranger Battalions in 1970 and hence are not considered here. The size of the Combined Action Platoon
program reached its maximum size in 1970 at four
Groups with 114 companies of approximately 100
men each spread throughout the five provinces of
I Corps.143
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As a military comparison, the RF-PFs were certainly more numerous (510,000 men), more capable, better
disciplined, and better organized than the somewhat
comparable ALP forces (maximum 30,000 men) being
created as quickly as possible in parts of southern Afghanistan. The RF-PFs inflicted about 30 percent of the
casualties suffered by the Viet Cong.144 In Afghanistan,
by January 2012, there were 57 validated districts in
which approximately 11,066 ALP operated. The MOI
subsequently approved the recruitment of 30,000 ALP
to serve in 99 of 410 districts throughout the country,145 and that goal has apparently been reached on
paper. However, public estimates of the actual size of
the ALP and the VSO program are sharply divergent.
The Long War Journal, for example, stated on March 28,
2013, that there were:
currently . . . about 70 VSO sites, and each site consists
of approximately 12 local police. The total force in Afghanistan to date is about 800 local police and is a far
cry from the proposed 10,000 sought out by President
Karzai and NATO/ISAF forces.146

It is difficult to see how it would be possible to grow
from 360 men (70 sites x 12 men each) in March 2013
or even “800 men”147 to 30,000 men 18 months later.
It should be noted that the ALP is simply the latest
in a long and muddled history of such intermittent,
half-hearted, short-lived, and unsuccessful U.S. military experiments with irregular forces unwisely connected to the MOI in Afghanistan,148 including Community-Based Security Solutions (CBSS), the Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program, Intermediate
Security for Critical Infrastructure (ISCI), the Afghan
Public Protection Program (AP3), and Local Security
Forces (LSF). The last category includes unlicensed
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private security companies, militias, and Arbakai forces still in operation as of 2012.149 Not included here are
the CIA’s notoriously renegade and above-the-law150
Counterterrorist Pursuit Teams in the Kunar region,151
the 3,500 man Khost Protection Force (KPF)152 and the
Cultural Exploitation Units (CEUs). One of the most
notorious, the Kandahar Strike Force, has been repeatedly accused of human rights violations and described
as “the most shadowy and the most unaccountable in
the country.”153 The KPF once attacked a police station
in Kandahar and killed the ANP police chief in order
to break one of their militiamen out of jail who was
awaiting trial for murder.154
These efforts have been consistently carried out
against the advice of many Afghanistan experts, who
correctly pointed out that unless these forces were incorporated into the ANA in some fashion, rather than
functioning as stand-alone “police” forces loosely
connected to the local police and thence to the distant
and infamously corrupt MOI, the ALP would soon devolve into warlord militias committing human rights
abuses, including extrajudicial killings. That is exactly
what has happened.155 “Not only do they murder,” as
Dexter Filkins notes, “they also steal, tax, and rape.”156
The Congressional Research Service notes that “the
ALP program has been cited by Human Rights Watch
and other human rights groups for killings, rapes, arbitrary detentions, and land grabs.”157 Oxfam added
child sexual abuse to the list.158 The allegations were
frequent enough that the U.S. Government was forced
to launch an investigation into the abuses and found
many of them credible.159 In May 2011, Oxfam reported that design procedures and community protections
built into the program on paper are often circumvented on the ground160 and warned of “communities
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living in fear of government-supported community
defense initiatives they see as criminal gangs.”161 As
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA) reported:
UNAMA observed weaknesses in the recruitment,
vetting, training and discipline of ALP as local communities in some areas reported ALP involvement
in criminality and serious human rights violations,
including the displacement of civilians, abduction,
physical and sexual abuse, and extortion. UNAMA
observed . . . a lack of accountability and oversight of
some ALP operations. In addition, despite procedures
for the vetting of individuals required to be conducted
by local shuras, UNAMA observed that in some areas
local power brokers influenced which individuals
were nominated and ratified as ALP members with
some individuals with documented human rights
abuses joining the ALP. In some cases, the ALP did
not appear to reflect the ethnic balance in the areas
they operated adding to tensions within communities.
In some areas, former illegal armed groups were absorbed into ALP raising concerns in local communities
that the ALP was used to legitimize such individuals
and their activities.162

On July 4, 2012, The Washington Post reported an
ALP unit of 41 men in Badghis had defected en masse
to the Taliban.163 In June 2013, another ALP unit of
six men in Panirak village of Bala Murghab district of
Badghis province also joined Taliban militants, taking their weapons and equipment with them.164 Other
ALP militias are making deals with the Taliban they
were supposed to fight. In October 2014, for example,
it was reported by the Guardian newspaper that the
ALP unit in the Gizab District of Uruzgan Province—
once specifically touted as the showpiece of the ALP
and VSO programs in Afghanistan165—has done exactly that. The Taliban has reestablished control over 80
46

percent of the district.166 In November 2014, ALP units
in Logar, Maidan, Wardak, and Ghazni provinces,
which have gone unpaid by the Afghan government
for months, were reported to be selling their weapons
and ammunition to the Taliban to feed their families.167
Like the ANP, the ALP has also been forced into
conflict beyond its design parameters and tactical abilities and is over its head. As Stars and Stripes reporter
Josh Smith notes:
The ALP was initially envisioned as a sort of national
guard that would live at home until called out, [but]
the high demands of the unending violence [have]
forced many ALP to man checkpoints and other bases
around the clock.168

Having been pushed into this battle by the VSO program, they are now marked for death by the Taliban169
and they are on their own. Haji Iqbal, an ALP commander in Dowlat Shah district of Laghman province,
says they have received no support from the Afghan
government. “Communities are paying for this themselves,” Haji Iqbal said, “and the lack of resources
means they are often outgunned by the enemy.”170 Haji
Noorani, an ALP commander in neighboring Alishang
district, agrees. “If the current situation continues, the
whole province will eventually return to the Taliban,”
Noorani said, adding, “the politicians say all is well,
but it is not true.”171
Entropy, or gradual decline into disorder, is the
second law of thermodynamics but the first law of Afghan security. It is a fact that counterinsurgency is a
dirty business, and, as many writers have noted, there
are few “good guys” in Afghanistan.172 It is also true
that guerilla warfare cannot be won by bureaucrats in
Washington fighting by the Marquis of Queensbury’s
Rules.173 But by any reasonable standard, police-based
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irregulars in Afghanistan like the ALP and their predecessors have a dismal track record in the business of
winning hearts and minds. They are a poor idea being
stubbornly pursued by American military leaders in
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) with a thimbleful of Afghan cultural knowledge, a hagiographic
view of Special Forces, and a seemingly perverse bent
to explore every possible iteration of getting irregular
forces wrong.
STRATEGIC IMPACT OF IRREGULARS
In South Vietnam and in Afghanistan and Iraq
today, there are ethnic groups, tribes, and clans that
were or are staunchly opposed to the insurgents and
that fought or are fighting desperately to prevent an
insurgent takeover of their lands, fearing in many cases genocidal retribution if they fail. In Vietnam, these
included the Hmong and the Montanyards of the highlands; in Iraq today the Kurds and the Yazidi minority
community; and in Afghanistan, they include several
disenfranchised Pashtun tribes with long-standing
antipathies to the Taliban tribes, the Shi’a Hazara ethnic group, and much of the Dari- and Uzbek-speaking
population in the northern areas.
For example, the Mashwari (or Meshwari) tribe of
Dangam district of Konar province has been “rabidly
anti-Taliban” for many years.174 According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) this animosity precedes the attacks
of September 11, 2001, in the United States.175 In lateNovember and early-December 2014, it was reported
that there was a “tribal uprising” against the Pakistani
Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP) in Dangam
district.176 The Mashwari receive military support by
being members of an ALP militia in Dangam district.
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It would be incorrect to attribute the “uprising” to a
yearning on the part of the people of Dangam district
to be free from the Taliban and to support the national government, however. In actuality, the Mashwari
are one of two major tribes in the district. The other
tribe, the Salazai, have been at war with the Mashwari
for decades, and they receive military support in exchange for loyalty and fealty to the Taliban.177 Thus
each side has forged an outside military alliance, a
common practice in the feuds of the Afghan hills. The
conflict in Dangam district is thus a tribal war, not a
government vs. insurgents war. The Mashwari do not
want to kill Taliban, they want to kill Salazai.
Historically, such irregular forces were a militarily insignificant part of South Vietnamese resistance
to invasion from the north. For the first 6 months of
the ISIS terrorist offensive in Iraq, the Kurdish militias (collectively termed the Peshmerga) struggled to
protect their own ethnic communities, and only in
mid-December 2014 began to push back into ISIS-held
territory—with the help of heavy U.S. air support.178
Most importantly, between 1996 and 2001 in Afghanistan, irregulars akin to the ALP today loosely allied under the banner of the Northern Alliance, without tactical exception, proved to be unable to defeat
the Taliban and hold their ground. From 1996 to 2001,
Northern Alliance irregulars often fought stubbornly,
but were always on the defensive, fighting holding
actions and retrograde movements. Once outside the
territory of their own clans, they often ceased fighting,
a universal characteristic of conflict in Afghanistan.179
They were ultimately betrayed by Uzbek commander
Abdul Malik Pahlawan and his Uzbek militiamen
from the Uzbek Junbish party (Junbish-e Milli-i Islami-i
Afghanistan). Ismael Khan was captured, and Abdul
Rashid Dostum escaped to Turkey. By July 2001, the
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Northern Alliance had yielded control of virtually all
of Afghanistan to the Taliban. Afghan history shows
that tribal irregulars cannot hold back, let alone reverse, the momentum of religious movements like
the Taliban.
In Iraq today, only larger and more ethnically
cohesive irregulars such as the Kurdish Peshmerga,
which received virtually no support and training from
the United States prior to 2014, constitute meaningful resistance to ISIS. The extent to which U.S. Army
training and equipment increases a fragile foreign
government’s chances of survival is debatable: the
U.S.-trained and equipped Iraqi Army collapsed in a
matter of hours during the ISIS offensive in the summer of 2014, while the Kurds, a downtrodden and persecuted minority in three countries that received no
U.S. military support prior to 2014, are putting up a
stiff resistance in Iraq and Syria today. The difference
is that the Kurds think of themselves as a nation and
are willing to fight and die for it. There is no substitute for nationhood, a concept that will be explored in
depth in Part II.
MILITARY CONCLUSIONS REGARDING
COMPARABLE FORCE SIZES
The point here is not to belabor the comparison of
the equivalent Afghan, Iraqi, and South Vietnamese
army, paramilitary, and local irregular forces. Rather,
the four key points to consider are these:
1. All of the security forces of all types of South
Vietnam and the Iraqi Army were qualitatively and
quantitatively vastly superior to those in Afghanistan
today, and both quickly collapsed for reasons that will
be discussed in Part II.
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2. All of the militia-type forces in South Vietnam
and Iraq (the Peshmerga) were far larger in size, better equipped, better mentored, and better trained than
the paramilitary ANP is today, but they did not play
any militarily significant role in the events of 1975 and
2014. The ANP, which comprises more than half the
ANSF on paper (56 percent), is already overmatched
by numerically superior and better-armed Taliban
combat groups, is taking heavy casualties as a result,
and is a net security negative (see Appendix II). Similarly, the ANP will play no militarily significant role
in the events of 2015-19. Counting them as “security
forces” is intellectually dishonest.
3. All of the security forces in South Vietnam, Iraq,
and the Northern Alliance from 1996 to 2001 were far
superior qualitatively and quantitatively in numbers
and equipment to those of the ANSF today, and all
three were roundly defeated on the battlefield.
4. The security forces of South Vietnam in 1975
outnumbered those in Afghanistan today 28-to-1 per
square mile, and 5.4-to-1 per 1,000 inhabitants. South
Vietnam lost.
In conclusion, the military, paramilitary police
forces, and irregulars in South Vietnam and Iraq
in 1975 and 2014, respectively, and in Afghanistan
from 1996-2001, were simply no match for the disciplined, mobile, highly motivated, battle-tested, and
more heavily armed troops they faced and still face
today, whether they were ISIS, the Viet Cong main
force, the PAVN, the Taliban, or the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In terms of objective analysis, there is no realistic military possibility that the
undersized and underequipped “ANSF,” lacking
CAS, logistics, and medical support, and disproportionately comprised of combat-weak police, will fare
51

better than the ARVN, the Iraqi Army, the SovietAfghan army, or the Northern Alliance.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: THE SINE QUA NON
OF AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
SURVIVAL
As has been discussed, the ANAF does not currently have any aircraft equipped to conduct CAS, the
ANA does not have a single Forward Air Controller
(FAC) trained to call for it, and the only capability currently in the pipeline for the ANAF is 20 light A-29
Super Tucano trainers adapted to carry an ordnance
load-out of two wing-mounted machine guns and two
bombs or rockets.180
CAS is one of the most difficult functions of a modern military force. Even with extensive and recurring
training and practice, there are often tragic mistakes,
such as the one that killed five American soldiers in
Zabul province in June 2014.181 The basic building
blocks of competent close air support are aircraft designed for the mission, like the A-10 Warthog, highly
numerate and well-educated FAC officers with months
of training in specialized schools, advanced communications equipment with encrypted transmissions to
prevent enemy countermeasures, and sophisticated
methods of target designation and marking. The ability to operate advanced global positioning system
equipment and maps, make accurate calculations of
enemy positions, calculate aircraft approach vectors,
determine the location and proximity of all friendly
troops on a constantly shifting battlefield, and communicate calmly and clearly while under enemy fire
does not come easily, and it is beyond anything the
Afghans are capable of in the next 5 years.
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For deploying the A-29 Super Tucanos, rudimentary target marking methods such as colored smoke
rounds put on target by mortars, as were sometimes
used in World War II, could be made to work by the
ANA—if they had trained forward air controllers
(FACs), the necessary mortars and marking rounds
in each unit, the tactical skill in each unit to put the
marking rounds on the target, suitable communications equipment and training to enable ANA spotters
on the ground to communicate with ANAF pilots,
and if the ANAF had any aircraft capable of mounting weapons systems. As of December 2014, they do
not have any of that. Assuming they could gain this
capability rapidly with the four A-29s to be delivered
in 2015 and put it into full operational use by the end
of 2015, it would be entirely inadequate to the threat.
As Giustozzi notes, “Neither the armed opposition
nor Afghan Army troops on the ground are likely to
be very impressed with these assets, having become
accustomed to the mighty power of the USAF.”182
During one period of particularly intense fighting
around Sangin district in the late summer of 2014, for
example, four Apache attack helicopters and an AC130 Specter gunship were rotated continuously on station for nearly 2 days, with the Apaches completely
expending their ordnance load-outs eight times.183
The same scenario was repeated in the battle for the
town of Sangar in Ajristan district of Ghazni province
in late-September 2014. According to The Los Angeles
Times, Afghan Commandos again had to be called in
to prevent the town from being overrun by massed
Taliban fighters conducting a “well-planned attack.”
Again, the commandos were backed by U.S. Apache
helicopter gunships. “It was not pretty” said an Afghan NDS officer quoted by the Times, “just when we
were about to collapse, at the last minute they sent
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in two foreign helicopters.”184 Anyone who has ever
witnessed it knows that this represents a staggering
concentration of sustained firepower. The little A-29s
with their two wing-mounted machine guns, limited
ammunition, and two small bombs or rockets (which
have not yet been sourced) cannot begin to replace the
heavier gunships.

The AC-130 Specter gunship, top, and A-10 Warthog, middle, lighting up targets. The Super Tucano
light trainer, bottom, equipped with two machine
guns and two rockets or bombs, is scheduled to replace them on the battlefield.

Picture I-9. The AC-130 Specter Gunship,
A-10 Warthog, and Super Tucano Trainer.
54

At the same time, in practical terms, the ANA calling for CAS from U.S. military assets is, in soldier parlance, a “nonstarter.” Afghans are not trained to do
it; there is a huge language barrier; they do not have
the communications equipment for it; for security
reasons, we are not going to give it to them; and we
do not even allow the U.S. Army to call for fire support directly from U.S. Navy and Marine Corps assets.
(ANGLICO teams are attached to the U.S. Army for
this purpose.185) Even then, there are tragic mistakes
and deaths from friendly fire. Furthermore, there
were far too many cases in the prosecution of the war
in Afghanistan in which the United States was duped
into conducting airstrikes aimed not at the Taliban,
but at the informant’s own personal enemies. The bottom line is that the only way the ANA is going to get
U.S. CAS is if there are U.S. SF or SOF personnel on
the ground with them to call for it. In this respect in
particular, the failure to screen and vet ANA recruits
adequately is coming home to roost at this stage of the
war.186 Because of the danger of green-on-blue attacks,
this entails U.S. teams deploying only with reliable
Afghan troops, such as the commando battalions.
Artillery and mortars in the hands of the ANA will
not be a substitute for CAS. ANA use of artillery support was termed “dubious” by Stars and Stripes reporter Josh Smith in November 2014, who observed a 122mm Soviet artillery piece being fired more or less at
random toward a police operation a mile or two away.
Major Eric Lightfoot, an artillery mentor, noted in
January 2015 that the Afghans use a howitzer “sort of
like a tank, for direct fire at enemies they [can] see.”187
The ANA mortaring of a village in Sangin district in
January 2015, killing dozens of women and children at
a wedding party, was typical of the ANA’s indiscriminate use of fire support, according to Graeme Smith,
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the director of the International Crisis Group in Kabul.
“I’m actually surprised that we haven’t heard more
complaints like this,” Smith said:
all of the anecdotal feedback is that ANSF have a very
loose conception of the ‘enemy’ and uses artillery to
blast locations they understand as ‘Taliban villages.’
My best guess is that civilian casualties frequently
happen without complaints being registered, because
the tribal groups associated with the insurgency
don’t feel they have any access to mechanisms of
accountability.188

In November 2014, The New York Times revealed
that President Obama signed a directive extending the
U.S. combat role in Afghanistan through 2015. This
was done in the wake of the Taliban campaign in Helmand province in the summer of 2014, in which it became clear that major Afghan government garrisons
in the province would have been overrun without
U.S.-supplied CAS. The presidential decision permits
U.S. forces to assist the ANA by conducting air strikes,
essentially by allowing them to perform both sides
of the equation (requesting and delivering) through
2015.189 The fact that the President of the United States
was convinced that this step needed to be taken, at the
political cost of abrogating his promise to the American public to end the U.S. combat role in Afghanistan
at the end of 2014,190 attests to the urgency of the lack
of confidence of senior U.S. military leaders in the ability of the ANA to survive in 2015 without it. Indeed,
the withdrawal of American close air support will be
the beginning of the end for the ANA in the parts of
southern and eastern Afghanistan where Pashtu is the
predominant language.
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THE UNENDING CIVIL WAR
To see how these force capabilities will play out
in the future of Afghanistan, it will be useful now to
put the current situation in context, to zoom out to the
30,000-foot level, as it were, and examine the bigger
picture. What is happening in Afghanistan today is
not primarily a government vs. guerillas conflict. It is
primarily a civil war. Afghanistan has been in a state
of civil war, sometimes a cold war but most often a
hot one, since 1973, more than 40 years. Entire library
shelves are filled with academic treatises on the reasons for this conflict, and, to be certain, the reasons
behind the conflict are as complex as the conflict itself.
Almost anything one writes about Afghanistan runs
the risk of being seen as too simplistic and reductionist. It is as if the English language itself is not nuanced
enough to describe the intricately tangled web that is
Afghanistan. There is, in fact, not one single war going on, but many interconnected ones, involving actors whose motivations run the gamut from religious
fervor to mercenary gain, and these motivations are
rarely pure or mutually exclusive.
There is a religious war, or holy war, taking place,
that, on one level, is part of a cyclical pattern of Pashtun jihad in the region dating back centuries.191 This
element of the civil war in Afghanistan not only pits
the Deobandi-inspired Taliban groups against the
more moderate Hannafi Sunnis of the other ethnic
groups and mixed communities of the north and east,
it also pits the hard-line Sunnis of the Taliban against
the ethnic minority Shi’a Hazara people of central Afghanistan. This kind of sectarian animus, whose intensity is being demonstrated so clearly in Iraq today,
was already severe enough during the first period of
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Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001 to provoke mass
murders of the Hazara people and innumerable individual crimes against them across the Hazarajat by
the Taliban during their reign.192 The Hazaras, more
so than any other ethnic group in Afghanistan, used
the period of American engagement from 2001 to 2014
and the opportunities it offered to improve their traditional position as a permanent underclass in Afghan
society. Despite deep-rooted discrimination and prejudice against them, for example, they are prominent
in the army and at Kabul University.193 Development
programs in the Hazarajat were generally welcomed
with open arms and experienced less of the subterfuge, security problems, and rampant corruption that
plagued development efforts in the south. This refusal
on the part of the Hazaras to accept their traditional
underclass position in Afghan society has resulted in a
backlash of resentment on the part of the other ethnic
groups surrounding them. All four Hazaras nominated to ministerial posts by President Ghani were voted
down by the Wolesi Jirga in January 2015. In military
terms, these factors will intensify the violence against
them and elevate future levels of retribution by the
Taliban to the intensity being perpetrated against the
Kurds and Yazidi and Shi’a populations by the ISIS
terrorist group in Iraq and Syria today.
In addition to religious war, there is a constant
struggle for Afghanistan’s minimal wealth and resources among rival armed groups. These resources
consist primarily of opium and increasingly profitable
marijuana exports, but also include timber, semi-precious gems like lapis lazuli, and archeological relics,
all of which are smuggled out relatively easily. Representations of the viability of Afghanistan’s potential
mineral wealth are often exaggerated: the extraction
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and marketing of such deep mineral deposits require not only a highly secure working environment,
largely corruption-free civil and legal systems, and
reliable land tenure; they also require a highly developed industrial infrastructure of paved roads and
modern railways, huge amounts of electrical power
and water, large-scale worker housing and sanitation,
and very expensive deep extraction technologies and
equipment, none of which Afghanistan has today or is
going to have for decades.
Where there are no easily extractable resources
such as opium, marijuana, timber, lapis lazuli, and
cultural artifacts, the control of the border crossings themselves provides a major source of revenue
from bribes, fees, and “taxes.” Warlord militias and
the various Taliban groups regularly contest these
scant border revenue sources, often reaching local accords to divide the spoils, little of which ever reaches
government coffers.194
Additionally, in Pashtun areas in particular, there
are hundreds of ongoing feuds between clans like the
Mashwari and the Salazai, many of which have resulted in false intelligence reports intended to bring
about American military action against rivals. In the
early years of the U.S.-Afghan war, the United States
too easily fell victim to these scams, in one case in 2002
attacking the compound of a district governor in Uruzgan province allied with the United States and killing dozens of Afghan policemen and senior political
leaders in hand-to-hand combat.195 Many local feuds
have been going on for decades, often preventing any
kind of productive economic activity on the lands belonging to the warring families from perpetual fear
of attacks by war parties and snipers. Some Pashtun
clans, like the Mashwaris, Tanais, and Zadrans, do
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have long-standing animosity against tribes that support the Taliban, resulting in protracted local armed
conflict between them, but, geographically and politically, they are few and far between. Frequently, several of these different types of conflicts overlap one
another with an admixture of fighting motivations.
But by far the single greatest source of conflict in
Afghan society is the millennium-old animosity between the Dari- and Uzbek-speaking northern ethnic groups and the Pashtu-speaking southern ethnic
groups (including the Pashai196). Determining identity in Afghanistan, of course, is not as simplistic as
many newly minted “cultural experts” employed by
the military suggest.197 In many cases, prevailing notions of ethnicity and identity in Afghanistan today
were imported by the Americans themselves. Afghans
in general do not identify themselves solely by a single ethnic label per se, any more than Americans do.
Many communities are a mixture of villagers from
different ethnic origins, often intermarried, and multilingualism is a part of day-to-day life.198 Yet, broadly
speaking, the political divide between Dari speakers
and Pashtu speakers, often intertwined with disputes
over land, water, religion, and resources, remains the
largest obstacle to a sense of national identity and nation-building, a critical factor that will be discussed in
detail in Part II.
It is this animus and chasm of trust between north
and south, in general terms, that has driven the Afghan civil war since 1973 and will determine Afghanistan’s fate in the next 5 years. The beginnings of the
chaos and collapse of Afghan society which began
40 years ago can be traced directly to the bloodless
overthrow of (Pashtun) Afghan King Zahir Shah by
his cousin, Mohammed Daud, in 1973. Daud did not
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attempt to take the throne himself: rather, he seized
power and attempted to rule the country without a
king. The Afghan civil war began soon thereafter, and
continues to this day. In Afghanistan, the existence of
a king has not always been accompanied by peace, but
the absence of a king has always been accompanied
by war.
All of the events of the last 40 years in Afghanistan can be understood via this paradigm. The failed
experiment with communism, which provoked Soviet
intervention in 1979, was largely an outcome of a power struggle between the mostly Tajik Parcham faction
and the predominantly Pashtun Khalq faction of the
communist party of Afghanistan, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).199 The PDPA split
into these two main camps in 1967, but was still strong
enough in 1973 to help Daud overthrow his cousin,
King Zahir Shah. Daud’s rule was brief, however. With
help from the Afghan Army, the PDPA overthrew
and killed Daud and his family in April 1978 in what
is known as the Saur (April) Revolution, and established a communist government led by Ghilzai Pashtun Nur Mohammed Taraki and the Khalq faction.200
In 1979, with the help of Soviet Spetznaz commandos,
the Parchami faction overthrew the Khalqi faction and
killed then (Ghilzai Pashtun) President Hafizullah
Amin. The Parchami Tajik leader Babrak Karmal was
installed as President.201
The PDPA, as subsequently reconciled by the Soviets, was supposed to be a government of national
unity, with power shared between Pashtuns and Tajiks, but it remained deeply riven into these two ethnic
power blocs. The PDPA began to implement unpopular reforms. It attempted to eliminate religion and carry out sweeping land reform in the rural areas in order
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to redistribute farmlands confiscated from the landlord class to the feudal peasant farmers who worked
them. These measures sparked an armed conservative
backlash led by rural landowners and rural mullahs
protecting their respective turfs, and for a variety of
political economic reasons, the peasant sharecropping farmers who stood to gain the most from land
reform instead backed their landlords. The PDPA also
attempted such equally radical social reforms in the
1970s such as allowing women to participate in public and political life, which shocked the conservative
Afghan people.
The 10-year war that followed is commonly and
wrongly presented as the “Soviet-Afghan” war, in
which the Soviets are portrayed as fighting alone
against heroic mujahideen fighters bravely repelling
the invaders. The absurdly ahistorical 2007 Hollywood
film Charlie Wilson’s War, for example, is a classic of
this genre.202 Such myths are a part of every country’s
narrative, but the war was, in fact, nothing of the sort.
In reality, the Soviets allied with a significant proportion of northern Afghans from the Tajik, Uzbek, and
Hazara ethnic groups to fight the largely Pashtun
mujahideen.
All major Afghan ethnicities (except the Shi’a
Hazaras) were represented among the “Peshawar
Seven,” the seven mujahideen parties formed and
recognized by the Pakistani Army via the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which armed them
with weapons provided by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and paid them with money provided
by the intelligence service of Saudi Arabia.203 Only Iran
supported the Hazara resistance groups, under the
umbrella of the Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan.204
In reality, however, the great bulk of the support (by
ISI design) went to Pashtun groups, and actual resis62

tance was largely carried out by Pashtuns (when they
were not killing each other, a specialty of Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar and his Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, or HiG205).
It was the Pashtuns who bore the brunt of the genocidal Soviet “drain-the-swamp” tactics.206 The Soviets
destroyed thousands of Pashtun villages and massacred as many as a million Pashtuns between 1979
and 1989.207
Of course, there were notable exceptions. The legendary Tajik mujahideen leader Ahmed Shah Masood,
for example, was known as the “Lion of the Panshir.”208
Masood fought off countless Soviet offensives into the
Panshir Valley north of the Soviet airbase at Bagram
and subsequently led the last elements of resistance to
the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2001.209
Nevertheless, a large proportion of the fighting
against the mujahideen was carried out by the conscript Afghan Army loyal to the PDPA and its Soviet
advisors. Before the Soviet incursion, the (conscript)
Afghan Army consisted of:
. . . three armored divisions (570 medium tanks),
eight infantry divisions (averaging 4,500 to 8,000 men
each), two mountain infantry brigades, one artillery
brigade, a guards regiment (for palace protection),
three artillery regiments, two commando regiments,
and a parachute battalion (largely grounded). All the
formations were under the control of three corps level
headquarters.210

After the Soviet occupation, significant parts of the
Afghan Army deserted, but it remained in combat as
an almost entirely Dari-speaking conscription force
until the end of the war. Attrition through desertion
was a constant problem, but it was never as high as
the levels of desertion from the all-volunteer ANA
today.211 The communist Afghan Air Force was large
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and capable, operating a variety of aircraft, including
240 fighter jets, among them three squadrons of MIG21s. In fact, the current Commander of the ANAF,
Lieutenant General Mohammad Dawran (a Tajik),
flew against the mujahideen, compiling more than
2,000 cockpit hours in the MIG-21 and being trained as
a cosmonaut by the Soviets.212 Dispelling this mythos
of the Soviet period as a “war of national liberation”
is essential to understanding Afghanistan today in the
context of the ongoing civil war. The Soviet period
from 1979 to 1989 was, in fact, simply another chapter
in the 40-year civil war between north and south.
After a protracted period of anarchy, characterized by an ethnic free-for-all, and created by ethnically based warlord armies vying for power following
the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban period from 1996
to 2001 was a continuation of the north-south civil
war. The Taliban was, and is, a virtually 100 percent
Pashtun movement, and resistance to it, apart from a
handful of dissident Pashtun clans mentioned earlier,
took the form of a Dari- and Uzbek-speaking resistance movement known as the Northern Alliance. It
was comprised of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Turkmen. The Northern Alliance gradually lost ground
and retreated stubbornly in the face of the Pakistani
Army-equipped and advised Taliban army. Pakistani
advisors operated with the Taliban on the ground,
and Pakistani Air Force pilots flew for the Taliban
against the Northern Alliance.213 The infamous “Operation Evil Airlift” out of Kunduz in November 2001,
in which hundreds of senior Taliban and al-Qaeda
leaders were airlifted out of the Kunduz Pocket to
Peshawar in blacked-out Pakistani Air Force cargo
aircraft under a secret agreement with the George
W. Bush administration, was conducted as a facesaving measure for then-Pakistani President Pervez
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Musharraf.214 The airlift was intended to allow Musharraf to evacuate the hundreds of Pakistani Army advisors trapped in the Kunduz Pocket, and thus spare
him the international embarrassment of revealing the
Pakistani Army’s blatant role in supporting and supplying the Taliban.215 The ISI naturally used the opportunity to get its Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership out at the same time.216 In fact, the Taliban, then
as today, operates as a de facto expeditionary division
of the Pakistan Army, run by the army's intelligence
branch, the ISI.217
The two primary points here are that the various
military groups comprising the Taliban, including the
Quetta Shura group, the Haqqani Network, HiG, the
Tora Bora front, Hizb-i-Islami Khalis, and others, are
almost 100 percent ethnically Pashtuns, and that the
Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, HiG, and so
on were, and are, a de facto extension of the Pakistani
Army that is trained, equipped, supplied, advised,
and given refuge and medical care by the Pakistani
government, as Admiral Mike Mullen noted in 2011.218
The rationale for this on the part of Pakistan remains
Pakistan’s strategic shibboleth, “security in depth,”
which requires Pakistan to maintain proxy control over
Afghanistan in order to keep India off of its northern
flank and avoid its psychological bête noir, a hypothetical two-front war with India.219 Some observers interpret the ongoing war in Afghanistan almost exclusively as an extension of this dynamic. “Fundamentally,
the war in Afghanistan is an Indo-Pakistan proxy
conflict layered atop Afghanistan’s ethnic cleavages,”
Thomas Lynch of the National Defense University’s
Institute for National Strategic Studies has argued. “In
this decades-old struggle, NATO counterinsurgency
forces are but a temporary participant.”220
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In 2001, following the attacks of September 11, the
United States allied itself with the Northern Alliance
and stepped into this ongoing north-south civil war,
either without comprehending this context or ignoring it. The reemergence of the Taliban in late-2002, in
the form of an incipient insurgency,221 its rise from the
ashes to control large swathes of rural Afghanistan,
the power struggles within the kleptocratic Karzai
administration,222 the recent electoral conflict between
the Pashtun Ashraf Ghani and the Tajik Abdullah
Abdullah,223 and the 4-month delay in even nominating a cabinet are all further manifestations of this civil
war. Now that the United States is departing Afghanistan, it is once again heating up. Taliban attacks spiked
in 2014, and the largely Tajik Afghan National Army
and the locally recruited Afghan National Police both
suffered casualties that reached record highs during
the year.224
Ashraf Ghani, who was pronounced the winner
despite “industrial-scale” electoral fraud,225 actually
has very little overall support among the people.226
Barely a third of eligible voters cast legitimate ballots in the two elections of 2014, meaning that, at best,
Ghani has the active support of one-half of one-third
of the population, or perhaps 18 percent, since the outcome of the voting was presented as a nearly 50-50
split.227 According to surveys conducted by the Asia
Foundation in 2013, the Taliban has the support of approximately a third of the Afghan people today.228
Thus approximately one-third of the Afghan
people cared enough to vote for one candidate or
the other in the elections of 2014, one-third support the Taliban, and one-third simply want to be
left alone or are entirely apathetic to their future.
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AFGHAN COMMUNIST ARMY
YEAR

ARMY

AIR FORCE

1978

80-90,000

10,000

1979

50-100,000

5,000

1980

20-25,000

1981

25-35,000

1982

25-40,000

1983

35-40,000

1984

35-40,000

1985

35-40,000

1986

40,000

PARAMIL

5-7,000
7,000

50,000
60,000

1987

70,000

1988

80,000

1989

100,000

Numbers are incomplete but some may be extropolated. In the
final years of the war, the Soviets also attempted to raise irregular
units like the ALP. The Soviets also had trouble with “green on
red” attacks, and came to rely heavily on the Afghan Commando
Brigades (444th, 37th, and 38th) toward the end of the war, just
as U.S. SF and SOF rely heavily on them today. Attrition from
the all-conscript communist army was lower than that of the
ANA today.

Figure 1. PDPA Force Size from 1978 to 1989.
In other words, of the one-third who cared enough to
vote in 2014, roughly half supported President Ashraf
Ghani, the great majority of them being Pashtuns.
The Afghan government today, a shotgun marriage
of north and south following the bitterly contested
election audit process, is an extra-constitutional “government of national unity” in which the fault lines
between Ghani’s supporters among the anti-Taliban
Pashtun, including many former Khalkis like Mohammed Afzal Lodin229 and Shah Nawaz Tanai,230 and the
Tajik supporters of Abdullah Abdullah, who include
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the second most powerful man in Afghanistan, Mohammed Atta,231 are already beginning to appear.232
Today’s “government of national unity” cobbled together by the United States not only resembles the
PDPA “government of national unity” cobbled together by the Soviet Union in 1979, but it also features
many of the same cast of characters. The new Minster
of the Interior, for example, Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, was a
Parcham member of the PDPA.233 Only a third of the
“government of national unity” ministerial choices
were accepted by the Wolesi Jirga.234 Meanwhile, apparently not fully grasping the Afghan Constitution’s
prohibition of elected leaders having private militias,
First Vice President of Afghanistan and former PDPA
officer Rashid Dostum235 spent the month of December 2014 resurrecting his private 20,000-man Junbish
(Uzbek) militia to “root out Taliban” from Kunduz
province.236

Former communist party members are prominent among Ghani
supporters. Khalqi general Mohammed Afzal Lodin, left, is a
leading Ghani supporter and was briefly his nominee for Minister
of Defense. Shah Nawaz Tanai of Khost province, center (seen
here wearing his Khalqi general's uniform in his 2014 presidential campaign poster) was the Chief of Staff of the Army under
Najibullah. Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, right, former prominent Parchami
faction member and Lieutenant General in the communist army,
is now the Minister of the Interior.

Picture I-10. Ghani Supporters Mohammed Afzal
Lodia, Shah Nawaz Tanai, and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi.
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ATTRITION: THE FORCE KILLER
Returning now to the Afghan security forces, having situated them within this broader context of the
ongoing ethnic civil war, what follows is an explication of their operational problems. The first of these
are force size, force maturity, combat experience,
and attrition.
National Military Training Center-Afghanistan
(NMTC-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) deliberately obscured
these statistics for years by reporting only the “trained
and equipped” numbers and refusing to share the
statistics with the State Department and other government agencies.237 According to SIGAR, the reported
strength of the ANA as of January 2014 was 149,185
men, not counting civilians and “Trainee, Transient,
Holdee, and Student” numbers.238 In a rare moment
of ISAF candor, on December 11, 2014, Lieutenant
General Anderson told Reuters news agency that 20
percent of the 195,000 authorized ANA billets are
currently unfilled because “recruiting and retention
aren’t matching, and, of course, don’t forget losses,”
indicating a total strength in December 2014 of 156,000
men, including the approximately 6,000 personnel of
the ANAF.239 This number tallies with the first quarter
2014 SIGAR report figure (149,185, not including the
ANAF) and may be considered reliable.
According to U.S. Government figures, during
the 12-month period of September 2012 to September
2013, the ANA lost 67,682 men to attrition. British government figures are comparable. As reported by The
Independent in 2013:
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the latest British Government assessments . . . confirm that the rate of recruits leaving is far worse than
targets set by coalition leaders, amounting to 63,000
every year, or more than a third of the current size of
the army.240

Using SIGAR’s 2014 figures of 149,185 men actually wearing uniforms and on the rosters,241 the loss of
67,682 men in a year to desertion represents 45 percent
of the entire army. The ANA recruited only 64,383
new soldiers during the same period.242 Only about
54,000 of them made it through the mild basic training
course, because the basic training dropout rate is 16
percent.243 Thus, the ANA lost some 13,600 more men
than it could recruit in the year between September
2012 and September 2013. (In comparison, the all-conscript ARVN suffered 20 percent attrition in 1973,244
and the all-conscript Afghan Army fighting with the
Soviets against the mujahideen never had more than
35 percent attrition.245) Recruiting statistics are hard to
come by and are now classified, but there were several months in 2013 in which the ANA did not meet
its recruiting goals,246 and Lieutenant General Anderson’s observations on December 11, 2014, indicate a
20 percent recruiting shortfall in 2014.247 This suggests
that not only has the number of recruits which can
be found annually reached its maximum level and is
starting to decline (in a country with 50 percent unemployment248), but also that the maximum recruiting
level is now below the current level of annual attrition, and the ANA is shrinking. At a minimum, what
can be said with certainty is that the ANA has reached
its maximum possible size at roughly 150,000 men.
In point of fact, no one knows exactly how many
soldiers and policemen are actually present for duty
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on any given day. The precise figures given lend a
false sense of credibility and confidence in numbers
which are, in actuality, mostly estimates. Personnel
accountability in the ANSF, and in the police in particular, is in its infancy. ISAF is almost entirely reliant on Ministry of Defense (MOD) and MOI reports
of force size, so, although the United States pays the
salaries of every soldier and policeman the MOD and
MOI say are present, we do not have any granularity
on ANSF numbers because western personnel literally never count them. As the DoD Inspector General
reported in August 2014:
the [government of Afghanistan] lacked the basic controls to provide reasonable assurance that it appropriately spent $3.3 billion of ASFF [Afghan Security
Forces Fund] direct contributions. . . . As a result of
[the government of Afghanistan’s] internal control
weaknesses, CSTC-A cannot verify that the ASFF
direct contributions were properly spent or used for
their intended purposes.249

SIGAR added in 2013 that:
Determining ANSF strength is fraught with challenges. U.S. and coalition forces rely on the Afghan
forces to report their own personnel strength numbers. Moreover, the . . . CSTC-A noted that, in the case
of the [ANA], there is ‘no viable method of validating
[their] personnel numbers’.250

Unlike western armies, Afghan soldiers and policemen routinely “self-transfer” to other units for
personal and ethnic reasons. Maintaining “ghost soldiers” on the rolls is an entrenched Afghan military
tradition that allows commanders to report imaginary
men in order to receive extra bulk rations that are sold
on the grey market to supplement their meager officer
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salaries. In December 2014, it was reported that the
Iraqi government of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi
had discovered the presence of 50,000 such “ghost soldiers” on the roles of the Iraqi Army as well.251 Giustozzi notes that payment of ANA salaries by electronic
funds transfers and the presence of U.S. combat advisors kept a lid on ghost soldiering in the ANA, but
with the advisors now gone, there are no formal structures within the ANA to prevent it from increasing.252
Behind the smoke and mirrors surrounding the
doctrinally already inadequate 149,185 ANA force
size number cited by SIGAR and Lieutenant General
Anderson (not counting the 6,000 man air force),253
the reality is sobering. Of the reported total “assigned
strength” of the ANA of 149,185, only 119,485 men are
designated as combat-assigned troops (the six Corps
commands, the Commandos, and the Kabul 111 [static
garrison and parade] Division). The remaining 30,000
are rear area staff and headquarters personnel. Of this
119,485, SIGAR found that a further 9,000 men who
were still on the books and counted as “assigned”
were actually deserters not yet removed from the rolls,
another 15,915 were still in basic training or on administrative hold,254 and 9,236 were civilians.255 Thus
34,151 men “assigned” to the combat forces were not
in them, or were not even soldiers—almost 30 percent.
This does not include men on authorized leave.
To determine the “not present plus authorized
leave” number and calculate the actual fighting
strength of the ANA, SIGAR’s statistics from the previous 12 months can be used. SIGAR found at the beginning of 2012 that out of the (then) strength of the
ANA on paper of 176,354, only 63 percent were actually present for duty.256 Thus the “not present” plus
“authorized leave” number equals roughly 37 percent
of the assigned number.
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Using this statistic of 37 percent as an approximate
relative constant, of the 119,485 who were assigned to
combat commands in December 2014 (the six ANA
Army Corps, the 111th Capital Division, and the commandos) only 75,258 soldiers were actually in fighting
units and present for duty.257 This is the real fighting
strength of the ANA. Only 41 percent of the big ANA
number are actual soldiers actually present in combat
units. In other words, cutting through the smoke and
mirrors, SIGAR found that ISAF was routinely counting deserters, civilians, recruits in basic training, the
sick, the halt, the lame, the wounded, men on leave,
and rear echelon clerks and generals as “trained and
equipped” or “assigned” to make the end strength
number appear larger, the ANA appear more ready,
and the ANA program appear more successful.258 The
reality is that, in all of Afghanistan, there are only
about 75,000 soldiers actually out there with guns in
their hands, or one for every 3.4 square miles of the
country. The comparable actual fighting strength of
the police in the field is 53,500.
In addition, despite the bar being constantly lowered by ISAF for this metric,259 there are still only a
handful of ANA battalions rated as being able to operate entirely without U.S. advisors or support.260 In
April, 2013, a force of over 200 Taliban attacked one of
them, the Third Battalion, Second Brigade, 201 Corps,
in Nari district of Kunar province, wiped out the entire garrison of 13 men, and captured the outpost.261
In contrast, from 1971 on, the entire ARVN operated
without U.S. advisors or support. At the time of publication, the extent of possible future analysis of the
ANA personnel situation is unclear, because while
Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT is walking back
its much-criticized262 unilateral263 decision to classify
ANA personnel and readiness numbers,264 which data
73

will remain classified is still unknown. If the numbers
were good, however, it seems unlikely they would
been classified in the first place after 6 years of open
publication.
Moreover, attrition is not constant across the force.
It is understandably much higher in combat units in
the south than in comfortable rear area staff positions
in major cities, or in corps in the north that are not
regularly engaged in fighting. Attrition from the 205
Corps operating in Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Daykundi provinces in 2014 was 42 percent.265 In the summer
of 2014, the 2nd Brigade of the ANA’s 215 Corps operating in northern Helmand suffered 70 percent attrition.266 (The U.S. Army rates a unit as “combat ineffective” when its personnel strength declines to 50
percent.267) In 2014, there were approximately 25,500
men in these two Corps (205 and 215), and about
13,000 of them deserted. In contrast, the highest rate
of attrition experienced by the conscript Afghan Army
fighting with the Soviets against the mujahideen was
about 35 percent,268 while attrition from the conscript
ARVN in 1973 was about 20 percent.269 Thus, the allvolunteer ANA has double the desertion rate of the
all-conscript ARVN, not a good indicator of its fighting spirit. In short, the combat element of the ANA
is about 75,258 men, fully half of whom have been in
the army less than 12 months. How would U.S. Army
officers evaluate the U.S. Army if half of it deserted
every year and half of the remainder had been in the
Army less than 12 months?
Casualties, another source of attrition, have also
risen alarmingly. Approximately 4,000 ANA soldiers
have been killed in action in the last 34 months.270 In
fact, casualties are at an all-time high and rising.271
Lieutenant General Anderson described these casualty figures in November 2014 as “not sustainable,”
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noting that the ANSF (Army and Police) have suffered 9,000 KIA since the beginning of 2013.272 In 2012,
1,170 ANA soldiers were killed in action or died of
their wounds,273 by 2013 the number had risen to
1,400 soldiers,274 and in the first 6 months of 2014, approximately 950 soldiers died.275 (Almost 3,000 ANP
personnel were killed in 2013 alone, and some 3,500
died in the first 10 months of 2014.276) The numbers
of ANSF personnel wounded in action (WIA) and no
longer present for duty are very difficult to acquire;
apparently the ANA and ANP either do not keep close
records of the numbers of personnel wounded or do
not regularly release them to the public. In February
2013, the Watson Institute for International Studies at
Brown University put the number of Afghan military
and police WIA at 30,471, “estimated using the common ratio for other conflicts of three soldiers wounded
for every one killed.”277
Using this formula, in addition to 4,000 ANA soldiers KIA in the previous 34 months, another 12,000
have been WIA. SIGAR reported that between March
2012 and February 2014, the ANA had 2,166 personnel KIA and 11,804 WIA, an actual wounded-to-killed
ratio of 5.4-to-1, so the common 3:1 ratio may be much
too low.278 Using the SIGAR 5.4-to-1 ratio as a relative
constant and Lieutenant General Anderson’s figures,
in addition to 9,000 overall ANSF KIA since the beginning of 2013, another 48,600 have been wounded.279
Some 57,600 combat casualties (KIA plus WIA) in 2
years, not counting missing in action (MIAs) and prisoners of war (POWs) or losses from disease and noncombat related injuries, represents almost 45 percent
of the entire present-for-duty combat fighting strength
of the ANSF of 128,500, a staggering statistic. (In comparison, in the 4 years of World War II, 6 percent of
all Americans who served in uniform were killed or
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wounded.280) Perhaps most importantly from a strategic viewpoint, during 2013, the Taliban suffered an
estimated 10,000 to 12,000 men killed, wounded, and
captured. During the same period, ANSF casualties
(ANA plus ANP killed and wounded) were 20,960.
In other words, in 2013, Afghan government security forces suffered two casualties for every one they
inflicted on the enemy.281

Figure 2. ANA Casualties from 2002 to 2014.
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THE ETHNIC TIME BOMB
The ANA has one other major, largely hidden
problem that is not often discussed, at least not publicly: It is largely a Northern Alliance army. The danger is that the heavily Tajik ANA is being portrayed
by the Taliban as “an occupying power in the south,”
as U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican, South
Carolina) noted in June 2014.282 A similar dynamic
was in play when the Sunni terrorist group known as
ISIS attacked Mosul. The Shia-dominated Iraqi Army
in Mosul abandoned the city rapidly in June 2014.283
Statistical analysis proves conclusively that the
routinely presented ANA ethnic balance numbers
simply are not accurate. The boilerplate numbers of
approximately 43 percent Pashtuns and 35 percent
Tajiks coincide precisely with what is known as the
“Eikenberry Rule,”284 guidelines promulgated by Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry during his first tour in
Afghanistan from September 2002 to September 2003,
when he served as both the U.S. Security Coordinator for Afghanistan and as Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan.285 The Eikenberry Rule
stipulates that the ethnic mix of the ANA will closely
mirror that of Afghan society, so that it will not be perceived as the army of one or the other of the country’s
major ethnic groups so that it will serve as a symbol
of national unity.286 In fact, the reported ethnic mix of
the ANA today is, astonishingly, a perfect mirror of
Afghan society that precisely reflects the Eikenberry
Rule—not close, or somewhat imbalanced, as is, for
example, the U.S. Army, but perfect.
However, this is not only ipso facto suspicious, but
there is substantial anecdotal and statistical evidence
that it is not true. The Pashtun presence in the ANA
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is being exaggerated, and to understand how, some
understanding of the ethnic group is necessary. The
Pashtuns in Afghanistan are not one monolithic people, but a large, segmentary descent group comprising more than 350 major independent tribes,287 each
one, in a strictly demographic, organizational sense,
roughly analogous to a Native American tribe such
as the Apache, Navajo, Sioux, Comanche, and so on.
Determining who is a Pashtun and who is not is not
always simple: some Pashtuns pretend they are not
and speak Dari, while some clans are not ethnically
Pashtun but speak Pashto and claim to be Pashtun.
In general terms, the Pashtuns are classified by
academic experts into four major tribal groups that
have a substantial presence in Afghanistan, and a
fifth group that lives almost entirely in Pakistan.288
The “Eastern Pashtuns” of Afghanistan live in the
area around Jalalabad and are comprised of scores
of tribes known collectively as the Sarbani as a result
of their ancestral claims.289 Former Afghan President
Hamid Karzai is from the “Western Pashtun” tribal
group, known to ethnographers as the Durrani or Abdali group. The kings of Afghanistan and their courts
were virtually all descended from this tribal group.
They reside primarily in the area around Kandahar.
In the same southern region are found the third tribal
grouping, the Ghilzai or Bitani group,290 traditional rivals of the Durranis. The deepest rivalry among the
Ghilzai is between the two major tribes, the Hotaki and
the Ahmadzai. Taliban founder Mullah Omar is from
the Hotaki tribe, and Afghan president Ashraf Ghani
Ahmadzai is from the Ahmadzai tribe.291 Much of the
original inner core element of the original Taliban
movement were Hotakis.292 Afghan president Ashraf
Ghani Ahmadzai draws his support base from among
the Ahmadzais, including many former members of
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the Khalq faction of the PDPA. The U.S. military erroneously aggregates these two tribal groups together
under the rubric of the “Southern Pashtuns,” a spurious classification that has no ethnographic basis or
academic validity beyond a broad geographic description of where they live.

Source: Map courtesy of The Long War Journal.

Map I-2. ANA Corps Commands.
The fourth major tribal grouping are the Karlanri
(putatively descended from another son of the ur-ancestor of the Pashtuns293 named Karlan294). They are referred to often as the “hill tribes,” the rough mountain
men and women who most closely hold to the old tribal
traditions and laws. They live in the inhospitable and
often barren mountains of south-central Afghanistan.
Many of them live across the largely imaginary Durand Line in the tribal areas of northern Pakistan (the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas). The Karlanri
are the Appalachian mountaineers of Afghanistan—
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they avoid all contact with any government, Afghan
or Pakistani. For this reason, virtually none of them
may be found in the ranks of the ANA, although some
served as scouts in former British times in irregular
formations like the Khyber Rifles.295
In rough terms, the Pashtun population of Afghanistan then could be said to be comprised of approximately equal numbers of each group, with the
Durrani and Ghilzai groups (the latter generally but
not entirely includes the nomadic Kuchi Pashtuns296)
comprising some 25 percent each, the Sarbani Pashtuns
forming perhaps 30 percent of the whole, and the hill
tribes making up roughly another 20 percent. Since
they have never been counted, these are only rough
but reasonable estimates based on data collected by
Louis Adamec, Louis Dupree, and Henry Priestly.297
This is important because it is critical to getting at who
among them are in the ANA.
NMTC-A/CTSC-A statistics indicate that only 3
percent of the ANA comes from the southern provinces inhabited by the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns,
i.e., “southern Pashtuns.”298 The Wall Street Journal
reported in September 2010 that:
southern Pashtuns accounted for . . . 1.1 percent [of
ANA recruits] in July [2010] and 1.8 percent in August
[2010]. Last month [August 2010], just 66 of the 3,708
Afghan recruits were Pashtuns, U.S. officials said.299

This is not surprising: The Durrani historically
have never participated in any Afghan army; almost
in the social sense that the once-rigid caste system
in India determined which occupation a given caste
would perform, the Durrani did not enter military service. Correspondingly, as much of the support for the
Taliban comes from the Ghilzai tribes, their formerly80

strong participation in the old royal Afghan Army of
the 1960s can now be expected to be rather low. In the
king’s time, the Afghan Army officer corps was the
sinecure of the Ghilzai,300 who have a traditional reputation as fighters, but that is no longer the case.
Since the Karlanri generally do not participate in
any government institutions, including the police or
the army, in any statistically meaningful numbers301
and the misnomered Southern Pashtuns (the Durrani
and Ghilzai tribal groups) are providing only 3 percent of the force according to NMTC-A statistics,302
this requires, mathematically, that the Eastern or Sarbani Pashtuns are supplying 40 percent of the ANA.303
This is, at best, dubious. Nangarhar has been the most
fertile recruiting ground for the ANA since its inception,304 but the contention that two of four major tribal
groups (the Durrani and Ghilzai groups) are together
providing 3 percent,305 the third group (the Karlanri)
are essentially providing none, and the fourth (the
Eastern, or Sarbani Pashtuns), who comprise roughly
12 percent of the overall Afghan population, would
therefore be providing 40 percent of the entire army
would require credulity bordering on a “suspension
of disbelief.”306
Instead, to increase the numbers, ISAF decided
in 2006 to include so-called “northern Pashtuns.”307
This demographic segment of Afghan society is theoretically comprised of the detribalized descendants
of several tens of thousands of Pashtuns forced to
leave their homes more than a century ago by Abdul
Rahman Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan from 1880
to 1901.308 Mostly intermixed and intermarried with
northern ethnic groups for more than 100 years, most
of these people today are only Pashtuns in a narrow
genealogical sense. In many cases, they no longer
speak Pashto. However, testifying before the Defense
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Committee of the House of Commons, Evening Standard defense correspondent Robert Fox reported in
2013 that “the disproportionate element [of the ANA]
among the Pashtuns are the northern Pashtuns.”309
Major General Zalmai Wesa
Ethnicity: Pashtun
Commander 209th Corps MAZAR
As of: 10/14
Major General Abdul Hamid
Ethnicity: Pashtun
Commander 205th Corps KANDAHAR
As of: 11/14
Major General Mohammad Zaman Waziri
Ethnicity: Pashtum
Commander 201 Corps KABUL
As of: 10/14
Major General Sharif Yaftali
Ethnicity: Tajik
Commader 203 Corps GARDEZ
As of: 8/14
Major General Taj Mohammad Zahid
Ethnicity: Tajik
Commander 207 Corps HERAT
As of : 9/14
Brigadier General Dadan Lawang
Ethnicity: Tajik
Commander 215 Corps, LASHKAR GAH
As of: 12/14
Major Genral Mohammed Dawran
Ethnicity: Tajik
Commander Afghan National Air Corps
As of: 12/14
Major General Samin Qademsha
Ethnicity: Tajik
Commander 111 Division (Kabul Garrison)
As of: 12/14

Picture I-11. Ethnicities of Afghan Commanders.
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More importantly, in terms of actual numbers,
many Afghans of Pashtun and mixed-Pashtun heritage in the north were persecuted for their Pashtun
roots despite the fact that they had almost unanimously allied themselves with their Northern Alliance
neighbors in 2001 following the fall of the Taliban
(another ugly dimension of the ongoing civil war).310
In the face of coercive ethnic cleansing, many fled to
the south and to Pakistan refugee camps in the following years. This flood of refugees left behind a very
small military recruiting pool. Furthermore, the entire
fighting age male population of this invented ethnic
group remaining in northern Afghanistan in 2014 is
likely smaller than the entire ANA today. Most critically, after their persecution beginning in 2002, few
feel any affinity any longer for their former Northern
Alliance allies and are more likely to be aiding the Taliban in the north than fighting them.311 As Brookings
Institute noted in 2011, “The Taliban has been rather
effectively mobilizing among the northern Pashtuns
who feel discriminated by Tajiks.”312 As a result, there
are probably more Turkmen in Afghanistan and more
Turkmen in the Afghan National Army today than socalled Northern Pashtuns. Counting them as Pashtuns
in the ANA is intellectually dishonest at best; counting
them as being in large numbers in the ANA is plain
dishonest.
In fact, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that
Pashtuns comprise only a small fraction of the ANA,
and the Eikenberry Rule is a fig leaf that remains in
place for propaganda purposes. Ben Anderson, who
has been reporting on the ANA for nearly a decade,
reported in 2013 that “It’s an exaggeration to call this
a national army. It’s not. It’s the Northern Alliance.”
Noting the photos of Masood and Dostum taped in
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most of the ANA vehicle windows in Helmand province, Anderson says, “These guys look almost as
foreign to the Pashtuns as we do.”313 Former British
Ambassador Craig Murray recounts a conversation
with a senior British officer in the CTSC-A program in
2010 as saying the ANA is now over 60 percent Tajik.
“The Pashtun figure is hovering below 20 percent and
may have been overtaken by the Uzbeks,” according
to Ambassador Murray.314 Indeed, a substantial number of Hazaras have also joined the army as a way
out of the menial labor jobs most often open to them
in Afghan society. Visual evidence corroborates this.
The author saw many Hazaras but few Pashtuns in
the Kandaks operating in Paktika province during his
service in Afghanistan. In fact, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns are usually quite easy to distinguish from one another for an experienced observer
(any Afghan recognizes it instantly), and in photos
and videos of the ANA, it is difficult to spot a Pashtun
in the ranks.315 On an operation in April 2012, CNN
observed the “Afghan soldiers [were] mostly from the
north or northeast of Afghanistan.”316 In 2011 NBC
News reported:
The Afghan army tries to ensure a mix of ethnic groups
in each brigade of enlisted soldiers, but it is hard to
find a brigade that northerners do not dominate. Of
the nearly 40 soldiers based with the Americans at
Combat Outpost Ware in the Arghandab Valley, only
two are Pashtun. One of them is the cook.317

Tajiks are heavily over-represented in the officer
ranks as well, especially in operational billets, such
as corps commanders. Of the eight most important
operational billets, the six regional corps commands,
the ANAF Chief of Staff318 (designated as a corps), and
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the 111th (Capital) Division, five are held by Tajiks.319
That represents approximately 63 percent of the top
operational commands—almost exactly double their
proportion of the Afghan population. During his tenure as Minister of Defense, Bismullah Khan packed
the mid- and senior-level officer ranks with Tajiks.320
How can the Pashtuns be 43 percent of the army when
it is hard to find one in the ranks? As Arthur Conan
Doyle’s famous character Sherlock Holmes often
noted, “Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the
truth.”321 The deduction here is obvious: Tajik officers
in the MOD mid-levels charged with producing the
ethnic balance numbers in accordance with the Eikenberry Rule to maintain foreign funding are simply
falsifying the numbers.
In reality, an educated, well-informed estimate
of the representation of Pashtuns in the ANA in
early-2015 would be no greater than 15 percent, comprised of roughly 3 percent southern Pashtuns as
reported by NMTC-A, 10 percent eastern Pashtuns
(approximately equal to their representation in the
general population), and 2 percent northern Pashtuns,
Afghans of Pashtun descent born in Pakistani refugee
camps, and Pashai.
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
The problems of small force size, over-reliance on
weak police forces at this late stage of the insurgency,
limited mobility, lack of organic CAS and indirect fire
support, a virtually nonexistent logistics capability,
40 percent annual ANA attrition and 50 percent annual ANP attrition, and severe ethnic imbalance in
the ANA are only the most significant of ANSF op-
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erational problems. There is also, for example, a major
and growing problem of drug use and drug addiction
in both the ANA and the ANP. SIGAR reported the
number of ANA soldiers using drugs was “at least
50 percent,” while the figure regularly cited is 75 percent,322 and it may be as high as 85 percent of all Afghan soldiers, according to some reports.323 As Paul
Lacapruccia, who worked on the Border Management
Task Force training Afghan border guards at Torkham
Gate in 2014, noted: “Afghanistan has hundreds of
thousands of armed, uniformed service members who
are paid with our aid money. Most of them are illiterate drug addicts. I know. I trained them.”324 A video
entitled “The Hashish Army—The Afghan National
Army” showing an entire ANA unit high on drugs
was popular on YouTube in 2009.325 A similar hourlong film by Vice News entitled “This is What Winning
Looks Like” showing pervasive ANA and ANP drug
use was put online in 2013.326
The real strategic impediment, however, and the
elephant in the room, is the inability of the Afghan
government to come close to being able to sustain its
security forces without international financial donations of some $4.1 billion annually.327 Only $500 million of the annual costs, or roughly 12 percent, is to be
provided by the Afghan government.328 According to
World Bank statistics, Afghan government revenues
have been declining steadily since 2011.329 The World
Bank reported in December 2014 that Afghan economic growth “collapsed from an average 9.4 percent
growth between 2003-2012 to 1.5 percent this year.”330
As the civil war in Afghanistan increases in intensity,
further reducing Afghanistan’s already limited appeal
to foreign investors, revenue-producing foreign presence and investment will decrease further. Afghan
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government revenues will thus continue to decline,
not increase. Afghanistan’s public revenue for 2014 is
projected to be U.S.$2.4 billion—half the cost of the
ANSF alone.331
In meetings with the author in Kabul beginning in
2001, successive Afghan Ministers of Defense Mohammed Fahim, Rahim Wardak, Bismullah Khan, and the
recently nominated and Sandhurst-educated Sher Mohammed Karimi (as of February 2015 the Chief of Staff
of the ANA), all impressed upon me the unsustainability of the all-volunteer force structure of the ANA
on which U.S. Army leaders insisted. All previous
Afghan armies in history had been conscript armies.332
This was the Afghan way of making armies, and of
making them ethnically balanced. “How will we pay
for this when you’re gone?” Rahim Wardak asked me
in 2002.333 He and other Afghan military leaders knew
full well that a professional western-style army would
be prohibitively expensive to pay and maintain, and
urged our delegation to utilize conscription instead.
They agreed unanimously that when U.S. funding
eventually ceased, the Afghan government would be
forced to switch over to a system of conscription as
their only option, and so it may well prove to be. In the
meantime, they were content to get what they could in
terms of military resources from the United States.
It is unclear what sober and reasoned judgment
led the U.S. Army to build an unsustainable, hightech, and very expensive professional army in its own
image in Afghanistan, despite all the polite advice of
Afghan military leaders with decades of professional
experience operating in one of the most impoverished
countries in the world,334 but it was a poor one. Former
Special Forces officer Kalev Sepp conducted a seminal
study on best practices in counterinsurgency over the
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previous 50 years, identifying commonalities of success and failure. High on the list in every failed counterinsurgency is “building [and] training indigenous
army in [the] image of U.S. Army.”335
In simple terms, Afghanistan cannot begin to afford its own army today, and even under the most
optimistic economic projections for the Afghan
economy, it would not be able to do so for decades.336
Events of the next 5 years, however, will render this a
moot point.
COUNTERVAILING ARGUMENTS
The most obvious counterargument to the comparison of the fates of the ARVN in Vietnam and the ANA
in Afghanistan is that the Taliban does not have tanks,
and they are not the regular North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) with major backing from the Soviet Union and
China. The Taliban are irregulars, it is argued, not a
conventional force like the NVA, nor can their numbers begin to approach the strength of the NVA. This
is true, as far as it goes, but by the same token the
ANA is not the ARVN either, and if the NVA was 15
times more powerful than the Taliban, the ARVN was
at least 15 times more powerful than the ANA, while
suffering half the attrition from desertions and having
a quarter of the terrain to defend. The relative size comparison is, in fact, quite good. The NVA had the backing of the nuclear-armed Soviet Union and nucleararmed China; the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network,
HiG, HiK (Hizb-i Islami Khalis), Tora Bora Front, and
other jihadi groups have the backing of nuclear-armed
Pakistan. The Taliban may not have tanks, but for all
intents and purposes, neither does the ANA. Within
the 111th Division of the ANA, there is a single tank
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battalion equipped with 44 T-55 and T-62 tanks. Half
of them, however, are “hangar queens,” vehicles used
for spare parts, and only about 20 can actually run.
All are in poor repair; none are less than 40 years old,
there are no tank transporters, and the road distance
any of them could travel without breaking down
is questionable. Ammunition for the main guns is
scarce, as are tankers who know how to operate them.
Most importantly, there is no concept of combined
arms and the use of armor in conjunction with infantry and artillery in the ANA, let alone any training or
experience. Tanks in Afghanistan are a form of lineof-sight, direct-fire artillery, like very big rifles, and
when they are used, they are employed statically and
individually. The ANA’s 20 tanks are an unreliable
parade force.337
On the other hand, the ARVN did have tanks, lots
of them, and lots of experience in operating them in
a combined arms role.338 In 1970, the ARVN had four
brigades of tanks,339 largely M-48 Pattons, which
were a proven tactical match for the NVA’s T-55.340
Each ARVN armor brigade headquarters was “highly
mobile, track-mounted, packed with radio gear, and
manned by a carefully selected, battle-tested staff.”341
The ARVN and the NVA had relative armor parity.
Thus, the real comparison is not between the NVA
and the Taliban in terms of opposing combat power
and external support, it is between the Taliban and
the ANA, and in terms of heavy weapons, both are
roughly evenly matched. The Taliban vs. the ANA is
and will be a light infantry vs. light infantry war (see
Appendix II).
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Top, the Taliban have experience operating tanks,
and, increasingly, Humvees, bottom.

Picture I-12. Taliban Tanks and Humvees.
Arguments about relative force size are also red
herrings. To argue that the Taliban has only x number
of fighters (and substitute for x with whatever intelligence estimate one prefers) is a profound miscomprehension of the various groups that loosely comprise
the Taliban. While the number of men in the ANA
basically represents the maximum number it can field,
because the maximum annual number of recruits has
balanced out with annual attrition, this is not true of
the Taliban. The number of fighters in the field today
merely represents the number current Taliban leadership believes to be appropriate for its current opera-
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tional goals. In fact, there are hundreds of thousands
of young men in northern Pakistan steeped in militant
jihad in the radical madrassas which abound in the
region, and who are ready and eager to martyr themselves in jihad in Afghanistan.342 As long as American
airpower remains a daily threat, massing such forces
would result in mass casualties for little gain, as Taliban leadership is keenly aware. But whether the Taliban has 20,000 or 30,000 or 23,871 fighters in Afghanistan today is irrelevant; unlike the ANA, it is able to
“surge” quickly and escalate violence rapidly, given
logistic support from the Pakistani Army of the type
provided from 1996 to 2001. The year 2013 witnessed
Taliban forces massing in the hundreds for the first
time,343 with more such larger formations in 2014,344 a
classic indicator of a late-stage insurgency.345
In addition, the Taliban can rely to a great extent on
the “snowball” and “hanger-on” effects of the Afghan
Way of War,346 seen so dramatically between 1996
and 2001, in which Taliban forces assimilated fighters from overrun local militias into their ranks like a
snowball rolling down a hill. This is inevitable with
ALP forces; the choice presented in the Afghan Way of
War is always “join us or die.”347 Perversely, training
and equipping the ALP ultimately may be tantamount
to the Taliban outsourcing this function to the United
States. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban also absorbed
previously uncommitted young men along the way
to national power who suddenly saw benefits in the
form of loot, plunder, rapine, food, and especially social prestige from “hanging-on” to the Taliban as it
went by. This will certainly happen again in Pashtun
areas. The ANA will have neither of these traditional
Afghan force generators. Even combat losses today
in Helmand are difficult to replace, and it was only
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the insertion of one of the ANA commando battalions
into Helmand by air, rather than new replacements,
combined with the massive application of U.S. CAS,
that stabilized the situation in September and October
2014. Without U.S. airpower, the ANA garrison in the
town of Sangin was overrun on November 29, 2014,
killing 14 ANA soldiers and leaving another six or
seven MIA.348
Furthermore, in the summer of 2014, the highly
motivated but lightly armed ISIS in Iraq faced a numerically far superior and more heavily armed Iraqi
Army, which was equipped with armor and artillery,
and rolled over them in a matter of hours. Perhaps as
good or better a comparison than NVA vs. ARVN for
the future of Afghanistan is ISIS vs. the Iraqi Army.
For the Taliban, analyzing their campaign to regain
power in Western terms of the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of war, tactical success might be
said to take the form of temporarily overrunning police checkpoints and inflicting steady casualties on the
police and army. This they are already achieving on
a daily basis. Operational success for the Taliban, although they do not think about it in these terms, might
be evaluated as briefly capturing a provincial capital,
or taking and holding several contiguous district centers, to give themselves a base of uncontested local
power. The Taliban extended the traditional fighting
season into December in 2014 to achieve this in Helmand province. Dr. Abdul Hamidi, the chief of medical services for the ANP in Helmand told The New York
Times in mid-December 2014 that “the Quetta Shura
has a big push to raise their flags over three districts by
January, and has ordered their people to keep fighting
until they do.”349 Strategic success for the Taliban in
the next 2 years might be described in Western terms
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as perhaps taking and holding an entire province and
its provincial capital, from which they could proclaim
the return of the “Islamic State of Afghanistan” to Afghan soil. This would be an enormous propaganda
victory for the Taliban, and a major and demoralizing
defeat for the Afghan government. This is unlikely in
2015, but in this sense, the Taliban only has to succeed
in one province in 2015 and subsequent years, while
the ANA and ANP have to succeed in all 34 provinces.
The ANA and ANP must spread themselves out thinly and defend the government presence country-wide,
while the Taliban can mass and choose the time and
place of their attacks. In 2015, as in 2014, the military
initiative will be entirely in the hands of the Taliban.
In 2015, the Taliban would only need to win one big
battle to achieve something akin to strategic success;
the security forces need to win them all to prevent it.
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PART II:
AFGHANISTAN YEAR-BY-YEAR 2015-19
We have an issue with the will of the Iraqis to fight
[ISIS] and defend themselves. We can give them training, we can give them equipment; we obviously can't
give them the will to fight.1				
		
U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter

MOTIVATION: WHY THE AFGHAN NATIONAL
ARMY WILL COLLAPSE IN THE SOUTH
One, two, three, what are we fighting for?2
		1960s anti-war song, “Feel like I’m Fixin’ to
Die” by Country Joe McDonald

This part describes, year-by-year, what will happen in Afghanistan from 2015 to 2019 and why, using the available statistics and comparable outcomes
of Vietnam and Iraq and a spectrum of unclassified
Afghan indicators. It examines the key reasons for
the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) and the Iraqi Army, and the pending collapse
of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in the south of
Afghanistan. As shown in Part I, with almost no combat power, the Afghan National Police (ANP) will not
be a military factor (see Appendix II).
All three states—South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—collapsed or will collapse because their
U.S.-built armies collapsed, but this alone does not
explain why all three states have turned out so differently from the democracies envisioned by U.S. policymakers. In fact, the collapse of South Vietnam and
Iraq and the inevitable collapse of Afghanistan were
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ultimately not the failures of the U.S. Army, or of the
U.S. military and Navy in general. The cause lies much
deeper than armies, navies, and air forces.
The armies of South Vietnam and Iraq collapsed
almost immediately when confronted with military
force. The ARVN ceased organized resistance within
6 weeks of a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) armored
reconnaissance in force entering South Vietnamese
territory, although it was qualitatively and quantitatively superior on paper.3 We will dispense here
and now with the trendy but ahistorical revisionist
claim that the ARVN lost because the U.S. Congress
cut ARVN funding. This simply never happened, and
this falsehood has been comprehensively debunked.4
Congress never stopped funding support to South
Vietnam. This misinformation was started by Melvin
Laird in 2005 in a blatantly dishonest attempt to rewrite history. In fact, funding to the ARVN continued
to the last day of South Vietnam, and the ARVN had
warehouses full of ammunition and materiel when
it surrendered. No serious academic historian of the
Vietnam War accepts this deliberate lie.5
The Iraqi army’s cohesion in the face of a determined offensive by a small force of irregulars can
be measured in hours. When a few hundred Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militiamen attacked Mosul, for example, the 30,000-man Iraqi army garrison
there fled, shedding their uniforms and equipment as
they ran.6 After the departure of U.S. advisors, there
is no reason to suggest the ANA, with half as many
men and roughly twice as much territory to defend
as the Iraqi Army, will fare significantly better. What
caused these armies to collapse? As this part of the
book will demonstrate, all three collapsed or will collapse for the same reasons. Indeed, the failure of all
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three was predictable, even inevitable, to dispassionate and objective political analysts. Furthermore, this
was clear before the first local soldier entered basic
training, not in hindsight but in foresight. What lessons should have been learned from Vietnam? What
lessons should now be learned again from the current military re-intervention in Iraq and the crisis in
Afghanistan?
Warfare is a conflict of moral purposes. In war, as
Napoleon noted, “the moral [i.e., motivation to fight] is
to the physical [i.e., force size] as three is to one.”7 Carl
von Clausewitz, too, emphasized the importance of the
moral (motivational) aspect of war: “The moral forces
are amongst the most important in war,” Clausewitz
wrote, adding they constitute “the Will which puts in
motion and guides the whole mass of powers, uniting
[them] . . . in one stream. . . . The value of the moral
powers, and their frequently incredible influence, are
best exemplified by history.”8 The most serious deficit
of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is not
its lack of an air force, extreme over-reliance on weak
and static police forces, small size, nonexistent logistics, pervasive drug abuse, or the attrition that runs
near 50 percent per year in combat units in the south,
none of which substantively afflicted the ARVN to
anywhere near the severity of these problems in the
ANSF today. It is its lack of motivation in comparison
to the Taliban.
Although there are exceptions, there is simply
a general lack of will in the ANSF to fight the Taliban in the south at the soldier and policeman level.
As Afghan War veteran and military analyst John
Cook notes:
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Additional trainers are not enough to turn the situation around if there is no will to win from the Afghans.
The truth is the Afghan army is not very good and they
won’t fight. This is where we are after ten years and
billions of dollars invested in training and equipping
them with state of the art technology and weapons .
. . the Taliban, lacking any formal military training,
poorly led and poorly equipped, often living in caves,
enduring incredible hardships, shows far more fight
and aggressiveness on the battlefield than the Afghan
army . . . the Taliban believe in their cause enough
to die for it, while the Afghan [army] soldiers do
not. . . .This behavior can be traced directly to a lack
of national identity and national loyalty. Nor do they
have a cause they are willing to die for. . . . They are in
the army for one reason only: for the money.9

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
attempted to control the discourse of ANA performance over the past decade with an amplified narrative of positive ANA operations, but the truth consistently leaks through in press and military reporting. In
fact, the reports of this lack of fighting motivation and
morale failure in the ANA are pervasive and consistent. Even when partnered with Americans, the ANA
lacks fighting spirit. During the fight for Combat Outpost (COP) Keating in 2009, for example, known as the
Battle of Kamdesh, ANA soldiers hid under their beds
or looted the American barracks.10 As one American
combat advisor noted:
In Afghanistan, the problem we had training the ANA
was that they only really gave a shit about themselves
and their tribal group. Northern Pashtuns were especially bad with this. I caught a group of them smoking hash when they were supposed to be patrolling
and their commander gave them a tongue lashing, but
they really didn’t understand why they should be in-
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terested in Afghan security as a whole versus just their
own village/family/friends.11

American troops are not the only ones reporting
systemic ANA failure to fight. Latvian advisors stationed at COP Keating told U.S. investigators the Afghan soldiers lacked “discipline, motivation, and initiative.”12 Decorated British soldier Doug Beattie notes
the ANA “refused to fight” and lacked fighting spirit
during the British campaign around Garmsir in Helmand Province.13 British Captain Mike Martin wrote
of the British campaign in Helmand that “the Afghan
army in Helmand was nonexistent. The local Afghan
police were, on the whole, criminal.”14
During the fighting around Marjah in 2010, Marines reported the ANA lacked motivation, refused to
carry out their duties, and spent their time looting the
bazaar and smoking hashish.15 An embedded reporter
with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne,
in Zhari district in 2010 described the ANA unit that
the American troopers were operating with, the 4th
Company, 3rd Brigade, 205 Corps, as “clueless and
stoned.” During one firefight, the reporter observed:
few soldiers . . . seemed even to know how to fire their
weapons properly. . . . As insurgent gunfire spat overhead, some soldiers stared listlessly at the sky, their
hands pressed to their ears. Others crawled among the
vines, huddling among the roots, dazed and disorientated, their weapons useless in their hands. . . . Their
machine gunners had left most of their ammunition
behind. They refused to provide sentries, or else slept
at their posts. . . . Befuddled on hash, one machine
gunner dozed off, oblivious to the firefight around
him. A junior officer appeared briefly to chastise another group of troops for getting stoned, before he
too wandered off and fell asleep, ignored by his men
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. . . . The company commander seemed to be in hiding
for most of the operation while one of their platoon
commanders . . . simply walked away from his men
as he beat a retreat for the safety of a compound. One
of the enlisted 101st Airborne troopers said ‘Look at
that one,’ pointing out an ANA soldier who wandered
down a vineyard track in the midst of the shooting,
glassy-eyed, without any weapon. ‘I don’t know what
it is with this unit, but they are worse than useless. . . .
They are a complete liability’.16

An Army soldier named Andrew Carson shared
COP Pirtle-King in Kunar province for a year with
three different Afghan National Army platoons,
observing that:
the majority of the ANA we dealt with were poorly
trained, lacked discipline, and were cowards. . . . They
didn’t want our help or training. It seemed that they
really didn’t care about their own country. We found
out that one of the platoon sergeants was getting paid
by the Taliban to give them information about our
movements and fire missions. He was detained and
sent to Bagram. We had one of the Afghan soldiers ‘accidentally’ shoot one of our M240 machine-gunners in
the leg. A lot of the soldiers lacked discipline while on
missions which endangered everyone with them, and
a number of them would fall out of foot patrols after
just half a click.17

Based on what he saw, Carson concluded that “Afghanistan will follow the path that Iraq has, but with
less of a fight.”18 A former Battalion Sergeant Major
of the North Carolina National Guard who deployed
to Afghanistan put it more succinctly: “The ANA is
not worth a shit,” he said, adding “there is no sense
of nation or nationality in Afghanistan by the Afghan
people.”19 Former U.S. Army War College (USAWC)
134

Commandant Major General Robert Scales (Retired)
believes that “when we leave, the ANA will scatter
like leaves in a stiff breeze.”20
Fighting spirit has not improved over time. U.S.
Army Sergeant First Class Keith Norris, who served
as a combat advisor to the ANA in Paktika province,
wrote in 2012 in Military Review that “American soldiers consistently view their Afghan counterparts as
untrustworthy, unmotivated, and inept.”21 During the
fighting in Helmand in 2013, according to The New
York Times, “The Afghan soldiers seldom leave the installation, and mostly refuse to conduct missions—too
dangerous, they say . . . American officers admit the
ANA has an ‘addiction to bases’.”22 Antonio Giustozzi
noted in February 2014 that the motivation of the ANA
“rank and file” to fight was “dubious.”23 In June 2014,
Special Forces (SFs) operating with ANA personnel in
Zabul province reported the same pattern of behavior, including ANA soldiers refusing to help form a
secure perimeter and “huddling behind rocks” during
the fighting.24 The New York Times described ANA performance in Helmand that summer as “lackluster.”25
By the end of the fighting season in 2014, the Times
said, “the cowed Afghan Army unit [in Sangin] was
mostly unwilling to leave its base to confront the
threat. Late last year, reports of a deal between a local
army commander and the Taliban began to surface.”26
In October, The Economist described ANA morale as
“low,” noting that many soldiers had not been paid for
months.27 On November 29, 2014, the Taliban overran
the ANA garrison in Sangin, killing 14 ANA soldiers.
Another six or seven were missing in action. The ANA
forces in the Sangin District Center 300 yards away
from the ANA garrison did not sortie to counterattack
and relieve their comrades, instead firing in the dark
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over the walls of their fort in the general direction of
the garrison.28 Former Marine and former Assistant
Secretary of Defense Bing West, who served in the
Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in Vietnam
and spent months with Marines in Helmand province,
corroborates the poor morale and poor fighting qualities of the ANA as well as U.S. Marines’ low regard for
them across the board.29 West also noted that, while
he and thousands of other Marines lived with their
Vietnamese counterparts in rural villages in Vietnam,
no American forces would ever live with their Afghan
counterparts because of the extremely high risk of
betrayal.30
Few military leaders would dispute the principle
that troops with high morale and strong motivation
are better and more aggressive fighters than those
without. Here again, Afghanistan resembles Vietnam.
There are remarkable parallels between the certainty
of victory among the enemies of the state in Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan. In each case, the enemy’s will
to fight overall was greater than that of their opponents. In the case of Vietnam, a senior advisor on the
Phoenix program to neutralize Viet Cong cadre, Colonel Jack Weissinger, interviewed hundreds of known
mid-level Viet Cong officials and recorded that:
One of the underlying beliefs I have, and it is unshakeable by the way, is that there was a basic difference,
possibly in the cultural background, possibly in the
people, but certainly in the motivation of the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong, on one hand, and the followers of the [Government of South Vietnam] GVN
on the other . . . I was struck, time and again, with
the terribly strong belief they had in what they were
doing. They absolutely believed, and I mean every
one of them, that they were going to win eventually.
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They didn’t believe in a military victory at that time,
I don’t think any of them did, but they all believed in
the inevitable, final, political victory or combination
military-political victory. That was a universal belief
with them. It was right down inside the skin, they
believed it so strongly.31

As former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
noted with hindsight and understatement in 1996:
We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate people (in this case, the North Vietnamese and
the Viet Cong) to fight and die for their beliefs and
values—and we continue to do so today in many parts
of the world.32

A parallel motivational dynamic is at work in Afghanistan today in relation to the Taliban. According
to a British Broadcasting Corporation report in February 2012, confirmed by NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the U.S.
Department of Defense, interviews with thousands
of Taliban detainees over a period of many years are
unequivocal empirical evidence that the Taliban are
utterly dedicated to battlefield victory, uninterested
in any negotiated settlement, and absolutely confident of the final victory of their cause. In the NATO
report, confirmed and acknowledged by both Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie Cummings, a spokesman for
ISAF in Afghanistan and U.S. Department of Defense
spokesman Captain (now Rear Admiral) John Kirby,
“the Taliban are absolutely confident of victory, based
on 27,000 interviews with over 4,000 detainees ranging from senior Taliban commanders to Afghan civilians. They also include mid- and low-level Taliban,
al-Qaeda, and foreign fighters.” Lieutenant Colonel
Cummings publicly authenticated the information in
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the report, which he confirmed in a press conference
represented the “opinions or ideals” of Taliban detainees.33 Then-Captain Kirby, in publicly discussing
the document at a press conference in February 2012,
confirmed that the report, called “State of the Taliban
2012,” is “the product of thousands of interviews with
Taliban detainees in 2011.” Appearing before the U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence one day earlier, on January 31, 2012, the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed that the Taliban
“remains a resilient, determined adversary.”34
In Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, U.S. military
officers dismissed the importance of these findings,
confident of the superiority of American troops, tactics, commitment, and equipment. This confidence
was not misplaced; in all three conflicts, the American Soldier was a better fighter than any of his opponents. However, in all three wars, the confidence
of higher-ranking American military officers and
advisors in the fighting potential of their respective
local troops and senior-level American enthusiasm
for their performance was, and is, misplaced. Scales
recently referred to this subjective bias toward the
ANA on the part of U.S. trainers as “spin.”35 This is
another similarity to the Vietnam War, according to
historian Arnold Isaacs. Isaacs argues that the Richard
Nixon administration embarked on a large and farreaching information campaign to make “failure look
like success,” beginning with Nixon’s famous “silent
majority” speech.36
A report prepared in January 2014 by the Department of Defense (DoD) concluded that not only does
the ANA lack motivation, the Afghan civilian population in many parts of Afghanistan are also sure the
Taliban eventually will win, according to CNN:
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. . . dramatic increases in fighting against the Taliban
have failed to convince the local population that the
Afghan government and coalition forces will succeed.
‘The Taliban’s strength lies in the Afghan population’s
perception that Coalition forces will soon leave, giving
credence to the belief that a Taliban victory is inevitable,’ the report says.37

In Iraq, too, the Iraqi Army lacked the will to fight,
even briefly, despite overwhelming quantitative and
qualitative superiority. The opponents of the Iraqi
Army, the terrorist group ISIS, have a similar level of
fanatical motivation to that of the Viet Cong, the NVA,
and the Taliban. One ISIS terrorist noted: “I think it’s
impossible that the new [Iraqi] army can defeat ISIS.”
The Mosul-based terrorist added: “The [ISIS] gunmen
are highly trained. They are ready to sacrifice their
lives to get what they want and they are motivated
by religion.”38 In comparison, the Iraqi governor of
Nineveh province, Atheel al Nujaifi, says of the Iraqi
Army, “the leaders and the soldiers have no military
experience and have no convictions.”39
One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the
armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for the weak, corrupt, illegitimate
governments that we stand up in parallel, no matter
how big they are or how much equipment we give
them. As McNamara admitted in 1996, Vietnam War
planners:
. . . failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that,
in the final analysis, if the South Vietnamese were to be
saved, they had to win the war for themselves. . . .We
viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in
terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst
for—and a determination to fight for—freedom and
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democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces
within the country.40

The ARVN that the United States created collapsed
in 6 weeks, and the Iraqi Army that the United States
created collapsed in 6 hours because they had neither
a national sense of country nor a government—in Saigon or Baghdad—that its soldiers believed was worth
dying for. The ANA will certainly not fare any better
than the ARVN or the Iraqi Army (IA) after we leave,
and for the very same reason.
WHERE DOES MOTIVATION COME FROM?
THE CRITICAL LEGITIMACY FACTOR
The cafes of Vienna might seem an unlikely place
to find a preeminent source of military wisdom. Yet,
it was there 100 years ago that the father of modern
sociology, Karl “Max” Weber, did his seminal work
on legitimacy of governance, Politik als Beruf.41 Weber
famously identified three basic sources of governmental legitimacy, which he characterized as traditional,
charismatic, and rational-legal.42 Traditional legitimacy originates in social cultures that historically respect
the authority of tradition. In this group, Weber included dynastic, hereditary leadership—monarchies
and patriarchal systems—which included segmentary
tribal organizations like the Pashtuns. Charismatic
leadership, Weber writes, is the human response to
the personal charisma of a person or an idea. Weber
included religious authority in this category. “Religious” leadership is self-explanatory, but would obviously include, for example, as archetypes the former
Caliphate of Islam and the Papacy of Catholic Europe
in the Middle Ages.43 The terrorist organization ISIS
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in Iraq and Syria today seeks to claim legitimacy to
rule by proclaiming itself as the new caliphate for the
Muslim world, and indeed has attracted recruits from
all over the world with the power of this perceived
legitimacy.44 Taliban leader Mullah Omar obtained the
same legitimacy by donning the sacred Cloak of the
Prophet in Kandahar in 1996 and proclaiming himself
the Amir ul-Mumaneen, or leader of the faithful.45 (In
Central Asian culture, such articles of clothing convey
enormous authority as they are believed to literally
embody the power and sanctity of the original wearer.46) Rational-legal legitimacy comes from a system
of institutional procedure, wherein government institutions establish order through the consent of the
governed. Weber included in this category all of the
forms of representative government that the democracies of Europe and North America today embody, and
that have in common a basis in the rule of law and
elective popular representation. This is the source of
legitimacy of all western governments today.
The nucleus of the U.S. failures in South Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan was the political failure to have
any legitimacy of governance. Despite the fact that
none of the three countries ever had any experience
of Weber’s third source of legitimacy, i.e., democracy
and government institutions that established social
order through the consent of the governed, the United
States attempted to impose one in each country anyway, and deliberately excluded any other source of
legitimacy.
Without exception, for 2,000 years, Afghanistan
has known only the first two of these sources. Afghanistan has been ruled by kings, emirs, and empires,
including the Samanids and the Seljuk Turks, whose
rule over what today is Afghanistan was endorsed by
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Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad (in other words, traditional legitimacy reinforced by charismatic legitimacy).47 Afghanistan, for all intents and purposes, has no
experience at all with the third source of legitimacy of
governance, i.e., democracy, the rule of law, and representative government. The international community, in the form of the United States and the United Nations, led by Lakhdar Brahimi and allied with a tiny
group of educated, expatriate, urban Kabuli elites, entered the medieval rural Afghan world of traditional
and religious legitimacy in 2001 and 2002 with the
so–called Bonn Process.48 Working together with one
or two idealistic western scholars who shared the patently false view of this handful of educated, westernized Afghan urban elites that Afghanistan was ready
for democracy, the ideologically neo-conservative
U.S. Government created a new Afghan polity that
comprehensively eliminated or marginalized the only
two culturally acceptable sources of government legitimacy, the traditional and the religious. Here the
United States again forgot not only the wisdom of
General Douglas MacArthur regarding land forces in
Asia but also his lessons from post-war Japan. MacArthur knew the Japanese people and culture,49 and he
recognized that the beloved Japanese Emperor was a
critical symbol of national unity for a defeated nation.
MacArthur ensured the Emperor would remain as a
ceremonial figurehead, in a role much like the monarchy of the United Kingdom (UK).50
The monarchy in Afghanistan, although it had
been in exile since 1973, nevertheless remained enormously popular with the Afghan people51 and conveyed among them the critical traditional legitimacy
of governance that Weber described. When King Zahir
Shah spoke to the Afghan people on the radio a few
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days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, “I almost
cried,” said one young man in Kabul, “you can’t believe how reassuring it was just to hear his voice.” The
day after the King’s address, the value of the national
currency doubled. There was literally dancing in the
streets. “All the ethnic groups in Afghanistan support
Zahir Shah—Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras,”
the BBC quoted another man as saying. “All the other
leaders and the armed factions couldn’t bring peace
and stability, but he will,” said a third man. “Yes,
we’ll welcome him,” said a fourth, “when he was our
ruler, our king, we had hunger, but we had peace.” As
the BBC correspondent noted, “It is actually quite difficult to find an Afghan who does not want the former
king back.”52 Despite the blatant obviousness of the return of the King in a largely ceremonial role as the one
chance Afghanistan now had for peace and stability,
the United States abolished the monarchy via proxies,
against the express wishes of 75 percent of the official
delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002, who
signed a petition requesting King Zahir Shah be made
the interim leader of Afghanistan.53 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) subverted this petition54 and
had Zalmay Khalilzad browbeat the elderly king into
abdicating his throne.55 As United Press International
(UPI) reported at the time, “After nearly 25 years of
war, democracy nearly broke out in Afghanistan on
Monday, but was blocked by backroom dealing to
prevent former King Mohammed Zahir Shah from
emerging as a challenger to Hamid Karzai, head of the
current interim government.”56
Into this void of political legitimacy in 2002 returned the Taliban with its religious source of legitimacy to fill the vacuum. It had to be one or the other,
the monarchy or Islam, because the third source (le-
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gal) has no legitimacy in Afghanistan. The Taliban today only have the support of one-third of the Afghan
people,57 but they are seen as legitimate, which should
not be conflated with popularity. Leaders can be seen
as the legitimate leaders of their countries without being popular, as American presidents from Abraham
Lincoln to Barack Obama know only too well. The
Bonn Process coupled this illegitimacy of democracy
to a system of strong central authority, which Afghanistan has never accepted. In short, in Afghanistan, the United States attempted to create something
that has never existed successfully, a strong central
government, based on a source of legitimacy that has
never existed, democracy, by implementing a strategy
of “extending the reach of the central government,”
which for a thousand years has always provoked a
virulent, rural, conservative insurgency based in Islamic models of resistance.58 At a critical inflection
point in Afghanistan’s history, it was a catastrophic
western diplomatic failure at the Bonn conference, not
military failure, that sealed Afghanistan’s fate. After
the abolition of the monarchy and the de jure establishment of a highly centralized state government that
gave no power to the regions, to the King or to the
mullahs, there was simply never any chance of a successful outcome.
The same fundamental mistake was repeated in
South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In each case,
the United States removed unpopular leaders who
were perceived to have some legitimacy to govern
(Diem, Hussein, and Mullah Omar) and replaced them
with unpopular leaders who were illegitimate (Thieu,
al Maliki, and Karzai). In each case, grown men and
women in the United States actually operated under
the belief that, in primitive countries with no experi-
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ence of democracy, entire populations could be transformed virtually overnight into Jeffersonian democrats. The operating assumption was apparently that,
when the people of each country somehow instinctively recognized the inherent superiority of western
democracy over whatever they had been doing for the
last thousand years, they would, in a forehead-slapping moment of epiphany, suddenly be enraptured
by democracy and believe it to be legitimate. But the
simple fact is that elections do not make democracies,
democracies make elections. As retired CIA senior
analyst Paul Pillar recently noted:
The cause of the political crisis in Afghanistan is . . . to
be found . . . in the lack of a political culture that nurtures the habits of thought and behavior critical to the
smooth functioning of a stable democracy [including]
. . . fairness, inclusiveness, and observance of impartial
rules—and confidence that one’s political opponents
are displaying those habits as well. A failure to recognize the importance of a democratic political culture .
. . and the time it takes to develop one has led repeatedly to the mistaken belief that in a troubled country
(be it Afghanistan, Ukraine, Iraq, South Vietnam, or
someplace else), if we just pick the right leader and
give him enough support, including at times military
support, stable democracy will prevail.59

All the military effort in South Vietnam, Iraq and
Afghanistan was futile, because politically, in Saigon,
Baghdad, and Kabul, there was, and is, no perception
of a legitimate government that had, or has, the support of the rural population and for which the people
were willing to fight. It is the rural population in Afghanistan that matters, as Giustozzi notes, because
virtually all the recruits in the ANA are from rural
hamlets.60 In another critical parallel between South
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Vietnam and Afghanistan, one of the Vietnam War’s
best historians, Eric Bergerud, has written that:
The . . . GVN lacked legitimacy with the rural peasantry, the largest segment of the population. . . . The
peasantry perceived the GVN to be aloof, corrupt, and
inefficient . . . South Vietnam’s urban elite possessed
the outward manifestations of a foreign culture . . .
more importantly, this small group held most of the
wealth and power in a poor nation, and the attitude
of the ruling elite toward the rural population was, at
best, paternalistic and, at worst, predatory.61

As Jeffrey Record notes, “the fundamental political obstacle to an enduring American success in Vietnam [was] a politically illegitimate, militarily feckless,
and thoroughly corrupted South Vietnamese client
regime.”62 Like Afghanistan, South Vietnam at the
government level was a massively corrupt collection
of self-interested warlords, many of them deeply implicated in the profitable opium trade—including in
both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the President’s own
brother—with almost nonexistent loyalty outside the
capital city beyond that which could be bought with
bribery, patronage, and corruption. The purely military gains achieved at such terrible cost in our nation’s
blood and treasure in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq
never came close to exhausting the enemy’s manpower pool or his will to fight, and simply could not be
sustained politically by illegitimate and dysfunctional
state institutions where corrupt self-interest at every
level from the minister to the desk clerk was and is the
sole order of the day. As McNamara writes, “external
military force cannot substitute for the political order
and stability that must be forged by a people for themselves.”63 In other words, the military cannot provide
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a national identity. Nixon’s “Vietnamization” of that
conflict, President George W. Bush’s “Iraqification”
of the Iraq War, and President Obama’s “Afghanization” of the Afghan War were never sustainable. As
the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles in 1954, “Strong and stable governments
and societies are necessary to support the creation of
strong armies.”64 Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were
a century away from having either one.
THE FALLACY OF “NATION-BUILDING”
“Nation-building” is frequently conflated with
“state-building.” It is, in political terms, a fluid concept that has been given multiple definitions over time
by many political scientists. The definitions of nationbuilding and state-building themselves are the subjects of ongoing debates and semantic arguments, and
the topic has generated a large volume of academic
literature.65 As Carolyn Stephenson notes, “Nationbuilding is a normative concept that means different
things to different people.”66 Paul Beinart for example,
defines nation-building as “the use of armed force in
the aftermath of a crisis to promote a transition to democracy.”67 This is essentially the same definition contrived by James Dobbins as: “the use of armed force
in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring
transition to democracy.”68 For the purposes of this
book, however, nation-building simply refers to the
evolutionary process of creating and establishing a
broad, deep, and pervasive personal sense of national
identity in a great majority of the population, rather
than one that is centered in a localized identity: “I am
a German” for example, as opposed to “I am a Bavarian”; or “I am an American” as opposed to “I am a
Catholic” or “I am a Latino.” It is about creating a sense
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of primary personal identity that is located at the level
of the nation, rather than one grounded first in region,
race, religion, tribe, language, culture, or political affiliation. As Godfrey Mwakikagile writes, “Tribalism
is incompatible with nationalism, and nation-building
is impossible without nationhood. And you can’t have
nationhood without a genuine feeling of common citizenship and identity.”69
Higher levels of identity can be achieved as nations mature. The current political experiment of the
European Union (EU) is an excellent example of how
nations may seek to transcend national identities to begin to forge larger regional identities based on shared
values and economic interests. As the struggles of the
EU to create workable political and economic policies
demonstrate, however, this is not an easy process. But
beyond any reasonable doubt, becoming a nation is
a necessary precursor stage of state maturity through
which all countries must pass before transcending
this 18th century concept. Tribal and sectarian societies cannot leap-frog nationhood to democracy. It has
never been done. Nor does nationhood always ensure
unity or stability: The cases of the Basques in Spain
and Scotland’s independence movement in the UK are
examples of the persistence of sub-national fissures
within modern, developed nations.
A state is properly defined as the governmental
apparatus by which a country rules itself. Max Weber
provided the classic definition of the state:
Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that territory is one of the characteristics
of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right
to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions
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or to individuals only to the extent to which the state
permits it.70

By this definition, Afghanistan is neither a state nor
a nation.
State-building, therefore, refers to building or reinforcing the institutions of civil society. These might
include fostering more transparent voting procedures,
for example, or supporting society-state relations in
the justice, education, or health care sectors. The interrelationship between nationhood and state-building
is complex. Having a national identity can itself be
nuanced and subtle in mature nations. In the case of
Switzerland, for example, three major ethnic groups
speaking four national languages live in 26 cantons,
each of which has its own constitution. Yet, there is
a national army, in which all males serve, a national
government, and a single currency, and the people of
Switzerland think of themselves as Swiss regardless of
which canton they are from. Switzerland has existed
since 1291, last having been involved in a war more
than 200 years ago. It has almost no natural resources, yet it is prosperous, and civil unrest is virtually
unknown.
Afghanistan, in contrast, has only two official languages (and more than 60 unofficial ones) and three
major ethnic groups (defined as comprising more than
10 percent of the population), vast mineral resources,
and mountainous terrain similar to Switzerland. Yet
the overwhelming majority of Afghans live in desperate poverty, have no sense of national identity, and
have rarely, if ever, known peace, education, or justice. After 13 years of American engagement, Afghanistan in 2014 set an all-time record on the Gallup World
Poll human suffering index.71 Already the worst in the
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world, Afghan suffering in 2014 reached a global historical high.72 In July 2014, U.S. reconstruction spending in Afghanistan exceeded the Marshall Plan,73 yet,
despite the United States spending $3,350 for every
man, woman, and child in Afghanistan since 2002,74 it
remains the poorest country in the world. As journalist Anna Corsaro notes, “Absolute poverty has risen
by about 10 percentage points in Afghanistan since
the beginning of the war; life expectancy has fallen to
44 years, [and] infant mortality has increased to reach
150 per thousand.”75 Not surprisingly, on November
18, 2014, John Sopko, the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), termed the
entire Afghan reconstruction effort “an abysmal failure.”76 What accounts for the difference? Switzerland
is a nation, Afghanistan is not.
U.S. foreign policy is relatively uncomplicated regarding developed and developing democracies that
are at peace and do not harbor international terrorists.
We trade with them and, in the latter case, attempt to
provide aid in the form of civilian-led programs designed to foster the state-building process. More recently, military cooperation has morphed into a major
component of American foreign policy. Prior to World
War II, the United States did not participate in multinational training exercises or provide any peacetime
armaments or training to foreign countries. Since the
Vietnam War, in particular, the U.S. military has positioned itself as a major component of state-building
ostensibly limited to the sector of national defense and
state security.
After World War II, what the United States did in
Japan and Germany was state-building, not nationbuilding. Both the Germans and the Japanese already
had a strong sense of national identity, indeed a
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highly militarized national identity. Both had developed economies, functioning justice systems, high
literacy levels, and pervasive civil order enforced by
(however repugnant and unacceptable their methods)
relatively corruption-free professional policing. The
challenge was building enduring democratic institutions, not creating a national identity. Germany had
experience of democracy in the Weimar Republic and
a highly literate population; Japan had its beloved
Emperor to sustain it through the transition. Seventy
years later, the United States still has substantial numbers of troops stationed in both countries.
After the Korean War, the United States faced a
different challenge. Korea was not a defeated enemy,
but an ally that had helped fight its way back from
the brink of extinction to a delicate cessation of hostilities in which both North and South remained heavily
armed and ideologically opposed. No peace treaty
has ever been signed.77 The Koreans on the south of
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), like their northern
brothers and sisters, were largely illiterate, poor, and
underdeveloped. They did, however, have a common
ethnicity, and they shared a common language and religion. The sense of being Korean as a primary identity
was nearly universal. They were already a nation. The
challenges here, too, were state-building, and transforming a sense of national political identity into being
specifically democratic South Korean as distinct from
being (communist) North Korean. This task was complicated by the multitude of family ties that reached
across the DMZ. Success was not easy, nor did it come
quickly. Post-war Korea experienced significant political turmoil, going through six periods, or republics,
before emerging in the 21st century as a liberal democracy.78 The first of these, formed in 1945 after the
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surrender of Japan and known as the First Republic
under Syngman Rhee, was staunchly anti-communist
and was in place for 5 years before the outbreak of the
Korean War.79 This continuity provided significant advantages in state-building after the hostilities ended,
despite Syngman Rhee’s shortcomings as an (increasingly) authoritarian ruler.80 Nevertheless, even given
nationhood and these other advantages, stable liberal
democracy and middle class prosperity took nearly
70 years to emerge, following periods of military rule,
and, of course, the United States has maintained a
sizeable garrison in the country since the end of World
War II. During these 70 years, a more nuanced sense
of national identity in the sense of being a South Korean has indeed emerged without diminishing a larger sense of being one people and a continuing desire
for peaceful reunification with the North. Today the
South Korean (Republic of Korea [ROK]) Army is both
powerful and imbued with an aggressive spirit and an
intense will to fight. The author served in Korea and
operated with the ROK Army and Marine Corps, and
has never heard a U.S. military officer speak disparagingly about either.
All countries are different, and each is unique. It
would be reductionist and simplistic to suggest that
what worked in one country will work in another.
Nevertheless, certain larger, strategic, historical lessons can be drawn that should inform foreign policy.
The first of these is that state-building takes a long
time. Success in Germany, Japan, and Korea came
about slowly during significant and unbroken 70-year
U.S. military defense treaty commitments, a large U.S.
force presence, and sustained economic investment.
In the cases of Germany and Japan, the latter took the
form of the Marshall Plan.
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The futile U.S. effort at nation-creation and concurrent state-building in South Vietnam, in contrast,
lasted 12 years; the attempt in Iraq, 10 years; while
the effort in Afghanistan has ground on for 13 years.
Even these durations are misleading; the rotation
of military officers and civilian officials every 6 to
12 months meant that little expertise was accumulated, and little traction was sustained anywhere. As
Army officer and U.S. Agency for International Development official John Paul Vann famously said of
America’s experience in Vietnam, “We don’t have 12
years’ experience in Vietnam. We have 1 year’s experience 12 times.”81 The same is true in equal measure
of Iraq and Afghanistan. The government left in place
in South Vietnam lasted 3 years; the government left
behind in Iraq lasted just 2 years. How long the government left in place after the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Afghanistan (whenever that happens) endures is predictable. Given its complete lack of nationhood; its complete lack of legitimacy of governance;
its unworkable “unity government”; its geostrategic
location; its innumerable ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic fissures; the current Taliban war against the
government; its completely inadequate and unmotivated security forces; its imploding economy and its
perpetual status as a pawn in a larger game between
India, Iran, and Pakistan—the 2 to 3 years of Iraq and
South Vietnam, respectively, are a reasonable projection. The Soviet-backed regime of President Mohammad Najibullah also lasted 3 years after the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the resulting cutoff of Soviet
funding. What would be unreasonable would be to
think that Afghanistan—with all the ethnic and sectarian hatreds of Iraq, multiplied by all the poverty and
rural isolation of South Vietnam—will fare better than
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either did after our departure. The strategic reason for
this is that all three are not nations. They were not yet
or are not yet “nation-built.”
Succinctly put, nation-building is impossible. This
is the single most important lesson unlearned from
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. As historian Jeffrey
Clark notes, no nation, no matter how powerful, has
the capacity to “reform and reshape the society of
another.”82 There are no successful examples in our
history of nation-building. As Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel, himself a Vietnam combat veteran with
the Purple Heart, recently noted:
I learned as I walked through this 12 months of war in
1968 . . . you cannot impose your will, you cannot impose your values, you cannot impose your standards,
your institutions on other societies in other countries.
It has never worked. Never will work.83

The United States has never occupied a country
with troops and camped out long enough for the
slow, evolutionary, internally driven social process
of becoming a nation to occur. How long this process
might take, under full military occupation and with
complete enforced control over the building blocks of
education, justice, and honest policing, as was done in
the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, for
example, is difficult to say. There are no precedents.
The U.S. experiment in social engineering in the Philippines was terminated by the Japanese Imperial
Army in 1942, and the insurgency today in Mindanao
and smaller southern islands rages on, despite the fact
that the Philippines largely meet the test of being a
nation. It is unlikely that the United States will ever
commit to such a massive and naïve project of social
re-engineering of the type attempted in Vietnam, Iraq,
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and Afghanistan again in the future. At least we can
hope so.
In countries where nation-building, as distinct
from state-building, was not necessary, due to preexisting national identities reinforced by common
languages, religions, and ethnicities (Germany, Japan,
and South Korea, for example), 70 years of continuous
U.S. alliance and military presence backed by defense
treaties and economic investment were demonstrably
sufficient. All three of these countries were already
nations—they were already “nation-built.” U.S. forces
are now based in these three countries, with the arguable exception of South Korea, as much for power
projection in support of U.S. global interests as they
are for ensuring domestic tranquility and deterrence
of external aggression.
It is true that in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
U.S. military forces in the field succeeded in temporarily halting enemy efforts to destabilize the countries,
despite huge handicaps imposed on the U.S. military
in each case by the political parameters of a limited
war. But as North Vietnamese Colonel Tu apocryphally said to Colonel Harry Summers in Hanoi in
1972, that is also irrelevant.84 In each case, there was
no pervading sense in the armies of South Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan of belonging to a nation and
having a legitimate government worth fighting and, if
necessary, dying for. In each case, the enemy did. As
McNamara notes, “our misjudgments of friend and
foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area.”85
Or, as Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter admitted of
the Iraqi Army in May 2015, “We can give them training, we can give them equipment; we obviously can't
give them the will to fight.”85a

155

THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN BY YEAR
FROM 2015 TO 2019
The unanimous assessment of the intelligence community as released to the public in unclassified form
is that the various elements of the Taliban have zero
interest in a negotiated settlement, or even in negotiations beyond accepting the Afghan government’s surrender. There is no possibility of a negotiated settlement. None. The exchange of the Taliban military high
command for the suspected deserter Bowe Bergdahl
in May 2014 had less to do with the return of Bergdahl
than it did with a phantasmagorical desire on the part
of the Office of the President’s Special Representative
to Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) to prove that negotiations with the Taliban were possible as an imaginary stepping stone to peace talks. In order to achieve
the Mullahs’ specific short-term agenda, the Taliban
simply gamed the Pollyannaish American negotiators
who were over-eager to have “proof of concept” at
any cost.86 It was the equivalent of the Union in 1862
swapping Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, James
Longstreet, J. E. B. Stuart, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for a Union private who wandered away from his
post. The Taliban will continue to fight well beyond
the departure of the United States by January 1, 2017.
U.S. airpower, now directed by U.S. SFs and special
operations forces (SOF) on the ground, will continue
to disrupt massed conventional Taliban attacks on
ANA outposts in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan in
those places where they are deployed, and for as long
as it is available.
Some readers may be put off by the certainty of
the following projection, but the point of this book has
been, from the outset, that this outcome is, in fact, not
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difficult to predict using sound military strategic analysis, the kind of operational understanding taught at
all Command and General Staff colleges, empirical
tactical data, and the simple guidelines this analysis
contains. Given this information, the mathematical
level of probability of this projection is close to 100
percent. Here, therefore, is a year-by-year projection
of what is going to happen in Afghanistan from 2015
to 2019, although the exact timing of specific tactical
events may be off by some months on either side due
to battlefield variables and the “fog of war.”
2015.
Because of President Obama’s recent order to extend U.S. air support to the ANA, 2015 will be largely
a repeat of 2014, a period of slow decay and heavy
casualties for the ANA and ANP, accompanied by incremental and modest improvements in ANA logistical capability. The Taliban will continue to achieve
regular tactical success with hit-and-run attacks, inflicting casualties and seizing weapons, ammunition,
and equipment as they did consistently in 2014. Operational success in the form of taking and holding
several contiguous outlying districts is likely. Overrunning a remote provincial capital with a small government garrison, such as Parun, is possible. However,
strategic success, defined here as taking and holding
an entire province, and announcing the return of the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), is unlikely.
2016.
Assuming U.S. air support ends in December 2015
as is currently planned, Taliban gains in the south
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and southwest will be significant in 2016. Operational
success is certain; strategic success is likely. Helmand
province, in particular, is vulnerable without air
support; a repeat in 2016 of the Taliban’s campaign
against Sangin district in the summer of 2014 would
be successful without close air support (CAS). Seizure
of Lashkar Gah will be more difficult for the Taliban,
as urban warfare substantially favors the defender
and is best suited to the ANA’s sedentary nature. But
ANA and ANP attrition will increase as momentum
continues to shift to the Taliban. With attrition from
the 215 Corps already running near 70 percent in 2014,
the 215 Corps may simply disintegrate as four entire
Iraqi divisions did at Mosul. Politically, the “unity
government” established by rivals Ashraf Ghani and
Abdullah Abdullah will either unravel completely or,
at best, be dysfunctional, further destabilizing the situation.87 If President Ghani pushes ahead with wholesale removal of officials and officers he believes to be
corrupt in 2015, as he did on December 28, 2014, in
firing more than 30 senior officials in Herat, including
15 district police chiefs,88 major civil unrest in Kabul,
Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif is probable in
2016. Ousted warlords and power brokers may well
incite their followers to violent protest. This will further distract and disaffect the security forces, some of
whom will be tempted to take sides or consider the
option of a coup, as happened during the election
impasse in August 2014.89 Iranian military support in
the form of weapons and money to the Hazaras in the
Hazarajat region will pose a diplomatic challenge for
the United States similar to the situation in Iraq today.
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2017.
As currently planned, December 31, 2016, will
mark the departure of all foreign troops and support
from Afghanistan, beyond a robust Office of Defence
Assistance group in the U.S. Embassy. After that, the
almost entirely Tajik ANA’s position in the south and
east will be militarily untenable. Surrounded by a
countryside effectively owned by the Taliban; crippled
by desertions; and unable to communicate, resupply,
or reinforce, the garrisons of the 215th ANA Corps
will collapse. The Taliban will achieve strategic success, as defined for this book. Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan, Nimruz, Ghazni, and perhaps Wardak provinces
will fall to the Taliban. Taliban leadership will announce the return of the IEA to Afghanistan. With the
exception of parts of Kandahar province and Kandahar itself, the ANA 205 Corps will also collapse in the
south. Barring assassination, however, the formidable
Chief of Police of Kandahar Province Lieutenant General Abdul Raziq will be hard to dislodge.90 The extent
to which this can be controlled as an orderly strategic
withdrawal, preserving portions of the 215 and 205
Corps to fight again, as opposed to complete disintegration (as was seen with the Iraqi Army in 2014), will
be critical to establishing a stable defensive line and
de facto partition.
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Map II-1. Tactical Situation in 2017.
The front will be a rough west-east line north of
the Helmand River valley and eastwards to the Hindu
Kush. Control of Kabul, with its symbolic importance
as the capital city, will be contested. The current Taliban build-up in Wardak and Kapisa provinces in 2014
attests to the Taliban’s intent to capture the city, and
the almost daily attacks in Kabul in November 2014
may be seen as probes testing the city’s defenses.
Fighting in Wardak to keep the Taliban out of rocket
and artillery range of Kabul will be intense. The CIA
will have extensive evidence of Pakistani Army support to the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and one of the
first challenges for the next U.S. President taking office in January 2017 will be deciding how to deal with
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this provocation. The United States will belatedly address this security crisis, and, as it did a year too late in
Iraq due to misplaced faith in the Iraqi Army, the U.S.
security policy apparatus will be forced into a crisis
mode again to decide how to return to support the remainder of the ANA, and determine who in Afghanistan could be our Afghan equivalent of the Kurdish
Peshmerga.91
2018.
The establishment of a de facto partition between
Taliban-held Pashto-speaking Afghanistan and government-held Uzbek- and Dari-speaking northern
Afghanistan will depend to a significant degree on
the speed of the return of U.S. CAS and the extent of
the presence of U.S. forward air controllers (FACs)
in the form of SF/SOF teams inserted with those elements of the ANA still considered to be reliable. A
very similar situation pertains in Iraq today. The ANA
commando battalions are a leading candidate, as they
are the best the Afghans have got. The Hazaras are
another possibility. However, the Tajik, Uzbek, and
Hazara remainder of the ANA will now be fighting on
their own territory, defending their own homes and
families, and their resistance will stiffen as it did from
1996 to 2000. Evacuation of the U.S. embassy and the
embassy annex by air from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif is
likely, as the fighting will be close to Kabul. There will
be helicopters on the embassy roof again. Other regional players, including Iran92 and Tajikistan,93 have
already expressed deep concern over the prospects
of a Taliban government on their borders again and
may intervene in the form of substantial military aid
to northern armed groups.
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2019.
The primary issue in 2019 will be who controls
Kabul. Expeditionary U.S. air support operating from
Shindand and Bagram air bases will be spread much
thinner than is the case in Iraq today because of Afghanistan’s far greater size, and sorties from an aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean will have to traverse
either Iranian or Pakistani airspace, with consequently
shorter loiter times on station. As a result, there will
be a greater reliance on drones.
Taliban territorial control in the south and east,
however, now becomes a strategic liability for them,
as it forces Taliban leadership to return from exile in
Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta or become irrelevant.
This now exposes them to punishing U.S. air strikes.
When they are no longer in densely populated Pakistani cities and closely guarded by the ISI, they can be
targeted. This is the potential game-changer to induce
the Taliban to accept “half a loaf” and agree to a bifurcated state. As a result of the U.S. ability to target and
kill senior Taliban leadership for the first time when
they return to Afghan soil, a quid pro quo may become
possible in which the Taliban agree to establish their
state capital in their spiritual capital city, Kandahar,
which houses the sacred Cloak of the Prophet, and to
leave Kabul to the north. Pakistan may consider half of
Afghanistan sufficient strategic depth, although some
scholars believe Pakistan’s fear of the old dream of a
Pashtunistan will drive Pakistani resistance to partition, as it could be a precursor to a Pashtun national
independence movement.
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Map II-2. Tactical Situation in 2019.
Realistically, however, in a sound analysis, there
is very little chance of a serious revival of the Khudai Khidmatgar (Red Shirt) Pashtunistan movement.94
The level of political support for the Awami Workers’ Party (AWP) in Pakistan, let alone for the more
nationalistic offshoot Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party,
compared to the religious and political power of the
Taliban is negligible. In the 2002 elections, the AWP
received only 11.1 percent of the votes for the National
Assembly and 9.4 percent of the votes for the Provincial Assembly.95 In 2013, in the general elections, it declined still further, receiving only 5 percent of the vote
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.96 In 2015, the AWP has only
six of the 99 regular seats in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Assembly.97 This is not the stuff of a mass popular
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movement. The realpolitik of the relative power relationship between the AWP and the Tehrik-i-Taliban
(TTP) in the Pashtun areas of northern Pakistan today
is illustrative of this dynamic. The Deobandi Islamist
construct is fundamentally incompatible with Pashtun nationalism and a Pashtun nation—as are, indeed,
the Pashtuns themselves.
If not, the war will go on and, because of a lack on
both sides of mobile supporting arms, may even become World War I-like in its static nature. Either way,
the end state will eventually be de facto partition and
a ceasefire along a brokered line of control that could
eventually become a negotiated de jure partition, with
residual U.S. air power at Bagram and Shindand as
the enforcer, creating an armed stand-off of the type
in the Koreas today. Another imperial map will have
to be redrawn.
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PART III:
THE STRATEGIC LESSONS UNLEARNED FROM
VIETNAM, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN
The great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie—
deliberate, contrived, and dishonest—but the myth—
persistent, persuasive and unrealistic.1
		

John F. Kennedy

IMPEDIMENTS TO STRATEGIC JUDGMENT
Neck deep in the Big Muddy, and the big fool said to
push on.2
		

Pete Seeger

Controlling the message in warfare is as old as
warfare itself. At Baghdad, in 1401, Tamerlane had
his warriors build a tower of 90,000 severed heads to
assist the city’s population in assessing the pros and
cons of resistance or surrender.3 Expressions of confidence in victory are a part of war, whether they are
called public affairs, strategic messaging, psychological operations, information warfare or propaganda,
in the old, more positive, pre-Nazi connotation of the
word.4 One would hardly have expected International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders to say
publicly “the Afghan National Army is terrible” when
the audience included the Afghan National Army
(ANA), the enemy, and Afghan civilians. This American foreign policy by messaging is deliberate, simplistic, repetitive, and pervasive. For the withdrawal from
Afghanistan, in 2010 administration message crafters
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came up with a year-by-year public “narrative.” As
Jack Fairweather notes:
a U.S. PowerPoint presentation laid out what the West
hoped would be the ‘Key Tenets of the Afghan Narrative:’ ‘2011/12, Notice what is different; 2012/13,
Change has begun; 2013/14, Growing confidence;
2015, A new chance, a new beginning’.5

Reviewing the media reporting on Afghanistan since
2011, one can clearly see administration officials
sticking to these talking points and repeating them
in unison.
The danger to which civilian and military leaders
alike are increasingly prone, however, is coming to believe in their own public messaging as if it were actually true, and making decisions based on it as if it were
reality and not wishful thinking about how we would
like the world to be. This optimism afflicted ISAF officers in general and National Military Training Center-Afghanistan (NMTC-A) officers in particular.6 For
a decade, notes a senior Afghan analyst, “whenever
a problem with the ANA was raised, the typical response of NMTC-A was that ‘we have a plan to solve
that completely, so that isn’t a problem anymore’.”7 A
problem was no longer a problem if a staff officer had
developed a plan to fix it, accompanied, naturally, by
more positive messaging.
A corollary danger lies in the natural human desire
to report success up the chain of command, and to design or modify metrics in a way that appears to support
positive momentum. The author of this book attended
many Afghan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG)
meetings at which considerable pressure was applied
and arguments made to upgrade unpleasant “yellow”
(not so good) boxes on the color-coded “Progress Met176

rics” chart to “green” (good), to indicate up the chain
of command that progress was assuredly being made.
This, too, is a venerable aspect of warfare. When faced
with the unhappy task of reporting an unbroken series of defeats to the Chinese Emperor in the 19th century, Mandarin officials arrived upon the solution of
simply describing them all as victories.8 A similar approach was taken in Vietnam, where “body counts”
were notoriously inflated, and the daily Pentagon reports of battlefield success were dubbed the “Five o’
Clock Follies” by a press corps no longer finding them
credible.9 Briefings on Afghanistan sometimes seem
to emulate both the Mandarin and the Five o’ Clock
Follies solutions. As Anthony Cordesman notes:
Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S.
does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content
that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead.
They also . . . were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from
2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak
and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the
risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’
the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the
steady growth of Taliban influence and control.10

The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) press office has copied the art. The frequent press statements
from the Afghan MOD in Kabul exaggerating the
number of Taliban killed in operations are known locally to the few foreign journalists still covering the
war as the “Panj o’ Clock Follies,” using the Dari word
for “five.”11 The war by messaging in English is also
going strong, using the “Key Tenets of the Afghan
Narrative” message plan adopted by the administra-
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tion, with “Growing confidence” the message theme
for 2014.12 In a briefing on December 2, 2014, for example, ISAF spokesman Lieutenant Commander Justin
Hadley told reporters “the Afghan National Security
Forces are becoming more capable and stronger each
day.”13 As has been shown, statistics indicate that just
the opposite is true.
More recently, the outgoing commander of ISAF,
Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, said he was
confident the Afghan police and army could prevent
the Taliban from regaining territory next year. “This
country is safer and more prosperous than ever,” he
said. “The insurgents have been beaten back and the
Afghan National Security Forces are carrying the fight
to the enemy.”14 In fact, no part of this statement is statistically true: The country is not safer than ever: Taliban attacks and Afghan civilian deaths both reached a
new record high in 2014, according to the United Nations.15 The country is not more prosperous than ever:
Afghanistan not only remained the poorest country in
the world despite reconstruction spending which has
surpassed the Marshall Plan, it also set a historical record in 2014 for the most human suffering in modern
world history.16 Absolute poverty has risen by about
10 percentage points in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war. Life expectancy has fallen to 44 years,
and infant mortality has increased to reach 150 per
thousand.17 The Afghan economy is shriveling.18 The
insurgents have not been “beaten back,” (a somewhat
disingenuous statement in itself, as one must wonder,
if they have never been winning, why were they being
“beaten back”?) the Taliban now control more territory than ever.19 And the security forces are not carrying
the fight to the enemy: they are more sedentary, less
mobile, and conducting fewer patrols and offensive
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operations than ever before.20 As Phillip Münch of the
Afghan Analysts Network noted in January 2015:
Observers frequently describe the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) as rather passive and defensive, with the usually better paid and supplied special
forces often being the only forces who regularly take
offensive action.21

After 13 years and a trillion dollars spent,22 security is
so bad in the capital city that the flag-furling ceremony for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM had to be
held in secret at an undisclosed location in Kabul out
of concern that the ceremony would be attacked by
the Taliban.23 The main roads in the capital are so unsafe that “[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] forces
often fly by helicopter over the 5-10 [kilometers] from
the coalition headquarters to the capital’s military airport because of the threat of suicide bombers on the
roads.”24
Again, the reasons for this public position are
obvious, but this approach carries with it the corollary danger that Americans and Afghans alike will,
in fact, believe all is well, and Afghans in particular
will not be moved to the sense of urgency and the
kind of national mobilization necessary at this point
to combat the Taliban. Noting this kind of danger, a
January 2011 report by the Afghan Nongovernmental
Organization (NGO) Security Office in Kabul advised
foreigners working in Afghanistan that its assessment
of the security situation was:
sharply divergent from [ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to
recognize that no matter how authoritative the source
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of any such claim, messages of this nature are solely
intended to influence American and European public
opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended
to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those
who live and work here.25

In fact, such “strategic messaging” generally befuddles both our Afghan allies and our enemies in
Pakistan.26 Coming from a completely different culture in which not dissembling and politeness rank
equally high, Afghan civilians and most senior officers outside the press office are often baffled why U.S
generals would say things they know are not true. The
Pakistanis, on the other hand, ever fond of conspiracy
theories,27 ask of the ANA, “why has the U.S. sunk billions of dollars in a project that had no chance to deliver?”28 One Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)
theory is that, since much of the ANA training and
infrastructure development was carried out by former
American military personnel working as contractors,
there was money to be made in the ANA training
business.29 The ISI and the Pakistani Army have other
conspiracy theories about resources and dark U.S.
intentions in Central Asia, but until recently, apparently, they did not consider the possibility that U.S. officers might actually believe what they were saying.30
As former ISI Lieutenant General Asad Durrani put it:
[until] recently I had believed that the U.S. was too
smart not to know about the ANA’s limits and was
pumping it up as a ruse. But since an American friend
of mine who is a keen observer of the Afghan scene is
convinced that the ANA could carry out its mission
with some help from its mentors, it is quite possible
that Washington too has faith in this role.31
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The same messaging was a constant feature of the
war in Vietnam. Just as U.S. officials today are pointing to the escalating casualties suffered by the ANSF
as proof of their fighting spirit, senior U.S. officials
in Vietnam “cited the death of ‘approximately ten
thousand Vietnamese’ through 1962 as proof of their
willingness to prosecute the war.”32 Defeats like the
Battle of Ap Bac were described as victories. Admiral
Harry Felt (Commander in Chief Pacific [CINCPAC]
from 1958 to 1964) told reporters in Saigon that Ap Bac
“was a Vietnamese victory—not a defeat as the papers
say.”33 As historian David Toczek notes:
CINCPAC was not only sure of a [South] Vietnamese
victory at Ap Bac, but he also believed in total victory,
proclaiming that ‘I am confident the Vietnamese are
going to win their war.’ Despite the ‘recent casualties
suffered by Vietnamese forces at Ap Bac,’ the war in
Vietnam [CINCPAC said] was ‘taking a generally favorable course.’34

When American war correspondents reported on
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s (ARVN) “lack
of aggressiveness,” as is seen in the ANSF today,
Commander US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) General Paul Harkins praised
them and emphasized their casualties.35 This positive
messaging continued right up until the end of the
war. On November 21, 1967, COMUSMACV General
William Westmoreland told U.S. news reporters the
United States was winning in Vietnam. “I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was
winning,” Westmoreland said, “today he is certainly
losing.”36 In 1970, as the United States was preparing
to withdraw from Vietnam, President Richard Nixon
told the American people that “progress in training
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and equipping South Vietnamese forces has substantially exceeded our original expectations last June. . . .
Very significant advances have also been made in
pacification.”37
The same optimism of messaging seen in Afghanistan and Vietnam also pervaded the creation of the
Iraqi Army as well. In 2006, the Armed Forces Journal
reported that “in fighting spirit, small-unit tactics and
discipline, the fledgling Iraqi army has made substantial progress.”38 In testimony before the House Armed
Service Committee in January 2008, Commander of
the Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq, Lieutenant General James Dubik, stated:
The Iraqis are proud of what they are accomplishing.
They are proud of themselves, and they are committed to their own success. And we are meeting with
some success, Mr. Chairman. The Iraqi Security Forces
are bigger and better than they have been at any time
since the effort to establish them began. I attribute this
to three things . . . the rejection of Al Qaeda and other extremists by much of the Iraqi population. More
people want to serve. More people feel invested in
their own futures . . . we have seen significant growth
across the board. We are seeing the Iraqi’s want to take
more responsibility for the battlespace . . . It is money
well spent. 39

Six months later, Dubik told Congress, “There has
been huge progress. There has been significant improvement in every possible way you can measure
it” and reported the Iraqi Army would be proficient
to take over its own security in 2009.40 In May 2008,
Anthony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) stressed the “need to recognize that very real progress is being made.”41 Late
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in 2009, U.S. Army Colonel Fred Kienle, an Iraqi Army
trainer, gushed that:
They’re all soldiers. What we find is, particularly the
Iraqi soldiers are patriots. They are risking their lives
to be soldiers, as most soldiers do, but them particularly . . . they see a new Iraq. They’re committed to
what they’re doing.42

In fact, none of this messaging reflected reality, but
so deeply had this positive public messaging pervaded the public sphere, and so convinced were military
leaders by it, that many were shocked when the Iraqi
Army collapsed in 2014. Jessica Lewis, a former Army
intelligence officer and the director of research at the
Institute for the Study of War, said, for example, “the
fact that the four ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] northern
divisions were overrun or collapsed with almost no
resistance is extraordinary, and hugely alarming.”43
“The U.S. military worked incredibly hard in the 200508 time frame to build the ISF into a professional, national force that represented all Iraqis,” echoed retired
Lieutenant General David Barno, “and the fact that
. . . [it] folded so fast when confronted with Islamic
extremists is a very dangerous development.”44 Company and field grade officers with closer knowledge of
the U.S. effort in Iraq and less exposure to the talking
points, however, were not taken by surprise. “They
weren’t soldiers because they wanted to be soldiers,”
explained Marine First Lieutenant Dave Jackson, who
fought with Iraqi forces during his two deployments
to Iraq. “They were soldiers because they wanted a
job.”45 A Marine colonel, who asked to remain anonymous because he is on active duty, said that after their
own families, the soldiers and leaders were loyal to
their tribes and then their religion. “Iraq as a nation
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falls at the bottom of the list. Combine this with lack
of cohesion, unity, loyalty, and camaraderie among
themselves, and you have an organization that will
disintegrate under pressure.”46 The fact that Iraq is not
a nation, and never has been, and the fact that there
was in reality nothing in Baghdad that the men of the
Iraqi Army were going to fight and die for, made this
outcome entirely predictable. It was a strategic repetition of South Vietnam.
What causes the disconnect between rational intelligence assessments made by seasoned intelligence
professionals and the optimistic positions of military
officers? In some cases, it is a result of confirmation
bias, the remarkable psychological phenomenon in
which many people, when presented with facts that
show their positions and views to be completely
wrong, actually reinforce their wrong beliefs rather
than changing them.47 Another factor is bureaucratic
“groupthink”—the tendency of people involved in a
decision to try to sense which way a decision is shaping up and then make sure to be on board and stay
on board with the eventual decision. The author observed this as a major factor in foreign policymaking
in the interagency on Afghanistan from the middle
levels up. Groupthink is defined as occurring:
when a desire for conformity within a group transcends rational thought and issues of right and wrong.
When this happens, individuals in a group fail to
express their doubts about the group’s dynamic, direction or decisions because of a desire to maintain
consensus or conformity. Thus the group may be on a
headlong rush to error or disaster and no-one speaks
up because they don’t want to rock the boat. Groupthink can affect communities of any size from small
groups to whole nations.48
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In other words, savvy bureaucrats and politicians
can sense which way a decision is taking shape and
often feel compelled to be on the “winning side” of
the policy argument. Dissent is not career-enhancing.
Individuals, too, can be affected by what is known as
the “blind spot bias”—the inability of persons to see
confirmation bias and groupthink within themselves.
Another danger is bureaucratic path dependency.
Path dependency is defined as a state of organizational
inertia and the historical imprinting of decisionmaking by which organizations lose their flexibility and
become inert or even locked in.49 Experts in organizational dynamics say this happens in three phases.
Phase I, the “Preformation Phase,” is characterized by
a broad scope of action. In Phase II, the “Formation
Phase,” a dominant action pattern emerges “which
renders the whole process more and more irreversible.” Choices and options narrow, and “it becomes
progressively difficult to reverse the . . . initial pattern
of action.” Phase III, the “Lock-in Phase,” occurs when
the dominant decision pattern becomes fixed and
gains a deterministic character; eventually, the actions
are fully bound to a path. One particular choice or action pattern has become the predominant mode, and
flexibility has been lost. Even new entrants into this
field of action cannot refrain from adopting it. U.S.
Government policy is particularly vulnerable to this
process.50 Capturing this dynamic in 1983, historian
Arnold Isaacs summarized the reasons for failure in
Vietnam in his history of the final years of the war as
follows:
Misperceiving both its enemy and its ally, and imprisoned in the myopic conviction that sheer military
force could somehow overcome adverse political circumstances, Washington stumbled from one failure to
the next in the continuing delusion that success was
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always just ahead. This ignorance and false hope were
mated, in successive administrations, with bureaucratic circumstances that inhibited admission of error
and made it always seem safer to keep repeating the
same mistakes, rather than risk the unknown perils of
a different policy.51

The intellectual habits of thought of military institutions also tend to become predictable and calcified.
The same thing has occurred in Afghanistan today. As
Afzal Amin notes:
. . . the personality type (in psychological terms) favored across NATO in terms of recruitment, training, promotion and retention is the linear-thinking
process-focused maintainer of the status quo, which
was ideal for holding back the Soviets while keeping
our force readiness at optimum levels. We didn’t want
mavericks and non-conformists so we didn’t have
them. But for the wicked problems that were Iraq and
Afghanistan, mavericks were precisely what we needed, the problem-solvers and the independent thinkers.
Recognizing our own limitations is both wise and necessary. We must learn from the institutional failure to
gain victory in Afghanistan if we are to have any hope
that the escalating crises in Iraq and Syria are to be
resolved any time soon.52

GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE WARS
He was impregnably armored by his good intentions
and his ignorance.53
		
Graham Greene, of Alden Pyle,
		
the idealistic Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) agent in his novel, The
Quiet American
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What should elected leaders, civilian officials,
and military officers consider when future military
intervention is proposed? First, nation-building is
impossible, except perhaps in the negative sense: if
you invade a country, you may unite them in temporary opposition to you and foster a more nationalistic
identity. But the Afghans have united to eject a lot of
invaders over the last 2,000 years and it has not made
them a nation. Be wary of collaborators telling you
what you want to hear. In any coercive environment,
there will always be the Chalabis, al Malikis, Karzais,
Khalilzads, Kys, and Thieus on the weaker side ready
to collaborate with the stronger, but usually only for
their own personal self-aggrandizement.54 Before seriously considering military intervention (as opposed to
humanitarian relief, for example) in a foreign country
that will require the extended presence of U.S. troops
(for example, longer than 90 days), the best academic
experts in the United States should be summoned
to provide an assessment of the extent to which the
people of that country have a developed sense of nationhood. If a country has not reached a point where
nation-building is no longer necessary, conventional
military intervention involving occupation should be
off the table, because failure in that environment is
inevitable, as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan clearly
prove. Successful state-building cannot occur until a
country has reached the “nation-built” stage of development, and nation-building cannot be done by any
foreign country. It is, by definition, a slow, evolutionary, internal social process.
Second, state-building is possible, but it is best
done by civilians, and it takes between 70 and 100
years to go from poverty, illiteracy, and economic
under-development to a liberal democracy with stable
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economic growth. The role of the military is to defend
it, not to build it. Germany, Japan, and Korea are proof
of this. The nations of Central Europe and Eastern Europe have undoubtedly benefited greatly in terms of
political and economic progress by their membership
in NATO, the presence of small numbers of NATO
forces, and the guarantee of security provided by Article 5. In no case in Central or Eastern Europe, however, was nation-building necessary, and a steady and
reliable influx of Western support, including trade
and defense commitments, provided a jump start on
post-communist state-building. The Ukraine, on the
other hand, was clearly not “nation-built.” The key in
such cases would be understanding the lengthy time
span of military commitment required, the nature of
that commitment, and the degree to which the people
of the country in question would support a long-term
U.S. military peacekeeping presence. Not all nations
are pro-American.
Third, peacekeeping is possible, but coercive
peace-creating in a failed state is not. The U.S. interventions in Somalia and Lebanon come to mind. An
international peacekeeping presence could work, for
example, in a post-Castro Cuba. No nation-building
would be required—Cubans have a strong sense of
being Cuban. American troops might be represented
along with those of Cuba’s Latin neighbors—Cubans
have no great dislike for the United States,55 despite
60 years of a misguided economic embargo.56 The
political turmoil that inevitably follows the collapse
of communism in a country with no democratic history could be stabilized by an international military
presence that prevents the vacuum from being filled
by undemocratic opportunists in the army or police
forces or by wealthy carpetbaggers from Florida. Such
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a stability presence could allow a legitimate indigenous process to develop democratic tendencies over
a period of several decades. This is not to advocate
such a policy, merely to provide a real world example
of a nation where state-building, backed by extended
military peacekeeping, could assist a nation in transition if properly considered and planned, and all the
necessary conditions pre-exist (i.e., a permissive environment, a receptive population, a functioning justice
system, reasonable literacy levels, and a strong sense
of nationhood). Needless to say, however, the assistance in building civil institutions should be done by
civilians, not the military.
Finally, what do these lessons from South Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan say about the future role of the
U.S. Army and the U.S. military? What larger overall
lessons should be learned from Germany, Japan, and
Korea—and Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan? What
missions should the U.S. military of the future be prepared to carry out? The answer is primarily two-fold:
First is the ability to conduct long-term peacekeeping
operations, such as the one in South Korea, which require a substantial, benign military presence in barracks ready to go to war against an aggressor literally at a moment’s notice with intense lethality—“to
fight,” as the current expression has it, “outnumbered
and win.”
The second function is essentially expeditionary:
To be able to go into a country where events have
dramatically threatened American citizens and/or
Americans interests, strike a military target hard in a
way that will change the balance of power in favor
of moderate indigenous elements, and get back out
within 90 days. Why? Because staying longer does
not help where nationhood does not exist. Operation
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DESERT STORM is a textbook example of this kind of
intervention, but the U.S. Army will rarely have a year
to prepare for a designer war and a carefully choreographed walkover in the future.
On the other hand, 8 years in Vietnam, 11 in Iraq,
and 13 in Afghanistan did not change the outcome
or made it worse. All were ill-considered, because
none were nations. In each case, the adversaries of
America’s nation-creation illusion were and are stronger than the united will of the indigenous people to
fight for it. Ho Chi Minh was more committed to a
reunited Vietnam than he was to communism, as Office of Strategic Services (OSS) advisor Archimedes
Patti, Foreign Service Officer Paul Kattenburg, and
others reported.57 Saddam Hussein was a horrible
human being, but he kept the lid on Iraq’s volcanic
internal dynamics, kept Iran in check, and allowed
no terrorists on his soil. Rural Afghanistan is a 14th
century society that is several centuries at best from
being a nation ready for state-building. It may never
be. Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, and South Sudan
all exist today because a unified Pakistan, Indonesia,
Ethiopia, and Sudan were never going to be nations
within their existing colonial maps. It is heresy to the
State Department,58 which has always fought against
it, but sometimes the best way to solve a problem is to
draw a new map.
CONCLUSIONS
U.S. foreign policy and military engagement in
any part of the world should hinge first and foremost
on the extent to which the country under consideration is a nation. The first corollary to this book might
be that the greater the extent to which a country is
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a nation, the lesser the probability that U.S. military
engagement will be ever considered or needed there,
because instability can largely be graphed in parallel
with nationhood. Many definitions have been offered
by political scientists for the term “nation,” but for the
purposes of this book, the word will mean a country
in which a broad majority of the people identify themselves at a national level. In other words, a country in
which, when asked, the great majority of the people
would answer the questions “Who are you?” and
“Where are you from?” with the names of their countries: “Peru,” for example, or “Switzerland,” rather
than by any more localized identities, such as clan,
tribe, ethnicity, religion, or linguistic group.
This is, of course, a very superficial definition;
the concept of nationhood and identity are complex
and fluid. The sense of national identity should not
be conflated with pride in nationality; these are quite
different. However, for the purposes of discussion,
it provides a readily understandable and easily established baseline on which to plot a country’s social
and political development. It is the kind of litmus
test that anyone can apply and, if answered objectively and honestly, casts the country in question into
clear focus. Indeed, it could easily be plotted on a
linear graph.
In Vietnam, the CIA planned and carried out a
coup in 1963, which inadvertently resulted in the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình
Diem and his brother.59 This was followed by a prolonged period of coups and instability. In Afghanistan in 2001, the United States invaded to remove the
Taliban from power, then subverted the will of the Afghan people, prevented the Afghan King Zahir Shah
from returning to the throne in a ceremonial role as a

191

symbol of national unity to confer legitimacy on the
state, and refused the Taliban’s offer of surrender.60
Because Plan A, Abdul Haq, was betrayed to the Taliban by the ISI and killed in 2001,61 an Afghan political
nonentity named Hamid Karzai was placed in power
instead because he was the only other Afghan the CIA
had on its payroll.62 In Iraq, the United States invaded
in 2003 to remove Saddam Hussein from power and
have him hanged after a fair trial. (Hussein’s defense
attorney noted that “this court is a creature of the U.S.
military occupation, and the Iraqi court is just a tool
and rubber stamp of the invaders.”63 As The Washington Post observed, “Americans have drafted most of
the statutes under which Hussein and his associates
are being tried.”64 Amnesty International called the
trial “deeply flawed and unfair.”65) The U.S. Government then conspired to install Nouri al-Maliki as the
Prime Minister of Iraq.
None of these deliberately planned foreign policies of regime change and armed nation-creation during civil wars (Vietnam and Afghanistan) or in barely
contained civil wars (Iraq) worked out well. (To these
three could be added the U.S. intervention in a civil
war in Somalia in 1992, the U.S. intervention in a civil
war in Lebanon in 1983, and the U.S. overthrow of the
nationalist leader Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran in
1954 to put the Shah in power.) Diem was unpopular
but his successors were worse, and their corruption
and incompetence fueled the Viet Cong insurgency.
Hamid Karzai turned out to be a corrupt, incompetent,
and mentally unstable milquetoast, and his failure to
even try to reign in his kleptocracy and reduce opium
production, from which his own family made billions
of dollars,66 aided the rise of the many tentacles of the
Taliban comeback. In Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki took none
of the steps required to build trust and a sense of in192

clusion among Iraq’s religious factions, especially the
majority Sunni Muslims, and instead concentrated
power among his own Shia minority,67 giving rise,
first, to a Sunni insurgency that claimed the lives of
thousands of American Soldiers, and ultimately to the
radical Sunni terrorist group, Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS). In all four cases of deliberate U.S. regime
change by force and installing our man in power in
Asia in the past 50 years (including Iran), the results
have been catastrophically and diametrically opposed
to those intended.
In Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there were
American experts who advised, or would have advised if they had been consulted, against all of these
courses of action. Yet, in most cases, the Americans
who knew these countries best were either not spoken to, not heeded, or deliberately excluded from the
room at the time these fateful decisions were being
made. In the case of Vietnam, Patti, for example, knew
Ho Chi Minh well, having fought with him against
the Japanese in Vietnam during World War II. Patti
advised that Ho could be one of our most important
post-war allies in Asia, and his commitment to communism was skin deep.68 As Patti later recalled:
In my opinion the Vietnam War was a great waste.
There was no need for it to happen in the first place.
At all. None whatsoever. During all the years of the
Vietnam War no one ever approached me to find out
what had happened in 1945 or in ‘44. In all the years
that I spent in the Pentagon, Department of State, in
the White House, never was I approached by anyone
in authority. However, I did prepare a large number,
and I mean about, oh, well over fifteen position papers
on our position in Vietnam. But I never knew what
happened to them. Those things just disappeared,
they just went down the dry well.69
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Paul Kattenburg was another unheeded Vietnam
expert. Kattenburg served in Vietnam in the late1950s and early-1960s and knew the country as well
as any American alive. On August 31, 1963, Kattenburg dissented at a meeting of senior Kennedy administration officials which prepared the ground for
sending in U.S. combat troops, including Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and the President’s brother
and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Kattenburg
told them the expanded U.S. war would fail, the South
Vietnamese were already tired of the war, and that
Diem was secretly negotiating with the north. Kattenburg later wrote, “[T]here was not a single person
there that knew what he was talking about.”70 Taylor,
who wanted a war in Vietnam, challenged him, while
Rusk derided Kattenburg’s statement as ‘‘speculative.”71 Bundy knew Kattenburg was telling the truth
because he had received a very similar report from
his trusted aide, Michael Forrestal, just weeks before,
but said nothing.72 Kattenburg was never invited to
another policy meeting.73
How, one wonders, is this possible? In a nation
populated with the world’s leading experts on most
foreign countries, how can critical foreign policy decisions be made that often deliberately exclude those
experts who do not agree with the proposed policy?
The answer is, sadly, that the policymakers do not
want them there. In the case of Vietnam, for example,
outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Saigon Frederick Nolting argued in late-August 1963 against a coup. Few
Americans knew Vietnam better than Nolting.74 He,
too, was ignored. The disregard for the advice of
experts on Vietnam was subsequently borne out by
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former Secretary of Defense and chief architect of the
Vietnam War Robert McNamara. In 1993, McNamara
addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New
York. As Bruce Nussbaum notes, McNamara told the
audience:
he had made a mistake. The protesters had been right
all along. The war was unwinnable from the start. The
domino theory was ridiculous. Nationalism had been
confused with communism. There had never been a
serious threat to U.S. security.75

When an audience member asked McNamara why he
did not listen to the experts, “McNamara smiled down
from the podium and said: ‘. . . they weren’t in our
circle’.”76
There also were, and are still today, tightly closed
“circles” for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The list
of military and government civilian experts opposed
to the Iraq War was extraordinarily long and deep.77
Again, an administration determined to have a war
was not interested in the views of American experts
who warned that Saddam Hussein was not a nice
man, but he was sitting on the lid to Pandora’s Box and
keeping Iran in check, and that removing him would
destabilize the entire region. In regard to Afghanistan,
days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
American-born Middle East journalist Eric Margolis
wrote a piece entitled “Spare Afghanistan from U.S.
‘Nation-Building’” in the Toronto Sun:
In all my years as a foreign affairs writer, I have never seen a case where so many Washington `experts’
have all the answers to a country that only a handful
of Americans know anything about. President George
Bush, who before election could not name the presi-

195

dent of Pakistan, now intends to redraw the political
map of strategic Afghanistan, an act that will cause
shock waves across South and Central Asia. Anyone
who knows anything about Afghans knows . . . they
will never accept any regime imposed by outsiders. . . .
Washington’s plan for `nation-building’ in Afghanistan is a recipe for disaster that will produce an enlarged civil war that draws in outside powers.78

Other American experts and Foreign Service Officers counseled against the notion of nation-creation
in Afghanistan and the administration’s approach.
While serving as the representative of the Bureau of
Political Military Affairs (PM) to the ad hoc Afghan
policy group in 2001 and to the Afghan Interagency
Operations Group (AIOG) thereafter, for example, the
author wrote a Briefing Memo in November 2001 to
James Dobbins strongly urging that King Zahir Shah
be returned to Kabul in a largely ceremonial role and
laid out the reasons why. It was neither answered nor
heeded. Dobbins had never been to Afghanistan and
knew nothing about the country, but he and his inner
coterie knew better.79
These “circles” are not naturally occurring phenomena. Politicians, bureaucrats, and generals make
them. Agreement with the policy is generally the criteria for admission to the circle. Groupthink rules.
Once inside the circle, groupthink is compounded by
the kind of “participant compliance” found by experts
like Dr. Muller Weitzenhoffer in stage hypnosis carnival acts, wherein members are compliant because of
the social pressure felt in the environment constructed
in the briefing room.80
The most disturbing interpretation of Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan is that senior leaders had already formed a consensus of what they wanted to do
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in a given foreign policy situation to fit it into a larger, overarching ideology, and were not interested in
contrary views and advice. It is well-documented, for
example, that then-Secretary of Defense McNamara
wanted a war in Vietnam and deliberately withheld
critical information about the second (nonexistent) attack in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 4, 1964.81 It is also
a well-known and well-documented part of the history of the run-up to the invasion of Iraq that within
48 hours of the attacks of September 11, 2001, thenSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instructed his
intelligence analysts to “find a connection to Iraq.”82
Another unlearned strategic lesson of Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan is the need to open the “circles.”
Indeed, perhaps law should require it in order to increase transparency, give American civilian experts
from outside of government a greater opportunity to
provide advice and counsel, and counterbalance administration war hawks. The genetic inbreeding of
foreign policy seldom ends well.
The U.S. military has influence over all of these potential pitfalls in deciding foreign policy. Perhaps more
so than is the case in any other mature democracy, the
U.S. military is itself included in the formulation of
policy. In most democracies, foreign policy is crafted
by civilian elements of a nation’s foreign ministry in
consultation with elected leadership, and, if a solution
to a problem is believed to involve military operations,
the military leadership of that country is then called
in and tasked with carrying out the intent of government. In the United States, senior military leadership
is involved in policymaking from the beginning. This,
perhaps not surprisingly, has resulted in the foreign
policy of the United States arriving at military solutions more often than is the case with most of our
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democratic allies around the world. Whether or not
it is the result of the military-industrial complex that
President Dwight Eisenhower warned the American
people about, the U.S. Government prioritizes war
over peace. There are more military personnel playing in military bands today for military parades than
there are State Department diplomats in total around
the world trying to prevent conflict.83
But as a result of this greater engagement in policymaking, the U.S. military is poised, almost uniquely
among our friends in the world, to be able to push
back against all of the potential systemic flaws in decisionmaking that involve the use of military force. If
the State Department, the National Security Council,
and the CIA are not consulting outside academic experts, the Department of Defense certainly can. In a
political system in which the military is not simply
given a tasking but in fact helps craft the tasking, it has
considerable bureaucratic leverage in the final product. One must ask: Why was the U.S. military willing,
even eager, to rush into Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
Iraq with ground troops and carry out complex military operations in those countries without inviting top
experts into the room who would have said, “No, you
really don’t want to do that”? Real leadership means
surrounding yourself with people who will tell you
your plan is bad, not sycophants eager to tell you it is
great. In the end, if all else fails, as retired Marine officer Frank Hoffmann suggests, “When civilian policy
masters will not establish the necessary conditions for
strategic success, military officers can retire, resign, or
request reassignment.”84
When the problem is a military one, the confidence, aggressive spirit, and determination to find a
way to win embodied by American military and naval
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officers are the qualities that make the United States
a deadly foe in battle. When the problem is political,
however, they can become an impediment to strategic vision. American military and naval officers are
taught from their first day in training to take care of
the men and women under their command and not
to squander their lives. In total, 65,069 American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines lie dead from the
wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, all of which
were predictable and predicted strategic failures. As
this book has shown, they are all dead because the
“circle,” as McNamara termed it, was closed, experts
were deliberately excluded from policymaking because they did not concur with prevailing groupthink,
and senior officers went along for the ride to do their
best with the mission they were given. The most outspoken critics of America’s military, like Lieutenant
General Herbert McMaster,85 retired Colonel Andrew
Bacevich,86 and former Marine Lieutenant Colonel
Frank Hoffman, have criticized the military establishment, or the officer corps, for not standing up to civilian leaders, for being too willing to try to get the job
done, or for being, in Hoffman’s harsh words, “yes
men.”87 Some extreme critics have even gone as far as
suggesting that America is becoming a new Sparta,
where endless wars give professional officers a chance
to prove their skills and reach higher rank.88
The correct courses of action—leaving Diem in
power and helping him find an acceptable path to reunification, possibly under a “one country, two systems” approach of the type used in Hong Kong, for
example; allowing Afghanistan’s king to return to the
throne as 75 percent of the country demanded, and
then allowing the Afghans to sort out their own government; and leaving Saddam Hussein in power as an
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unsavory alternative to obviously far worse potential
futures—were, in fact, all recommended by experts in
each case before these decisions were implemented.
The cost in blood and national treasure resulting from
not listening to them is almost incalculable. At the end
of the day, each of these tragedies was the result of an
almost willful overreach of national power in countries which were not and are not yet nations. What historian George Herring wrote of Vietnam could stand
as the epitaph of all three interventions: “an enduring
testament to the pitfalls of interventionism and the
limits of power.”89 The lessons for senior military officers are clear, but the question remains: will they be
learned this time?
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APPENDIX I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY GUIDE
TO THE ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCY

Figure I-1. Title Page for the
Central Intelligence Agency Guide to the
Analysis of Insurgency.
The following text is transcribed from the Central
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” a handbook intended to provide
government analysts with a way of interpreting the
progression of events on the ground when making intelligence assessments for the U.S. Government. The
guide is unclassified and was released to the public
many years ago. The CIA text is transcribed verbatim
and is intersticed with observations (in italics) pertaining to the situation in Afghanistan in December
2014. Using these U.S. Government metrics and publicly available reportage, by any reasonable, objective
assessment of the facts on the ground, the Taliban is in
the “late stages of a successful insurgency.”
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Ability to protect supporters and local population:
•	Do government forces adequately protect local
supporters on a 24-hour basis?
Afghanistan: No
•	
Do national army “reaction forces” respond
quickly and effectively to reports of guerrilla
attacks on local civilian militias or pro-government communities?
Afghanistan: Rarely, if ever.
•	Do government officials sleep in villages, or do
they seek protection of armed camps?
	
Afghanistan: Government officials never sleep outside district centers, it would be suicidal. Insurgent
forces always sleep among the local population.
•	
Are national army troops/guerrillas viewed
locally as threatening outsiders or as helpful
allies?
	
Afghanistan: 50 percent of the Afghan population
say they view the police with “some” or “a great deal
of fear.” The army is generally viewed positively. The
Taliban overall has the support of approximately a
third of the population, mostly in the south where
the insurgency is most active.
Local military effectiveness:
•	Are local civilian militia aggressive in small
unit, day and night patrolling, or do they avoid
contact with the enemy?
	
Afghanistan: Where they exist, local militias are defensive in nature. Patrolling is not done.
•	Do government/guerilla forces have an effective intelligence network at the local level?
	
Afghanistan: This is difficult to assess. The effectiveness of both enemy and government intelligence
networks may be roughly equal.
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•	
How disciplined are government/insurgent
forces in combat? Do they usually recover the
weapons and bodies of fallen comrades before
retiring?
	
Afghanistan: Insurgent forces are highly disciplined. They rarely, if ever, leave weapons or casualties behind. Government police checkpoints are often
wiped out to the last man. Government bodies are
left behind, and are usually stripped of weapons and
ammunition by the insurgents.
•	Are local government/insurgent forces capable
of executing coordinated attacks against nearby
enemy strongpoints?
	
Afghanistan: Insurgent forces routinely execute coordinated attacks against government strongpoints.
There were more than 6,000 attacks in the last year.
Government forces rarely, if ever, operate offensively and show little aggressive spirit.
Late-Stage Indicators of Successful Insurgencies.

Figure I-2. Late-Stage Indicators of Successful
Insurgencies.
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An analysis of historical cases indicates that a common pattern of behavior and events characterizes the
defeat of a government battling an insurgency. This
pattern comprises four categories of developments:
•	Progressive withdrawal of domestic support
for the government.
•	Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government.
•	Progressive loss of government over population and territory.
•	Progressive loss of government coercive
power.
These categories include a total of 14 interrelated
and mutually reinforcing indicators of prospective insurgent victory. Historically, the indicators have not
appeared in any single order. Moreover, while no single indicator can be considered conclusive evidence
of insurgent victory, all indicators need not be present for a government defeat to be in progress. While
the indicators are designed to identify a progression
of events typical of the final stages of a successful insurgency, this progression is not inevitable. Effective
government countermeasures can block the evolution
of an insurgency and shift its momentum. Within the
four categories, the indicators are:
Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government:
•	Withdrawal of support by specific, critical segments of the population:
	
Afghanistan: Much of the ethnic Pashtun segment
of the population supports the insurgents. Very few
of other ethnic group members do so.
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•	Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy:
	
Afghanistan: The regime has never had any legitimacy in the Weberian sense.
•	Popular perception of insurgents as leading nationalists:
	
Afghanistan: Not applicable. The insurgents are
viewed by their fellow ethnic group members as
waging a legitimate jihad.
•	Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposition groups to the
insurgency:
A
 fghanistan: No. Some militias have changed sides
and some police have defected, but there have been no
major defections of other elements of the counterinsurgents.
Progressive withdrawal of international support
for the government:
•	Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies.
	
Afghanistan: The withdrawal of more than 90 percent of foreign troops from Afghanistan can only be
interpreted as such.
•	Increasing international support for the insurgents.
	
Afghanistan: No. Only Pakistan continues to support the insurgents.
Progressive loss of government over population
and territory:
•	Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control:
Afghanistan: Beyond any reasonable dispute.
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• Escalation of guerilla/terrorist violence:
	Afghanistan: Beyond any reasonable dispute. Guerilla violence reached record levels in 2014.
•	Increasing inability of government to protect
supporters/officials from attack:
	
Afghanistan: Beyond any reasonable dispute. Government casualties and attacks in the capital city
reached record levels in 2014.
•	National economy increasingly weakened by
insurgent violence:
	
Afghanistan: Beyond any reasonable dispute. The
Afghan economy has been shrinking every year
since 2011.
Progressive loss of government coercive power:
•	Military plots or coups against the government:
	
Afghanistan: No. The rumor of a coup was reported
by the New York Times in 2014.
• Armed guerilla forces multiplying in size:
Afghanistan: Beyond any reasonable dispute.
•	Lack of sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency:
Afghanistan: Beyond any reasonable dispute.
•	Government seriously negotiating sharing of
power with rebels:
	
Afghanistan: The government would very much like
to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with the
jihadis. In January 2015, President Ghani offered
three cabinet ministries to the Taliban.1 However,
the Taliban are convinced of inevitable victory and
are not interested in negotiations beyond the release
of their prisoners.
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APPENDIX II
RELATIVE COMBAT POWER:
WARGAMING BEYOND ONE-TO-ONE
Calculating military outcomes in Afghanistan is
too often reduced to a simple 1:1 numerical ratio. For
example, “there are 10,000 counterinsurgent troops
and 2,500 insurgents,” wherein these are thought of
as interchangeable units of equal strength. However,
this kind of reductionist representation of the situation is dangerous and highly misleading, because it
completely omits any qualitative factors. No one
would seriously suggest that 100 U.S. Army Rangers
were the equal of 100 Afghan national policemen, for
example. Yet, in most discussions of Afghan security,
these forces would be routinely reduced to: “100”
and “100.”
To address this, some innovative wargames of the
1970s developed a way to build in quantifiable factors of mobility, range, power in attack, and tenacity
in defense for different units. For example, the 101st
Airborne at Bastogne would receive a high rating for
defense. This would make it harder in the wargame to
defeat that unit in an attack. Conversely, a 1945 German Volksturm unit comprised of boys and old men
with outdated weapons might receive a defensive factor of zero, because the wartime experience of such
last ditch units was that they did not put up much
of a fight and had no tactical power. A World War II
wargame in which a battalion of 101st Airborne soldiers was the same as a Volksturm battalion was unrealistic, and this innovation made it more realistic. To
give another example, a Waffen SS division would be
given a high attack rating because they were generally
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populated with fanatical, highly motivated, tactically
skilled, well-trained, obedient and well-equipped
fighters.

Examples of wargame counters, top, and an explanation of the factors represented as numbers in
each of the four corners, bottom. The factors rate
the unit shown in terms of its power in attack,
power in defense, mobility, and the range of its
weapons.

Figure II-1. Examples of Wargame Counters and
an Explanation of the Factors.
The same principle could be applied to Afghanistan today. A Navy SEAL team and a squad of Afghan
National Police (ANP) might be the same number of
men, but they should not be evaluated militarily on a
1:1 numerical equivalent basis in analyzing outcomes
in Afghanistan. It would also be unrealistic, and it
would not reflect battlefield realities. In the same way,
in a broader sense, referring to the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) as a single unified number of
men in uniform is equally misleading. The Afghan
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National Army (ANA) is stronger militarily than the
ANP, and agglomerating them as “128,500 ANSF”
rather than “75,000 ANA and 53,500 ANP” is highly
misleading—just as agglomerating, for example, one
Waffen SS Panzer Division (20,000 men and 500 Tiger
tanks) and three Volksturm divisions (30,000 old men
and boys with civilian weapons) as simply “50,000
men” would be misleading in a wargame.
In an effort to illustrate and reinforce this point
graphically in a format that will make the most sense
to a military readership, the author used unclassified
data from open sources to evaluate the ANA, ANP,
ALP, ANA Commandos, an ANA Company reinforced by a U.S. Special Forces A Team, and a 100-man
Taliban battle group in the same format introduced
by the 1970s wargames, rating their mobility, range
of firepower, and tenacity in offense and defense (i.e.,
combat power). Figure II-2 shows, purely for purposes of illustration, how the relative combat power
and tactical factors might compare. Thus, the Taliban
company counter could easily attack and overcome an
ANP platoon counter, as they regularly do in real life,
but could not successfully attack an ANA company
reinforced by a U.S. Special Forces A Team, because
its associated close air support is overwhelming in the
defense rating—as is true in real life.
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Notional game counters for the ANA, ANP, ALP,
Taliban, ANA Commando, and an ANA company
reinforced by a U.S. Special Forces A Team, to illustrate the differences in military tactical strength and
combat value of the units. The asterisk indicates that
U.S. forces no longer engage in offensive operations.

Figure II-2. Notional Game Counters.
The purpose of this Appendix is to attempt to add
nuance to the analysis of the current security situation
in Afghanistan by introducing qualitative thinking
into a discussion that today is dominated by quantitative thinking.
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